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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS ) 
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross ) 
Respondents. ) 
LA CLERK 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 36322-2009 
'Ada County Docket No. 2006-14241 
LAW CLERI( 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPC 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant on December 22, 21 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent/Cross-Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMI 
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include 
document listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Answer and Counterclaim (Plaintiffs Exhibit 102), file-stamped June 20,2003. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the docum 
listed below, filestamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS: 
1. Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff, file-stamped January 17: 
2007; 
2. Affidavit of Eric R. Clark, file-stamped January 17,2007; 
3. Affidavit of Robert A. Wallace, file-stamped January 17,2007; and 
4. Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff, 
stamped March 16,2007. 
DATED this L day of December 2009. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
lit/StePhen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
AUGMENTATION CORD 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS ) 
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross ) 
Respondents. ) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD . 
Supreme Court Docket No. 36322-2009 
Ada County Docket No. 2006-14241 
APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL IN 
RESPONSE TO ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION and an 
AFFIDA VIT OF GARY L. QUIGLEY IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL were filed by counsel for Appellants on June 28,2010. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT 
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the 
documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Order Re: Confidentiality of Plaintiff's Medical Records and Information, file-stamped 
February 4, 2008; 
2. Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped December 21,2007; 
3. Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped May 5, 2008; 
4. Affidavit of G. Scott Gatewood, file-stamped May 5, 2008; 
5. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped May 5, 2008; 
6. Affidavit of Gary Stephen, file-stamped May 27,2008; 
7. Affidavit of Counsel Filed in Opposition to Defendant Gatewood's Motion for Summary 
JUdgment, file-stamped May 27, 2008; 
8. Affidavit of Cathy L. Naugle, Esq., file-stamped May 27, 2008; 
9. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Gatewood's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, file-stamped May 27,2008; 
10. Defendant's Reply memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, file-stamped 
June 2, 2008; 
11. Motion to Reconsider, file-stamped June 24, 2008; 
RECORD Docket No. 36322-2009 
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12. Affidavit of Charles C. Crafts in Support of Motion to Reconsider, file-stamped June 24, 
2008; 
13. Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Memorandum, file-stamped July 28, 2008; 
14. Plaintiffs Supplemental Pre-Trial Memorandum, file-stamped August 1,2008; 
15. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine re: Evidence of Illegal Conduct, file-stamped August 6, 
2008; 
16. Motion to Remove Bob Wallace as Guardian and/or Not Refer to Him as Guardian 
During Trial, file-stamped August 7, 2008; 
17. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remove Bob Wallace as Guardian and/or Not 
Refer to Him as Guardian During Trial, file-stamped August 7,2008; 
18. Plaintiff s Bench Brief Re: Relevant Evidence and Request for Continuing Objection, 
file-stamped August 14,2008; 
19. Motion to Reconsider Pursuant to IRCP II(a)(2)B, file-stamped October 17, 2008; 
20. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to IRCP II(a)(2)B, 
file-stamped October 17,2008; 
2l. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendant Gatewood's Motion to Reconsider, 
file-stamped November 12,2008; and 
22. Motion for Stay of Execution on Money Judgment, file-stamped June 16,2009. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall submit to this Court, within 
seven (7) days of the date ofthis order, the items listed below as EXHIBITS, items which was NOT 
submitted with this Motion, and not contained in this record on appeal: 
I. All trial exhibits submitted to the district court shall be lodged with the Supreme Court 
for purposes of facilitating the review of the issues raised on this appeal. 
DATED this ~ day of July 2010. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, lerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
III 
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J. 
3 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH 
4 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
5 
6 
9 
a 
12 
13 
14 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
DENNIS SALLAZ, and SCOTT 
GATEWOOD, 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case OC 06 424 
ORDER RE: CONFIDENTIALITY OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL RECORDS 
AND INFORMATION 
5 It is hereby ordered that the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's treating physician(s), or 
6 other health care providers, or their agents or employees, will release. provide, disclose 
or furnish medical records that pertain the Plaintiff. Pamela Joerger Stephen. 
8 the Defendants' Attorney(s) or Law or their duly authorized agents and 
9 
employees, certain "protected health information" (PHI) as that term IS defined in the 
20 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 996 (HIPAA), and the related 
21 
federal Privacy Regulations. 
22 
23 
Defendants' attorney(s) shall be allowed by the Plaintiff to inspect a/l medical 
24 records in the possession of the Plaintiff or her attorney or in the alternative shall pay 
25 all charges for copies or duplicates of any PHI received pursuant to this order that are in 
26 the possession of the Plaintiff or her counsel. Copies of any medical records obtained 
ORDER - CASE NO. CVOC0614241 • PAGE 1 
by the Defendants from physicians or health care professionals that are not in the 
2 possession of the Plaintiff or her attorney shall be paid for by the Plaintiff. The 
3 Defendants shall provide the Plaintiff with duplicate copies of any medical records 
4 received from physicians or heath care providers that pertain to the Plaintiff. 
5 Defendants' attorney(s) shall keep and maintain the privacy and confidentiality of 
6 the Plaintiff's PHI to the greatest extent reasonable possible. In so doing, the 
7 Defendants' attorney(s) shall not provide, use, disclose, disseminate or allow access 
any such PHI by any person, firm or entity except as may be necessary solely for the 
9 
evaluation and/or defense of the above referenced case, and further shall only provide, 
o 
use, disclose, disseminate or allow access to the minimum amount necessary for such 
1 , 
12 
purpose(s). 
13 Upon conclusion of the above-referenced case, the Defendants' attorney(s) shall 
14 retrieve and return to the Plaintiff's attorney(s) any and all of the Plaintiff's PHI, and all 
15 copies or duplicates thereof, within their possession, custody or control. n so doing, 
6 
7 
8 
9 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
the Defendants' attorney(s) shall provide a verified certification that all such PHI has 
been retrieved from any and all third party sources to whom the Plaintiff's PHI was 
supplied, provided, disclosed or disseminated by or through the Defendants' attorney(s) 
or Law Firm. 
DATED THIS _---+ __ day of February, 
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MICHAEL McLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
o 
12 
13 
14 
5 
8 
9 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF lRVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the t day of February, 2008, I caused 
to be served via United States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
Attorney for Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD .. 
And Scott Gatewood 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC 
410 S. Orchard, 5te. 120 
Boise, 1083705 
Attorney for Dennis Sallaz. 
ERIC R. CLARK 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, 10 83616 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ROBERT WALLACE 
ATTORNEY LAW 
815 Park Blvd. #130 
Boise, idaho 83712 
Guardian ad litem for Plaintiff 
ORDER· CASE NO. CVOC0614241 - PAGE 3 
DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District 
.JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
ISB #5344 
16 1 t h Avenue S., Suite 113 
Nampa, ID 83651 
(208) 465-9839 Telephone 
(208) 465-9834 Facsimile 
Defendant Scott 
O£C 2 1 lool 
J.IJAV15 NAVARRO, CI~rK 
". ,,~fCATHY J. SIEHL 
. ~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
attorney 
CASE NO. CV OC 0614241 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
moves Honorable pursuant to Rule the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
a summary judgment said Defendant's favor. dismissing the complaint of the Plaintiff with 
prejudice on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and said Defendant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This motion is based upon the records, files, and pleadings in the above-entitled action. 
Counsel for the Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, reserves the right to supplement this Motion 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
with Affidavits and a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and is requesting and extension of time to file the Memorandum in support of the Summary 
Judgment motion on the basis that discovery is incomplete at this time. 
~ 
DATED this day of December. 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this -A day of December, 2007, that a true and correct 
copy of the forgoing document was served by the following method indicated below to each of 
Clark 
Attorney at 
Box 2504 
Eagle. 8361 
(208) 
Charles 
Attorney at Law 
410 ()rchard Suite 
Boise, 1D 83705 
Fax: (208) 389-2109 
Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Mail, Postage 
Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
.k::LF acsimile 
~ //Jo~Prior (./ 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~\~e 2 
JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
ISB #5344 
16 1 i h Avenue S., Suite 113 
Nampa, ID 83651 
(208) 465-9839 Telephone 
(208) 465-9834 Facsimile 
Attorney tor Defendant Scott Gatewood 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV OC 0614241 
Plaintiff, AMENDED MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
and 
Defendants. 
PRIOR. attorney for Defendant and 
moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule the Idaho Rules of CivIl Procedure, 
a summary judgment in said Defendant's favor, dismissing the complaint of the Plaintiff WIth 
prejudice on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and said Defendant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page I 
This motion is based upon the records, tiles, and pleadings in the above-entitled action. 
Counsel for the Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, reserves the right to supplement this Motion 
with Affidavits and a Memorandum in Support of Defendanfs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(".r_ 
DATED this ~ day of May, 2008. 
I J 
Vttorney tor Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r/ < 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this _--""--_ day of May, 2008, that a true and correct copy 
of the forgoing document was served by the following method indicated below to each of the 
following: 
Clark 
Attorney at Law 
Box 2504 
Eagle, 836 
(208) 
Charles Crafts 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. Orchard St.. Suite 
Boise, ID 83705 
Fax: (208) 389-2109 
Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mai I 
Facsimile 
Mail, Postage 
Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
YFacsimile 
AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
ISB#5344 
16 12th Avenue S., Suite 113 
Nampa, ID 83651 
(208) 465-9839 
Fax (208) 465-9834 
Attorney for Defendant 
DISTRICT 
·~·"·---_..P.M ....... ____ _ 
MAY 0 52008 
J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clark. 
ByJ.EAALE 
DEPtJry 
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAGISTRA TE DIVISION 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV DC 0614241 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
August, 2004, on the day of her divorce trial, Plaintiff agreed to a divorce settlement 
with her ex-husband. Plaintiff now claims that the she was not competent to enter into an 
agreement, therefore did not legitimately enter into the agreement and that the settlement 
was otherwise unfair. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Gatewood was negligent in encouraging the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page I 
Plaintiff to accept the divorce settlement and in his failure to fully investigate and pursue for 
more resulted in the Plaintiff getting less than her share of the community assets. Plaintiff, 
under oath, testified the she understood the terms of the settlement and agreed to comply 
with the terms of the settlement. Thus, Plaintiff's claim is barred by judicial estoppel. 
Further, that the Plaintiff's divorce settlement could have been fairer or the property and 
not render negligem, ,as matter 
law, Mr. Gatewood's informed decision to recommend that the divorce settlement was 
based on his reasonable research of the law and facts of the case, does not amount 
negligence. Because Plaintiff's claims are barred by judicial estoppel, and because Plaintiff 
cannot prove negligence or damages, as a matter of law, her complaint should be dismissed 
and Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
retained Defendant. 
matters related to her divorce from her ex-husband, Gary Allen Stephen. 
represent 
during initial 
conversations, Plaintiff indicated that she was '"bi-polar". however, she was always able 
case preCIse details. attached 
based upon the Plaintiff's representation the facts, an Answer and 
Counterclaim was filed. The Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment these issues and facts and 
never did it appear that the Plaintiff did not have a full understanding of the discussions or 
documents being filed. 
3. That throughout the pending divorce, if at any time the Plaintiff would report 
that she had received treatment or any medication, at subsequent meetings, she was always 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
found to be alert, lucid, and completely able to discuss her case in detail without confusion. 
The Plaintiff never behaved or acted in a manner that would suggest that she was confused or 
unclear on her positions or on her understanding of the issues during the case. When the 
Plaintiff and Mr. Gatewood would debate the merits of her case, she was always able to state 
arguments clearly and consistently. 
was pending, opposmg 
interrogatories for the Plaintiff to answer. Upon Mr. Gatewood's request to the Plaintiff, 
responding to the questions presented in the discovery requests. Plaintiff 
sixteen pages of handwritten answers to the discovery responses. They were written 
in plain consistent language and displayed her precise knowledge and understanding of the 
issues regarding property in her divorce case. (See attached Exhibit "B") 
That in August, 2004, the Plaintiff participated in mediation with Attorney 
purposes settling her divorce. those negotiations were ongoing, 
wouin send email communications to my office providing an update 
received emails on August August and August 2004, just prior to 
m communications that suggested 
and comprehend the proceedings. (See attached 
That prior to her divorce trial, Plaintiff was familiar with the property and debts 
issues that would be raised at trial. 
7. That on the day of the trial, August 5, 2004, Mr. Gatewood met with Ms. 
Stephen, opposing counsel and her husband, Gary Stephen at the Ada County Courthouse prior 
to the time set for hearing. During these meetings the parties were able to come to an 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3 
agreement regarding the pending issues in their divorce. The Plaintiff was an active participant 
in the meeting and discussion and was in agreement to the decisions reached. 
8. That on the day of trial, August 5, 2004, Plaintiff agreed to the final Judgment 
Decree and all of the tenns were placed on the record in front of Judge Day. The Plaintiff 
she understood and agreed to the final decree. Towards the end of the hearing 
T"""nf'rI that wanted include 
return to her maiden name, which further indicated that she was completely 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard for Summary Judgment 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary jUdgment is proper 
IJ.:>lVl.'" on and affidavits show there is no genuine issue 
movmg party entitled to judgment as a matter 
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brown Caldwell 
898 
Supreme has adopted the foHowmg standard for granting 
JUdgment: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party 
who fails to make a showing suffiCient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 
proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any 
material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 
of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 4 
v. Sf. Luke's Reg '/ Med. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 509, 768 P.2d 786, 772 (1988) 
temphasis in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). 
case 
Idaho has adopted the United States Supreme Court's standard in Celotex v. 
317,322 1986), which mandates summary judgment if the nonmoving party 
establish the existence an element that is essential to 
bear burden proof at As the court stated Jarman 
Idaho 952, 842 P.2d (Ct. App. 1992): 
party opposing a motion for summary judgment has the burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the facts, and a 
genuine issue of fact is not created by a mere scintilla of evidence. Summary 
judgment is proper if the evidence before the court on the motion would warrant 
a directed verdict if the case were to go [to] triaL Id Further, a nonmoving 
party's failure to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. Celotex 
supra; see also 56( c). "In such a situation, there can 
'genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily 
renders other facts immateriaL" Celotex Catrett, at 
at \ emphasis added: citation omitted). 
Idaho 
7 Idaho 1285, 299- 300 990): 
Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In opposing the motion, "'a mere scintilla of evidence or slight doubt as to facts' 
is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment." See Samuel v. 
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000) (citing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 
Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437, 439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998) (emphasis added). The 
nonmoving party "must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 50, 
868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994) (emphasis added). 
Sununary judgment an efficient resolution to a case. Ce/otex court. 
[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded as a disfavored procedural 
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination every 
action. 
at (citation omitted). Under these established rules of summary 
judgment, Plaintiff cannot produce evidence that is sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. Rather, at best, Plaintiff can only show a scintilla of speculation to support her 
not suffiCient to create a genuine issue purposes 
at 
cannot succeed as matter and Defendant' motion 
granted. 
JudiciaHy Estopped from Asserting a Legal Malpractice Claim 
Therefore Plaintiffs Cause of Action Must Fail. 
Idaho courts have adopted the doctrine judicial estoppel holding: 
sometimes also known as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions, 
precludes a party form gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second 
advantage by taking an incompatible position .... '" McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 927 
P .2d 1222, 1226 (1997) (citation omitted). "[JJudicial estoppel "rests upon the principle that a 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6 
litigant should not be pennitted to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in 
another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise." Vogel v. Touhey, 
151 Md.App. 682, 707,828 A.2d 268,283 (2003) (citations omitted). "Judicial estoppel [also] 
ensures "the 'integrity of the judicial process' by 'prohibiting parties from deliberately changing 
positions according to the exigencies of the moment[T" Finally, Idaho couns have held 
party the mconslstem 
either did or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to 
adopting initial position." McKay, supra, Idaho at at (emphasis 
In McKay, supra, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against St. 
Luke's Regional Center and her obstetrician after her son was born with severe birth defects. 
During the course of the lawsuit, the plaintiff's attorney and guardian ad litem negotiated a 
and accepted the 
disagreed, 
cou.rt that she understood 
plaintiff later filed a malpractice 
malpractice claim 
subsequent 
against 
consem. 
court granted defendant' motions summary judgment fInding 
that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting her malpractice claim. Affinning the 
court, the Idaho Supreme Court found that at the minor's compromise hearing the plaintiff, 
with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances underlying the settlement, accepted the 
proposed settlement without reserving any objections. McKay, 130 Idaho at 154, 937 P.2d at 
1228. the court further held: "By taking the position of agreeing to the settlement, [the 
EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 7 
plaintiff] obtained an advantage (the settlement) from one party (the medical malpractice 
defendant). She cannot now repudiate that statement made in open court in/ront 0/ a judge, 
by means 0/ her inconsistent positions, obtain recovery against another party, arising 
out same transaction." ld. (emphasis added). 
Lamb v, Manweiier, 129 Idaho 269, 923 P.2d 976 996), the plaintiff, an 
to two charges and was sentenced to 
Subsequent to his sentencing, the plaintiff sued his former attorney, the 
defendant, alleging that due to the defendant's negligent advice, the plaintiff entered guilty 
was sentenced. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant 
holding that the plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence to rebut his admissions of guilt 
or to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact regarding his guilt. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals reversed. 
affirmed monon 
plaintiff could not establish that defendant's was 
damages to the plaintiff. support this holding, the court noted that the district 
plamtiff during which the court thoroughly 
pleas were entered not 
Manweiler, 29 Idaho at 273, P.2d at 980. The court stated: 
[The plaintiff] specifically acknowledged his understanding that when he pled 
guilty he gave up his constitutional right to a trial, the presumption of innocence, 
the right of confrontation and cross-examination, and the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination. He had no questions about those rights, said he 
understood them, and voluntarily and intentionally waived those rights. 
Additionally, [the plaintiff] indicated that his education consisted of high school 
and two years of college. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 8 
The district judge specifically addressed the question of whether [the plaintiff] 
could withdraw his guilty pleas: 
COURT: Do you realize that is I accept your pleas of guilty they are final pleas? 
will not allow you to withdraw those pleas like I did in the other cases? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
court 
plaintiffl claims attorney said, those statements cannot be 
proximate cause of any damages to him. He was properly informed in court by 
the judge as to his rights and the consequences of his guilty pleas. Specifically, 
could not withdraw those pleas. He acknowledged that he understood that 
fact, indicated he did not have questions, and said he stilI wanted to enter pleas 
guilty. Thereafter he pled guilty. The district judge engaged him in extensive 
discussion of the charges and his decision to proceed with the guilty pleas. The 
advice the court gave [the plaintiff], together with [the plaintiffs] clear 
indications that he understood the proceedings, supersedes any ideas he might 
have had before that he could withdraw the pleas. 
Because the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant's advice caused damage, the 
was 
estoppel, Plaintiff should not to claim 
settlement was unfair and Gatewood was negligent. allow Plaintiff 
mconsistent position she took accepting settlemem 
the accepting settlement 
allowing Plaintiff to claim the settlement was unfair and that Mr. Gatewood was 
negligent would offend the "integrity of the judicial process" by allowing Plaintiff to 
"deliberately [change] positions according to the exigencies of the moment." Vogel v. Touhey, 
151 MD.App. 682, 707, 828, A.2d 268, 283 (2003) (citations omitted). 
EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9 
Defendant Made and Informed Judgment Based on His Reasonable 
Research of the Law and Facts and Therefore, As a Matter of Law, 
Defendant was Not Negligent. 
In Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,4,981 
(1999) the Idaho Supreme Court, for the first time, explicitly addressed the 
court noted that the doctrine of judgmental immunity 
were made truth and upon an 
undertaking reasonable research of the relevant legal principles and 
the court stated: 
Rather than being a rule which grants some type of "immunity" to attorneys, [the 
judgmental immunity rule] appears to be nothing more than a recognition that if 
an attorney's actions could under no circumstances be held to be negligent, then a 
court may rule as a matter of law that there is no liability. 
Valley Potatoes, 133 Idaho at 5, 981 P.2d at 240. Thus, where an attorney acts in good 
makes an judgment based on reasonable research the law and fucts 
was not negligent. 
was 
awarded damages against the plaintiff the amount $546,506.79. Thereafter. 
agamst defendants, alleging that 
contest damages underlying case. days prior 
summary judgment hearing, defendants submitted an affidavit alleging that the defendant's 
alleged malpractice involved tactical decisions protected by the judgmental immunity doctrine. 
The plaintiffs moved to strike the affidavit on the grounds that it was untimely and did not give 
them time to respond. The district court denied the motion to strike. After considering the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 10 
defendants' affidavit, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment 
finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact that defendants' allegedly negligent 
conduct was actually an informed tactical decision protected by the judgmental immunity 
mal court, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendants' 
was time Idaho Procedure 
trial court should not have considered the affidavit The court further held 
supporting affidavit, summary judgment was improper because 
was no evidence supporting the defendants' argument that their alleged negligence was an 
informed tactical decision. 
Plaintiff fails to recognize that there is no such thing as a perfect settlement. 
amount of a compromise settlement is often an educated guess of the amount that can be 
opponent was willing pay accepL 
whether maximum settlement or 
omitted); see 
dissatisfied settlement does not justify allowing 
to second-guess theIr attorney based on speculative allegations that their attorney could have 
obtained more out of settlement. See Scholmer v. Perina, 173, Wis.2d 889, 894, 473 N.W.2d 6, 
9 (1991). The factors that an attorney "should have" considered before recommending a 
settlement and the amount of money that a case "could have" settled for are determinations that 
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are subject to infinite speculation. Similarly, in the present case, there are an infInite number of 
factors that Mr. Gatewood could have considered as well as an infinite number of ways that her 
case could have either settled or ended at trial. 
Because .Mr. Gatewood's actions were based on reasonable knowledge of the 
maner law, Gatewood was not negligent. Therefore, Plaintiff's 
Plaintiff's Cause of Action Must Fail Because Plaintiff Cannot Prove tbat 
Gatewood's Alleged Negligence was tbe Proximate Cause of Plaintiff's 
Idaho, it 1S well settled that III order to prove a claim legal malpractice 
party must show (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty 
on the part of the lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) that the failure to perform 
was proximate cause the damage suffered by the party. Nepanuseno v. Hansen. 
{ 1 
·:In,n,.,.,pv malpractice action. burden is upon plaintiff to show 
caused recover 
Idaho 
damages must based on more than sheer speculation. 
Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257,796 P.2d 134 (1990) (affirming summary judgment for the defendants 
where the plaintiffs proof of damage was speculative and therefore insufficient to support the 
plaintiffs malpractice claim). "Breach of duty causing only speculative harm is insufficient to 
create" a cause of action for legal malpractice. Willie Thompson v. Paul N Halvonik, 36 
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Cal.Appp.4th 657, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 142 (1995) (citation omitted). "'[D]amages may not be based 
upon sheer speculation or sunnise, and the mere possibility or even probability that damage will 
result from wrongful conduct does not render it actionable. '" ld. In proving a malpractice 
claim, the "burden must be on plaintiff ... to demonstrate by evidence rather than by conclusory 
that indeed suffered substantial financial loss." Murray Becker v. Julien, Blitz & 
4 
'Neil, supra, the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against his attorneys, 
failure take action his alienation affections case 
resulted recovering one-half what he should have recovered. 
trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants because it was "unable to find as a 
matter of law that [the defendants'] negligence [was) the proximate cause of [the plaintiff's] 
one-half of the alienation award .. " 'Neil, 118 Idaho at 261, 796 P.2d at 138. 
Idaho Supreme found that 
defendants' negligence caused diminution amount 
amount that would have awarded 
any Introduced 
would awarded absent the defendants' negligence would 
to speculative nature. because the plaintiff's alleged damages 
were speculative and inadmissible, the plaintiff could not support his malpractice claim and 
summary judgment was proper. 
Under the standard established in O'Neil, in order to prove her allegations of 
damage, Plaintiff will be required to engage in extensive speculation. Plaintiff cannot prove, 
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without extensive speculation, that, had she not settled, the court would have valued her and her 
ex-husband's assets and would have distributed the community property in a manner that would 
have resulted in a greater benefit to Plaintiff. 
Finally, under the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Lamb v. Manweiler, supra, 
Plaintiff cannot prove that Mr. Gatewood's allegedly negligent conduct caused damage to 
court's 
Plaintiffs adoption the settlement, 
discussion regarding the terms and effect the settlement. 
court engaged 
after 
discussion the settlement, Plaintiff, under oath, in open court, and in front 
understood the terms of the settlement and promised to abide 
those terms. Thus, regardless of any conduct by Mr. Gatewood, it was Plaintiff who, after a 
lengthy discussion by the court, indicated that she understood and accepted the terms of the 
settlement. Like the Plaintiff in Manweiler, "the advice the court gave [the plaintiff], together 
indications that she understood the proceedings, supersedes any ideas 
settlement was unfaiL Manweiler. Idaho at 
Gatewood those actionsl cannot 
damages cannot prove that 
was negligent that was the proximate cause Plaintiffs damages, as matter 
claim must fail and Mr. Gatewood's motion summary judgment should 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting that the divorce settlement was 
unfair. Further, Mr. Gatewood's recommendation to settle was an informed decision based on 
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the relevant law and facts of this case and therefore Mr. Gatewood was not negligent. Finally, 
Plaintiff cannot prove that, had things been done differently, she would have obtained a better 
settlement. Plaintiff cannot prove that the advice caused her damages. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
claim cannot succeed and, as a matter oflaw, Mr. Gatewood's motion for summary judgment 
_~ ___ day of May, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ of May, 2008, I caused a true copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to be served by the 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Box 2504 
Eagle, 83616 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Fax: (208) 389-2109 
Postage 
Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~acsimile 
t. ) Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
#Facsimile 
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EXHIBIT A 
\ 
FEE AGREEplENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, between SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., Attorneys and Counselors 
at Law, located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, P.O. Box 8956, Boise, !D. 83707, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Attorney") and PAMELA STEPHENS, (hereinafter referred to as "Client',). recites as follows: 
Thank you for engaging this office to represent you. You hereby retain us to represent your 
interests in connection with a divorce and related matters. This agreement will confmn such representation 
and indicate how services are provided and payment is to be made. 
We will represent you only in connection \\-ith the above matters(s), unless we agree to additional 
representation in \\-Tiring. 
We will be as available and prompt in responding to your caUs as our business permits. Our 
receptionist is here to take your calls from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. You may leave 
a message with her, or talk directly with our legal assistant appointed to this case. 
Our retainer for this case is S5000.00. (Title to 1990 Che\TOlet truck to be held in lieu of retainer 
un~il retainer is paid). We ',t;ill alviays attempt to negotiate and consult along with you to make every 
effort to settle this matter short of a trial and control costs. However, each case is uniGUe in its C',"T, 
circumstances. You agree that whatever work needs to be expended in the proper handling of your case, in 
our judgment, will be done and authorized by you. The hourly charge for our time is S200.00.You will be 
billed monthly for such excess. You agree to promptly pay an monthly invoices, which will include time 
spent and description work done. Unpaid balance shaH accrue interest at the rare 
18% per annum). 
h%per month 
If you fail to comply \\ith the above arrangements, we have the right to immediately stop 
performing legal work until the account is brought current, and we may also withdraw from further 
representation of you, as our Client, in any pending court cases. 
\Ve appreciate your expression of confidence in our fIrm and we look forward to representing you. 
If you have any questions or concerns during the course of our relationship, please discuss them with our 
offIce promptly-so they can be resolved. 
Attorney is under no obligation to appear on Client's behalf until said minimum fee has been 
PAID IN FULL. Client agrees that should Attorney be discharged from further representation at any point 
after the initial fee has been paid, Client is NOT entitled to a refund. 
, 
// 
/ 
ENFORCEABILITY: This Agreement shall be enforceable under the iaws of the State ofldaho. 
Should legal action be required to enforce this Agreement, Client agrees to pay any and all Attorney fees 
and costs incurred therefrom. No agreement other than as stated herein shall be valid and any amendment 
hereof must be in writing and signed by the parties to be enforceable. 
COSTS: Client agrees to pay ANY and ALL costs and out of pocket expenses incurred by 
Attorney, in addition to the RE~ AINER or other legal fees described above; if advanced by Attorney these 
costs shall be repaid by CJjent upon demand; these costs may include fees for inveStigators. witnesses, 
court reponers. travel expenses, fees of process service. as well as any and all other costs other than 
attorney fees. 
DATED: ~II~--.:.? 
Gbxj\-:LL1i ~JG ~ ---
CLIENT ATTORNEY 
Payment agreement as follows: 
PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN FULL no later than August 15,2003. Should the balance of this 
account exceed the retainer, the account balance is to be paid Offmomhly. 
agree to the terms described above. 
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EXHIBIT C 
Page 1 of 1 
Scott Gatewood 
From: "Steve Beer" <sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com> 
To: 
sent: 
"Scott Gatewood" <scott@sallazlaw.com>; "Ann Shepard" <annshepard@boiselaw.net> 
Monday. August 02.2004 3:35 PM 
Subject: Stephen Mediation 
We met today. We have divided all personal assets. We meet again tomorrow at 10 a.m. and Wednesday at 3 
p. m. Good chance we will have all wrapped up by trial date. I have a spreadsheet that wilt work for both of you 
as far as a trial exhibit, if it goes to trial. I think there is a 99% chance of full settlement. Steve. 
Stephen l. Beer 
302 W. Idaho Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T -208-336-2323 
F -208-336-9060 
sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com 
Page 1 of 1 
Scott Gatewood 
From: "Steve Beer" <sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com> 
To: 
Sent: 
"Scott Gatewood" <scott@sallazlaw.com>; "Ann Shepard" <annshepard@boiselaw.net> 
Tuesday, August 03,200411:07 AM 
Attach: StephenPamGary .xls 
Subject: Stephen mediation 
Pam faiied to show for mediation this morning. We have one more appointment set for 3:00 p.m. I am attaching 
the spreadsheet. 1 did not know what you had done on debts so the debt section may be incorrect. I also left the 
401 (k) blank because I don't know how the equalization is going to be paid. Steve. 
Stephen L. Beer 
302 W. Idaho Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T -208-336-2323 
F-208-336-9060 
sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com 
"'-0-'& _ ...... 
Scott Gatewood 
From: 
To: 
Sent: 
Subject: 
"Steve Beer" <sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com> 
"Ann Shepard" <annshepard@boiselaw.net>; "Scott Gatewood" <scott@sallazlaw.com> 
Wednesday, August 04, 2004 3:53 PM 
Stephen mediation 
Scott and Ann - we finished. There is a little more work for you to do, but it should resolve. Need to watch out for 
social security eligibility. I tried to call Hugh Mossman, but he is out until Monday. Steve 
Stephen L Beer 
302 W. Idaho Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T -208-336-2323 
F-208-336-9060 
sbeer@beer-cainlaw.com 
5/2004 
JOHN PRIOR 
Law Office of John Prior 
16 121h Avenue S., Suite 113 
Nampa, ID 83651 
Telephone: (208) 465-9&39 
Facsimile: (208) 465-9834 
SALL\Z & GATEWOOD LAW 
Attorney for Defendant G. SCOTT GATEWOOD 
[4\001 
NO.-----eF\liii1~~n~~:~$~s:-: 
A.M"_----:--' 
MAY 052008 
.J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk 
Byj.EARLE 
oEPtJTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COlfRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COlfNTY OF ADA 
JOERGER STEPHEN, 
) Civil No. CV OC 0614241 
Plaintiff, 
) AFFlDA VIT OF 
SCOTT GATEWOOD 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., ) 
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
S8 
Ada 
GATEWOOD, Being first duly sworn upon oath, deposel-. and states: 
That on or about August 5, 2004, was the attorney of record for Pamela Katherine Stephen m 
divorce proceedings in front the Honorable Judge Day in Ada County, Idaho. 
That prior to our hearing date I was aware and had informadon that Ms. Stephens and her husband 
had been involved in formal settlement negotiations with Steve Beer and hHd been able to resolve 
a significant number of issues regarding property settlement. 
3. On or about August 5, 2004, I met with Ms. Stephens, opposing counsel and her husband Gary 
AFFIDAvrr OF G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, P. I 
SALL\Z & GATEWOOD LAW 141 00 2 
Stephens at the Ada County Courthouse at a time prior to the time set for hearing in their case . 
During these meetings the parties were able to come to an agreement regarding the issues pending 
in their divorce. 
4. Ms. Stephens was an active participant in the meeting and discussion and was in agreement to the 
decisions reached. 
Upon agreeing to the tenns of settlement in the divorce, the parties and their respective counsel 
were present Courtroom of the Honorable Judge Day, where ir front of Judge Day we 
placed our agreement on the record. 
was present when Judge Day inquired of each party as to whether they a;5I"eed to the terms of the 
agreement and I witnessed and heard ~s. Stephens when she verbally a~:reed, in open court and 
on the record, to the terms of the divorce decree. 
7. Near the end of the proceedings, Ms. Stephens then whispered to me and indicated that she 
wanted me to add her request to have her legal name changed back to her maiden name. I asked 
the Court to add this additional request to the divorce decree, and wlthlJUt objection from the 
opposing side, Stephen stated her maiden name and spelled it for the record. 
have listened to a recording of the hearing in front of Judge Day and read the transcript of the 
same and have personal knowledge that they reflect accurately that Ms. Stephens agred to the 
terms of the divorce decree m open court in front Judge Day. 
DA TED ThS day of May, 2008. 
~4::~ ~ G. SCOTT GA TEWOOD 
() 51 e 5/2008 12: 07 FAX 208 336 1.~~ 3 
.j 
F~/ 
SALL\Z & GATEWOOD LAW 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To ~f~:~,thiS _~ day of May, 2008. 
",w.~,~ 
'.' 
~oru Y PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
,;:, .::... ~;;~g at Boise, Idaho '~f~bmmisslOn Expires: #~t3 
... 
I4J 003 
Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
ax: (208) 939-7 
Attorney tor PlaintitT 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC[AL DISTRICT OF THE 
OF £DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMEI ~A K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GATEWOOD. 
Defendants. 
the Plaintiff 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
GA TEWOOD'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
and throuah her attorney b • and [1 
memomndum in Opposition to Detendant Gatewood's Motion for Summary Judgment 
STANDARDFORSUMMARYJUDGMEN~ 
Contrary to Mr. Gatewood's argument, he bears the burden of establishing that no 
genuine issue of material tact exists, before Ms. Stephen has to respond. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
When faced with an appeal from a lower court's grant of a summary judgment 
motion, this Court reviews the lower court's ruling by employing the same 
standard properly applied by the lower court when originally ruling on the motion. 
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of Jaw." This Court liberally construes the record in tavor of 
the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in that party's favor. If reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, summary judgment 
must be denied. However, if the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material 
fact then summary judgment should be granted. 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material tact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. In order to meet its 
burden, the moving party must challenge in its motion and establish through 
evidence the absence o(any genuine issue of material fact on an element of the 
nonmoving party's case. If the moving party jails to challenge an element or fails 
to present evidence establishing the absence ofa genuine issue of material fact on 
that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the non-
moving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence. 
Idaho Schoolsfor Equal Educational Opportunity v. State, 132 fdaho 559, 564 ~ 565 ; 976 P.2d 
913, citing Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597. 600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997), 
(quoting from Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.2. i28 Idaho 71 718-19.918 583, 
587 -88 (1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)), (Emphasis in original), 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Gatewood has failed in his burden to establish he is entitled to judicial estoppel. 
the Court should deny the Motion on this issue outright as Gatewood failed to 
provide the Court with the transcript the August 5. 2004 hearing. While Gatewood cites 
itkKay v. Owen, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222, (1997), in which the Idaho Supreme Court 
obviously had the benefit of the Court transcript because the Court quoted from it in the Court's 
decision, Gatewood failed to provide this Court with a copy of the relevant transcript. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
(Gatewood not only has a copy of the transcript, but the audio recording as well, as he contends 
in paragraph 8 of his Affidavit.) All Gatewood provided to the Court was a self-serving 
statement in his affidavit that he had reviewed the transcript and contends that Ms. Stephen 
agreed to the settlement. 
Without the transcript, this Court has no way of knowing what actually transpired on the 
. s burden to provide the transcn pt support this 
affirmative defense and Gatewood failed to provide the requisite transcript, the Court must deny 
summary judgment on this issue. 
2. The application of judicial estoppel is not absolute. The Supreme Court in McKay 
also discussed criteria that would preclude the application of judicial estoppel under the 
appropriate circumstances. 
This decision does not mean that attorneys will never he accountahle for their 
negligence whenever there has been a settlement in the underlying transaction. a 
client does not learn grounds for. or facts gIving rise to. legal malpractice 
until after the settlement has been approved. the policies behind judicial estoppel 
not be furthered. and the doctrine should not be employed. For guidance 
purposes and to avoid misapplication of judicial estoppel, it should be made 
dear that the concept should only be applied when the party maintaining the 
inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge 
of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another 
way, the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party 
states under oath in open court, but also what that party knew, or should 
have known, at the time the original position was adopted. Thus, the 
knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the 
statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is "playing t~lst and 
loose" with the court. 
The situation would also be different, for example, if an attorney committed 
malpractice by neglecting to include a defendant in the complaint. In that case, 
assuming that the client was not aware of the malpractice before agreeing to the 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - 3 
settlement, the client may have a legal malpractice claim. The conduct giving rise 
to the legal malpractice claim. while potentially affecting the amount of the tinal 
settlement agreement, is not part and parcel of the settlement agreement. The 
client could still agree to the settlement while retaining the right to file a legal 
malpractice action . 
. HcKay j'. Owen, 130 Idaho at ,155. 
<l. Guardian. Ms. Stephen has provided the Court with an affidavit from her expert 
Stephen had 
certain medical conditions to Gatewood during their initial meeting (which Gatewood confirms 
his memorandum), Gatewood had a duty to investigate the circumstances of these disclosed 
conditions with Ms. Stephen's medical care providers and to determine whether or not Ms. 
Stephen needed a guardian to act on her behalf during her divorce proceedings. If Gatewood 
failed to investigate Ms. Stephen's medical conditions or contact her medical providers, then Ms. 
Naugle believes that Gatewood's conduct fell below the standard ofcare. i 
Under the circumstances, to prevail at summary judgment. Gatewood has the burden to 
that Stephen did not need a guardian and that she was able to fully understand the 
proceedings. While Gatewood acknowledges that Ms. Stephen disclosed her medical conditions 
10 and disclosed that was undergoing treatment conditions during her 
Gatewood offers no testimony that he ever investigated these conditions or contacted any Ms. 
Stephen's medical care providers. All that Gatewood offers is his lay opinion that he believed 
Ms. Stephen understood the proceedings. 
1 Naugle Aff Page 2, paras. 7 and 8. 
2 Gatewood Memorandum, page 2, para. I, and page 2-3, para. 3. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
If Ms. Stephen needed a guardian, and all facts before the Court indicate she did, then 
judicial estoppel cannot apply as Ms. Stephen was not "chargeable" with "full knowledge" of the 
facts. 
h. Spousal' Maintenance. Notwithstanding that failing seek a guardian under the 
circumstances precludes the application of judicial estoppel: there are other examples 
s negligence address paragraph \) f 
Ms. Stephen understands the lvlcKay decision does not act as a bar to legal malpractice claims 
just hecause there was a settlement or judgment. a relevant example. if Gatewood advised 
Ms. Stephen to agree to a settlement that did not include maintenance, but he thought it had, then 
his negligence would preclude the application of this principle. 
Gatewood stated a claim for spousal maintenance for Ms. Stephen in her Answer and 
Counterclaim,J and during the divorce proceeding. Gatewood filed a Motion tor Temporary 
Maintenance along with an Affidavit Pamela Stephen m Support Motion Temporary 
Mamtenance.-+ Curiously. however. the final decree) does not address spousal maintenance') 
The divorce decree indicates that hecause of the disparity the division commumty 
property. Stephen was to Stephen per month months as 
an "equalization" payment. Stephen owed Ms. Stephen $48.000.00 and was required to pay 
this amount back to Ms. Stephen over 24 months. This payment was not spousal maintenance. 
either temporary or long tenn, but a repayment to "equalize" the community property settlement. 
3 Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit A. 
oJ Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit B. 
5 Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit C. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - 5 
In response to discovery Ms. Stephen propounded to Gatewood in this case, Gatewood 
responded that he believed Ms. Stephen sued him " ... only after her temporary maintenance 
ended.',6 Additionally, Mr. Stephen testitied in his aftidavit that Gatewood called him late last 
year and said the same thing. 7 Two years after the divorce decree was entered and Gatewood 
thinks that Ms. Stephen was awarded "temporary maintenance"') While we don't have the 
benefit the transcript. as to m suppon therettJre 
we don't know whether or not Judge Day discussed spousal maintenance on the record, it is clear 
that Gatewood thinks that Ms. Stephen received maintenance. although she did not. a parties' 
attorney does not understand what transpired regarding a settlement, how in the world would a 
client have "full knowledge of the attendant facts" ~ the requisite standard for application of 
judicial estoppel? 
B. Mr. Gatewood has failed in his burden to establish he is entitled to ",judgmental 
immunity." 
Gatewood cites to Sun Valley Potatoes. v. Rosholt, Roherston & Tucker. Idaho 
98 i P.2d 236 ( (99). a case which this Court is mtimately familiar. and argues that 
entitled to summary judgment based on application '~judgmental immunity." was a case 
impression in Idaho application principle and the Supreme Court at1iculated 
understanding of the requisite elements. 
The "rule" as applied in other jurisdictions has been articulated in different 
ways.(fnl) Most commonly it appears that the courts have simply ruled that in 
6 Affidavit of CounseL Exhibit D. Answer to Interrogatory No.6. 
7 Affidavit of Gary Stephen, pages 2-3, paragraphs 15-17. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - 6 
certain circumstances an attorney is not liable "as a matter of law" and thus, the 
issue need not be submitted to a jury for decision. All courts acknowledge the 
standard of care with which all attorneys must comply and that is: they are held to 
that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and 
exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer. The courts have then held 
as a matter of law that an attorney cannot be held liable for failing to correctly 
anticipate the ultImate resolution of an unsettled legal principal. See, e.g., 
Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 46 Wash.App. 708, 735 P.2d 675.681 (1986). 
Other courts have stated that, in the context of litigation, an attorney will not be 
held liable for a mere error in judgment or trial tactics if the attorney acted in good 
faith and upon an informed judgment. See, e.g., Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648, 
532 N. W.2d 842, 847 (1995). The "non-liability" rule in both situations, however. 
is conditioned upon the attorney acting in good faith and upon an infonned 
judgment after undertaking reasonable research of the relevant legal principals and 
facts of the given case. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Ca1.3d 349. 118 Cal. Rptr. 
621, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (1975). In other words, an attorney must act with that 
degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and 
exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer. 
Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Roherston & Tucker, 133 Idaho at 4-5. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Although Gatewood cites to the ",'un Valley Potato case. he fails to provide 
with any substantiating facts to support the application of judgmental immunity to 
case. Defendants have identified a number standard care experts In 
discovery, Gatewood offers nothing to support his contention he acted with "that 
degree care, skilL diligence. and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised 
reasonable and prudent lawyer. 
Based on the documents and affidavits filed, Gatewood does not even meet his 
burden at summary judgment that would necessitate Ms. Stephen's response. However, 
Ms. Stephen has filed an affidavit of her standard of care expert, Cathy Naugle, who 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 
testifies in her opinion the Defendants' conduct fell below the requisite standard of care 
in many respects. Because Ms. Stephen has raised genuine issues of material fact with 
her expert witness regarding the Defendants' conduct, the Defendants are not entitled to 
summary judgment on this defense. 
Ms. Stephen's damages are not speculative. 
[hat Stephen cannot prove that conduct 
proximaTely caused her damages, but really doesn't argue proximate cause at aiL The 
argument actually is based on the delense that the damages alleged are speculative and 
therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Because a claim that damages are 
speculative is a defense, Gatewood bears the burden at summary judgment of establishing 
this defense betore the plaintiff is required to respond. And, once again, Gatewood has 
failed in his burden. 
(iatewood cites Idaho 796 34 App. 
990.1. support "proximate cause" argument, but misunderstands or mIsstates the 
actual standard the Court applied. This is the excerpt of the opinion that Gatewood cites 
111 Memorandum. 
are thus presented with the question whether the district court properly 
dismissed O'Neil's claim by granting Vasseur and Gissel's summary judgment 
motion. Because the invasion of privacy suit is still unresolved, the damages that 
may be awarded therein are speculative, conjectural and unliquidated. 
Furthermore, it has not been established that Vasseur and Gissel's delay is 
responsible for a diminution of that possible award. To prove this contested fact, 
O'Neil would have to prove the amount a jury would have awarded absent the 
delay. We agree with the district court that any evidence tending to shed light on 
this question would be inadmissible due to its speculative nature. In negligence 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - 8 
cases, summary judgment is appropriate in only the most clear situations. Jarman 
v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 273, 731 P.2d 813, 816 (CLApp. 1986). Negligence issues 
are jury questions "unless the proof is so clear that different minds cannot 
reasonably draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would 
construe the facts and circumstances of the case in only one way." Annau v. 
Schutte. 96 Idaho 704, 707,535 P.2d 1095, 1098 (1975). Customarily, a claim of 
negligence presents questions of fact for the jury to resolve. Contested facts may 
not be resolved at the summary judf,Tffient stage. Jarman. supra: Fajen v. Allstate 
Insurance , 96 Idaho 886, 538 P.2d 1190 (1975); Johnson v. Stanger. 95 Idaho 
408. 10 (73), also S'fate o(Jdaho Bunker Hill ,662 .Supp. 
[daho now consider the Issues in the light these 
standards. 
v. Vasseur. I 18 Idaho at 261. 
is clear the Court of Appeals in 'Neil is limiting its conclusion that the alleged 
damages are "speculative" to the narrow issue of the damages caused by any alleged delay in 
bringing the case to the jury. 0 'Neil does not stand for the broad application that any potential 
jury award is speCUlative as Gatewood argues. 
the Stephen divorce case proceeded to trial. presumably the parties would have had 
render opil1lons regarding the value the respective community property (real estate) 
and presented evidence to support an award spousal maintenance. These amounts are readily 
ascertainable the proper which agam would have been presented- will 
presented at trial. Stephen's damages are therefore not "speculative" to the warranting 
application tl1IS defense. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 
Ms. Stephen, although not conceding that Gatewood has met his burden on this issue, has 
provided the expert opinion from Ms. Naugle regarding her damages that Ms. Naugle believes 
were proximately caused by the Defendants' negligence.s Gatewood's detense therefore fails. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Ms. Stephen respectfully requests that the Court award attorney fees to her as this motion 
was hrought and no 
admissibie evidence and no transcript, the Court could not have awarded Gatewood any relief 
even if Ms. Stephen had not responded. 
CONCLUSION 
Gatewood has failed to establish his burden that no genuine issue of material fact exists as 
to each element of his affirmative defenses, and he is therefore not entitled to summary judgment. 
The Plaintifftheretc)re respectfully requests that the Court DENY this motion in its entirety. 
day May. 2008. 
Clark. the PlaintitT 
8 Naugle AtT.. page 4. para. 20. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of May, 2008, I caused to be served in the manner 
indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
6 12th Avenue South. Suite 1 ] 3 
Nampa. Idaho 8365 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LA W, INC 
410 S. Orchard. Ste. 
Boise, In 83705 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
Eric R. Clark 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - II 
l 
Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
'li):f"i-
~. ;' rJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
Y. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
AFFIDA VIT OF COUNSEL FILED IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
GATEWOOD'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ERIC R. CLARK, being first duly sworn on oath, says: 
1. r am over eighteen years of age, and I have personal knowledge of the facts 
discussed below. 
2. I am the attorney for the Plaintiff in this case. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FILED IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
3. Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Answer and Counterclaim attached as 
tiled by the Defendants in the underlying divorce case. 
4. Exhibit B contains true and correct copies of the Motion for Temporary 
maintenance and Affidavit of Pamela Stephen filed by the Defendants in the underlying divorce 
case. 
5. Exhibit C is true and correct copy of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce of 
record in the divorce case. 
6. Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of excerpts of the Defendant Gatewood's 
response to Ms. Stephen's discovery requests in this case. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State ofIdaho and the laws of the 
United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED this 27th day of May 2008. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of May 2008. 
fj)"~d ,8 £ a~~ ~ UBLIC for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: __ t~h- 1;---1b, :1D 
My Commission expires: 1- S -. \ 3 
AFFrDA VIT OF COUNSEL FrLED rN OPPOSITrON TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTrON 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of May, 2008, I caused to be served in the 
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
Eric R. Clark 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FILED IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
NO. COpy 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, ISB No.IOS3 ~ -.. 
JUN 202003 G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, ISB No. 5982 SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD. 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 8956 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
J. DAV1D. NAVARRO f'tJ ~ 
8y E3J KNAPP ) Viet .. 
c90tJTY 
Telephone: (208) 336-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFADA 
GARY ALLEN STEPHEN, ) 
) 
PJaintif£fCounterdefendant, ) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
PAMELA KA TIIERINE STEPHEN, ) 
) 
DefendantlCountercJaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV DR 0301151 D 
ANSWER 
AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through her attorney, Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd., and in answer to Plaintiff's Complaint filed herein, admits, denies and avers as 
follows: 
1. Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint not specifically 
admitted herein. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations as stated in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 1 
r 
3. Defendant denies the allegation in paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and 
affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff has been forced to retain the firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd. to protect her interests herein and that Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
As and for a counterclaim against Plaintiff, Defendant alleges as follows: 
1. The parties were married to one another on the 17th day of December, 1976, at Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho, and have been, and now are husband and wife. The parties resided 
together as husband and wife in Idaho. 
2. There has been one (1) child born as issue of the marriage who is now an adult. 
3. That during the marriage of the parties, they have accumulated community property 
which should be equitably divided between the parties. 
4. That during the marriage of the parties, they have incurred certain community debts 
which should be equitably divided between the parties. 
5. That Defendant/Counterclaimant lacks sufficient property to provide for her 
reasonable needs and due to physical and emotional limitations is unable to support herself 
through employment. 
6. That there is a substantial disparity of the incomes of the parties and that Plaintiff! 
Counterdefendant should be ordered to pay to DefendanUCounterclaimant, monthly 
maintenance to meet the reasonable needs of the DefendanUCounterclaimant. 
7. That Defendant is without funds to retain an attorney to prosecute this action; that 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 2 
. . 
", 
she has employed Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. and Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to 
Defendant, as and for her attorney fees herein, the sum of $1200.00, plus costs, should this 
action be lll1contested and such sum as the Court may deem reasonable if said action is 
contested. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for Judgment against the Plaintiff as follows: 
A. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore and now existing between the parties 
hereto be dissolved and forever set aside and that Defendant be granted an absolute Decree 
of Divorce from Plaintiff herein on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
B. That the Court order an equitable division of the community property of the 
parties hereto. 
C. That the parties' community debts should be equitably divided between them. 
D. That Plaintiffbe ordered to pay to Defendant, as and for maintenance support, L1.e 
sum of$2,500 per month in addition to an amount reasonable for Defendant's mortgage. for 
a period of the Defendant' s life from the date hereof. 
E. That Plaintiff be ordered to pay to Defendant, as and for her attorney fees herein, 
the sum 0[$1200.00, plus costs, should this action be tlllcontested and such sum as the COllrt 
, 
may deem reasonable if said action is contested; and 
F. For such oth~r and further relief as the Court deems just. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 3 
r 
DATED This d.P day of June, 2003. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the dfCI day of June, 2003., I caused to be served a tme 
and correct copy of the above and forgoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following. 
Ann K. Shepard 
Shepard Law Offices, PLLC 
200 N. Front Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 4 
__ U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
-----,,-~ Via Fax: (208) 429-1100 
/ 
Sallaz Law, Chtd. 
(> .. t' 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: S8 
County of Ada ) 
PAMELA STEPHEN, after being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she is the 
Defendant in the foregoing action, that she has read the Answers and Responses and believes the 
facts stated therein are true based upon her own information and belief 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant has set her hand and seal the day and year 
first above written. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me thi~\ day of June, 2003. 
~'~ I __ e  I l.,..-(?L~~,Y~_> 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho~ J 
Commission expires: -1/·b/zZ:J~7 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P . .4' 
DENNIS 1. SALLAZ, ISB NO. 1053 
G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, ISB No. 5982 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD. 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 8956 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263 
Attorney for Defendant 
COpy 
_ ..... - - -;~'-.. ~;)-
." '/. , :i 
~.- ---,- ._-----
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
GARY ALLEN STEPHEN, ) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV DR 0301151 
Plaintiff. 
-vs-
PAMELA KATHERINE STEPHEN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
MAINTENANCE 
----------------------------) 
COMES NOW. Defendant, Pamela Stephen, by and through her attorneys of record, 
Sallaz& Gatewood, Chtd., and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an Order requiring Plaintiff 
to pay Defendant temporary maintenance and support pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 32-704, 
32-705. 
This Motion is made for the following reasons: 
1. Defendant has been married to the Plaintiff for approximately twenty six (26) 
years. 
2. During the substantial parts of this marriage, Defendant has remained a stay at 
home spouse and does not possess marketable skills for gainful employment. 
3. Defendant is totally without resources, funds or income, and is unable to support 
EXHIBIT--S 
(' 
herself or provide for her basic needs and to maintain the community assets; 
4. Since the filing of this action, the Plaintiff has moved out of the community 
residence located at 3309 Crescent Rim, Boise, Idaho. 
S. During the months of June and July Plaintiff has deposited approximately $2,000 
into the community checking account. 
6. Other than the deposits stated in paragraph three (3) above, Plaintiff has willfully 
and intentionally deprived Defendant of access to community resources, funds and 
income. 
7. A number of community bills are currently going unpaid and are subject to 
potential collection actions, the community residence has a leak in the roof, a ~arge 
window in the front of the house has damaged glass and general maintenance that 
is not being taken care 0 f and that greatly exceed the total money Plaintiff has 
deposited into the community account. 
8. Defendant has prescription medications which are necessary to her well being and 
health and she does not have sufficient needs with which to procure these 
medications. 
9. Defendant will suffer irreparable harm and injury if she is not granted relief and 
access to community resources, funds and income, as more fuUy set out in 
Defendant's affidavit filed concurrently herewith. 
For the above and foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests the Court enter an 
Order requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant temporary maintenance and support in this matter. 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE - 2 
Oral argument is hereby requested. 
DATED This!!tL day of July, 2003. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD. 
~~-~~~ 
G. Scott Gatewood 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~ day of July, 2003, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following in the manner described: 
[V MAlLED 
[] FAXED 
[ ] HAND DELIVERY 
[ ] OVERNIGHT DELIVERY 
Ann K. Shepard 
Shepard Law Offices, PLLC 
200 N. Front Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
~, Zl2?L~ 
sauazGatewood/ Chtd. 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE - 3 
/' 
I 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, ISB NO. 1053 
G. SCOTT GATEWOOD, ISB NO. 5982 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD. 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 8956 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263 
Attorneys for Defendant 
( 
----j:·.:o 
".~i.~ __ _ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
GARY ALLEN STEPHEN. 
Plaintiff. 
-V5-
PAIv[ELA KATHERINE STEPHEN. 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
State of Idaho 
) 55. 
County of Ada ) 
CASE NO. CV DR 0301151 
AFFIDA VIT OF PAMELA STEPHEN 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE 
COMES NOW, Pamela Stephen, Defendant, after being first duly sworn upon oath, and 
based upon her own information and belief, deposes and states as follows: 
1. r, Pamela Stephen have been married to Gary Allen Stephen since December 17, 1976. 
2. During approximately the first five years of our marriage, Gary's employment required 
that we relocate our place of residence often. 
3. In the second year of our marriage I gave birth to our daughter, Jennifer. 
AFFIDA VIT OF PAMELA STEPHEN 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
TEMPORAR Y MAINTENANCE - I 
( 
4. Due to our regular change in residences and my need to care for our daughter we agreed 
that during our daughter's early years tbat I would remain in the home and not seek 
outside employment. 
5. After our daughter started scbool in Boise, I then began working part time doing clerical 
work at the Casey Family Program, a private foster care agency. 
6. The rest of my married life I have remained a stay at home spouse. 
7. Other than self development classes, I do not have marketable skills for use in obtaining 
gainful employment. 
8. Approximately three (3) years ago, I was diagnosed as bi-polar and as suffering with post 
traumatic stress over the suicidal death of my daughter'S boyfiicnd wbo was living in our 
residence at the time. 
9. As a resll!t of my physical and mental and emotional limitations, I am not able to secure 
gainful employment to support myself. 
10. Due to our pending divorce, and current separation, I have been left without the ability to 
financially maintain the community residence, meet my basic needs, pay on community 
debts that are due and owing and otherwise enjoy a life-style in the same manner as 
accustomed prior to my separation from Gary. 
AFFIDA VIT OF PAJvfELA STEPHEN 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE - 2 
( (' 
s, 
DATED this 3\ day of July, 2003, 
~~~j~~~ 
Pamela Stephen 
~. SU~~I"~~ SWOR!~ TO befo, re the und~rsi.g.o" ed N t fY Public, this day ofJ !t~ •••••• <l~.... ;::;/-) u, . •• <J' .... ;/ - ,r;7.~ 
.. ~tI' .... ' ~ G.£. I 0 ~ ,\\1 n d' ..... ~ '=-.' --,---,--"""""",,,~..:::...;o,,--"_~_--::. __ -=-__ _ 
: I"~ _ \ : NOTARY PUBLIC- STATE OF IDAHO 
i * i _e o~ : ~ § Residing at Boise, Idaho :6// / 
\ ~ .... .{ ~v J.. /1:: i My Commission Expires:I2-3/?~7 
-:'0"· .·S'~ / 
..... , .. J'Or·· .. •• .. ~'I'\ .. ~~ .. 
###, /} a ~r'''' ",,, 
1""""1'1""" 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this fYl;day of July, 2003, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following in the manner described: 
[~ MAILED 
[] FAXED 
[] HAND DELIVERY 
[ ] OVERNIGHT DELIVERY 
Ann K. Shepard 
Shepard Law Offices, PLLC 
200 N. Front Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAMELA STEPHEN 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE - 3 
Ann K. Shepard 
SHEP ARD LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
200 North 4th Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ill 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-3881 
Facsimile: (208) 429-1100 
Idaho State Bar No. 4042 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
r copy 
~"------fh~Trt--------
AJ.t,,_--?M.----
AUG 09 20o.t 
J. DAV!D NAVARRO, CLlirk 
. Iil¥ KATHY J. BIEHL 
, L IJII'U'IY .-:-" 
~ - . 
L~ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
GAR Y ALLEN STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PANfELA KA THERlNE STEPHEN, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------- ) 
Case No. CV DR 03-011S1D 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
The above-entitled matter was before the Court for trial on August 5, 2004. Plaintiff was 
present with his attorney of record, Ann K. Shepard of Shepard Law Offices, PLLC, and 
Defendant was present with her attorney of record, G. Scott Gatewood of Sallaz and Gatewood, 
Chartered. The parties reached an agreement :md placed their stipulation on the record. Based 
on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are granted a divorce from each other on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences. Each is restored to the status of a single person. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the real property located at 3309 Crescent Rim, Boise, Idaho, 
subject to the first and second mortgage thereon. Defendant shall execute a quitclaim deed, 
, .' '. _. ,',' ~ f'" _) \' ~ • ,~ <1{ f ( . 
" _'::,: j 'j ',.) 1- f ~ ._, :" ~V, __ ." ' 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE - Page 1 
/)JG ? ; 
'. 
EXHIBIT ~ 
(' 
conveying her interest in the property located at 3309 Crescent Rim, Boise, Idaho, to the 
Plaintiff, within ten (l0) days of the date of entry ofthis Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
Defendant shall vacate the premises locatedat 3309 Crescent Rim, Boise, Idaho, on or before 
September 15,2004, and shall remove all personal property assigned to her under this Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce on or before September 15, 2004. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded the real property located at 527 S. Beach Street, Boise, Idaho 
(hereinafter "Beach Street residence"), subject to the mortgage thereon. Defendant shall execute 
a quitclaim deed, conveying any interest she may have in the property located at 527 S. Beach 
Street, Boise, Idaho, to the Plaintiff, within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce. Defendant shall be allowed to reside in the Beach Street residence for a 
period of twenty-four (24) months beginning September 15,2004. Defendant shall be allowed to 
move into the Beach Street residence on or before September 15,2004, Defendant's right to 
occupy the Beach Street residence is contingent upon Defendant's agreement that no person 
residing at or visiting the Beach Street residence shall engage in any illegal conduct. In the event 
that any illegal conduct or behavior takes place at the Beach Street residence, Defendant's right 
to occupy the Beach Street residence is terminated and Defendant shall immediately vacate the 
premises. So long as Defendant resides at the Beach Street residence, Defendant shall be 
responsible for the payment of one-half of the mortgage, in the amount of $430 per month. Said 
$430 per month payment shall be deducted from Plaintiffs monthly obligation to the Defendant, 
for the equalization payment specified in Paragraph 4, below. 
4. In order to equalize the division of the community property and debt, 
commencing September 1, 2004, Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant $2,000 per month (less 
$430 per month so long as Defendant resides in the Beach Street residence) for a period of 
twenty-four (24) months. In the event Defendant vacates the Beach Street residence, 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE - Page 2 
voluntarily or involuntarily, prior to the expiration of twenty-four (24) months, Plaintiff will pay 
to the Defendant the full $2,000 payment. 
5. The Plaintiffs UPS retirement and 401(k) retirement shall be divided equally 
between the parties up through the date of the entry oftms Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
Defendant's share of the retirement shall be transferred to her pursuant to a qualified domestic 
relations order. 
6. The property and debt of the parties shall be divided in accordance with Exhibit 
"A," attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
7. Both parties will be responsible for any debts, not otherwise listed on Exhibit 
"A," that they have incurred. The parties will indemnify and hold the other party hannless for all 
debts assigned to that party. 
8. On or before September 15,2004, the parties will transfer possession of the 
vehicles, to the party to which each vehicle is awarded, in accordance with Exhibit "A," attached 
hereto. On or before September 15,2004, Plaintiff will be responsible to insure, register, and 
title in his name only, the vehicles awarded to him. On or before September 15, 2004, Defendant 
will be responsible to insure, register, and title in her name only, the vehicles awarded to her. 
9. The parties will file separate income tax returns for tax year 2004. Plaintiff shall 
hire an accountant to prepare both parties' 2004 tax returns, and shall be responsible for the 
payment of the tax preparer's fees for preparing both returns. The parties will share equally the 
community income, deductions and credits up through the date of entry oftms Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, and following the entry of tms Judgment and Decree of Divorce the parties 
will each report their own income, deductions and credits separately on their respective returns. 
10. Both parties will execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate the terms 
oftms Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE - Page 3 
· . 
11. Defendant is restored to her former name of P AJ\'IELA CATHERINE 
JOERGER. 
DA TED this ~ day of August, 2004. 
DAVID E. DAY 
DA VID .c. DAY, Magistrate 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
PROPERTY/DEBT 
DIVISION 
-_  I~__ ;~E~;~~~Be;/~QU~~~~~~~~h~~ART ---~----=----[ All propert!l-Comrrii.m-i!-l.._-_-f-~-e~t-s-ep-arate _-P-roperty~mments 
ASSETS ' Fair Market Value Ga!y Pam G'!'Y Pam 1_ 
r_J~~;~:7~im __ - ==~-== ___ ~ ____ 38~00--~ 38§~QQ~~---=- -- -
~ _ 1527 S. Bea_c_h _SI_reet __________________________ l~OOO __ 105000 __ ------I I 
4 Financial Accounts 5--- 401 (k) -------------- 67000 ONE HALF ONE HALF ---
6-_ -UPS-Retirement - 42~000 ONElj6b£' OI'JE HALF_ 
7_- ---------- -- ------1 1 8 House 9 - M-a-in----ce-c-n-try-- __ -
10 Large mirror and frame______ x ------1 
111 ____ _ 
12 Dining Room 
13 Oak Table with 4 leafs & 6 chairs _ _ _ x __ 
x 
hade -- x 
17 -ups sauce.rs_=--====1 Gift to Jennifer 
18 LMngROo,;,__ _ ______ -r -_ _ ---
19_ Chair and-a-H(31f ~9fa &_Otlorna_n ________ ----f __ G~lto Je:nnifer 
20 12 inch round table ! x 
21- Brass. floor lamp with~hade (4 (oot) ______ _ 
22 Grand father clock x 
23 "L" shaped 6 cousin white Sectio~.!..~IbCl!:l Allen. __ ______ x 
24 Oval Glass and iron 36 inch coffee table __ x 25 Crystal ashtray------ ------- ____ - x 
~6 Oval 5 foot-glas-s and iron sofa table _--+-_ 
27 T_~_b~~_lamp with black silk shade 
1
28 Mendoza art and frame §~~; E I A_ 29 C.9_mmissioned hand made bowl __ ~ _ __ xl 
30 Earthen Vase _ _ __ _ x _ r /------- 1 _______ _ 
31 ~3Efcer:.a_~!c vase tre~_nter __ _ _ x+-____ \--- __ 
x 
_xt---~ ;.-
~2 __ _______ _ 
--1-- -I--- j-- ---~I-----
133 Front Bedroom I Office ____ _ 
34 Combination Floor safe 
Page 1 8/6/2004 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
PROPERTY/DEBT 
DIVISION 
IGary Stephen v. Pamela Stephen --~~]~:~~~~~TJ~Q':L~~bN CHA~T _~~~~- -~~~f Fair ~~~eI~~l~~~ ___ pr()p;;~ _s~p-x:~prop;~+~Of!!~_ t~I;;~~i~;:;;~k:L;~ii~~~~~:~·-···· -'~l-- -tj-. °T-~o~ ·-t~ jf-I----
39 Micron cO~~J~r_clnd Monitor I --------- ___ ~--~- x --~_I-
~~ ~:~ ~~~e~6~t~~:0;abinet-credenza------------~------· I 1 .-----
~~~-- ~~gf:~c-Io-c:----=--~---~ ----··---------l----~- ----- _~=_-_--_-_-_-_-J------~-~---I----f----
:t~ Picture PortrC!it of Jennifer _ ___________ _______ _ I xi ___ --+ ____ j _____ 1 
:~ ___ ~~~~~ style (brass) _________ -_~_--_- --- __ ± --x ~=_ __ -___ -_-_-+----.-+-.----.-. 
4]_ Grandmot~_er Stephen music box ___ +- __ . _______ x_:f I----+----I--.-----t.-.-----I 
:18 Oak strait b~~k C_hairs ( School teacher)-j_ .-_____ 1 x I 
:; Statio_nC!_ry Supplies_.____ l____ __.-==H_--a!fj Half __ e---------
~; I~~;~~ ~:::()p _leaf side t~-- ---+ ----- ____ ._. ·--··---x --_-_-_. --1'------+-.-~ Candle sti£..k.~~!!'ps (2) .. _.-__ -__ +- ____ . x -I 
54 30 inch_~ck wall clock -.---.. C 1 x 
~. . l.2 __ x 36 inch ova!JIlass and iron sofa table._ .. --. -----1. 1__ . . . _ .. _. __ . ___ . __ .. ~+_---.--+-----+-_-_+----
~~_ .~~2 Area rug ____ . ________ .._ ------1--------- ___ ._... x ____ ... 
5} _ Fire place tools __ ._ ._ . ___ ~ _ ____ x.,----t-----i----
58 10 inch round iron side table 
.--- ._----_._------
59 flo_Clf_uJl.lamp (6 foot) 
6~ __ ?Je~~er lounge chairs an~t()f!1~ ______ .. _ .-.-.---.-f-------.--.i-----
61 Chair and a half 
.-----.. ~2 Big·h_.b§.c~.r:.m·-c-:-h-a,-ir..,,(Bc:c---c----------
63 small decorative trunk 
64- Etha~ .~I~en C·h-.e-'-r--ry-pr-o"-je-c-'ti-o-n -vc-cid-e-o-c-abTrlet----
- I 
x 
x 
f?:; __ BJlLscree~~~ction TV ----.-.- . ·--·---··I! ===t=·-- -····-~I I I §.6_ CD's 100 pius some collectors~_ditjo~ ___ . __ ._._ .. ______ ._______ ______ x 
,67 4 f~ot tall x 3 foot ~i9~ earthe_~a..:?e/plant~______ _ ____ . ____ . x 1.---.. -- ___ ~I ___ +-___ _ 
68 Stereo Equipment I I X 
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ASSETII?!=BTIEQUA!::!ZATION CHA~T _____ ·__ -~~Pr~eerty _ COrnmu-"itifProperty Separate proeertYj<;.omments 
I ASSETS. ____ F~}.r: r~t~!ket Value __ ~_'!!1l- Pam . ~a Pall)_ __ . __ 
Gary Stephen v. Pamela Stephen * I 
~9 A'!1.E~~~rrou~_t:J~nd) _ ____ _ ___ ~-!-_____ I_ ___ __ 
Ii !~!tfi~:':~::o ---- -L - -r .... -=l--~-/=-- ···--1 ~l :::~:::d Sound slC~e" ... -- t . .- -r ---- -'I ~--=-_ ~--- I 
Z~ __ §-~-n-Lu.r~_~r.~~_bin_el TV ________ - -_-=--_. ~ -:-~--------=--t---~ _____ ___ _ _ _ ____ =~ _ t~_~-_-_-_x =--=-_--_ --=--= __ ---------
7.9_ Cof~ee/Espre~~~er _________ . ___ l ______ 1 __ -----J-----~ -._ - ____ ._ 
~_fj~t\..backswivelstools(4) ----- -- -J---------- ____ x.j____ ---81 Dishes Glasses & Flatwa_re ___ _ 
~ Whl~e dishes sJde plates c~s and sauce~~==-- _ - - ---- ---~ ~_'I===-x· ~ . ~3 Multi-color dishes side dishes mugs bowls - -- -- --'!---------~--- t l~--
§.4 ~storia crystal plates and serving dl~ _____ -- ___ ql!!J9....J.~nnifer ------1-- --J-----]==-- ____ I 
~ .Red Mikasa <2J'stal wine g~asses (8) __ ± . __ 1_. .x _ ] _ ___ ___ __ 
8§ Assorted glasses water tU.r!lbler wi~________ __ __ _l<. _. _ ____ ___ 1 §.7_ Sterlin Silve_r seWn forJlJlJus se~_!f:1JLPlece:;____ =-$=Gift to Jennifer _ 
88 Every da flatware Half Half 
if9 Corning warec~oking lse;:v;ngdiShes .=:. . ____ -.-.---- l<. 
99 __ _ ----j--__ • ___ • __ 1 _____ 1____ 1 ____ .-----
91 Henckle knife set 
----
----------1---92 Kitchen Utensils - -------'----
93 
c:-:--t::---.----
94 Pantry 
1_95 
196 Calphalon cooking pans _______________ x 
97 Toaster oven x 
98 Cuisenart with extra blades __ x 
~ Assorted bowls --------_-___ -_~~_-_- _ __l ____ J:!C!!f ___ Ji~f 
11QL Pool Changing Room I Mud Rooll1 ---- --~==---=-_--+____ _ ____ --_.-1------1----1----
102 Plastic yellow outside plates and cups (8) r-SeIIlDiv-:-id-e+-=S7e-cII:-C:/O:::-;-iv-'i-cde+----+---
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DIVISION 
Gary Stephen v. Pamela Stephen . I ~ 
_-_-=--_-t-:-A-=S~~JiE_gUA!:IZAfION CH.A:RT---- - --=l---AILProperty Commul"!~!t'.. - Pr()p~_rt Proe.ert~JCo_'!1m~..':1~ __ 
n~~ ~ ASSETS_
n 
. ~ 1 Fa', Ma,ket Value Ga')' ~ Pam __ ~aml ___ _ 
10~._ ~a..stic ass<?!ted co. lors glasse. s (1.?L----- __ __ _ _ __ SeJ~ivide S~I_" ... D____'iv_id_e+__----+_-
104 Pre-recorded & recorded VCR tapes (80) Half Half 105-----------·------ -- - --- - ----- ----+----+--
106 --- -- - ----
1-07 ---.--- ---- ~-------------+--------+J-----+---f-
108 Upstairs I 
109 _____ .______ __----[ __ -=-_ 
119 U. stairs guest b~,!room J sitting room __ ----------f' -------- --------t----- ------
111 !:¥~;i~~~~~1:~:,\h Oltomao nnn ~~~ nn n .... ~ •. ~ :-: ~=_~-:nnnn .•. ~=-:~=~~~ ~~=::f===ln~ n jnnn H 
i---___ +:T:-abl.e Lamp Urn style (Brass) - _--- __ ~=- - xl ----+-.-----+----1-----
- __ X~:~:rm FICJor Lam p - __j xl x f-
---_~aJ~r T\,I_JblaCk) ___ ~=~_ __---- ___ _1- ---~ .. ~In ;F-=-='····-
~~:i~CWr~~-k --- ~----------J--=-:--- ---1--- ----- l----x+-------t----
121 Telescope I I x 
122 Cello and Bow -- I - - x 
123_ Multi=Coloredc~- _________ - I __ -_--_-_-.:.:x+--_-___ -+ ____ + __ 
1~4_ Green table _____ ________ __________ X r--
--- I ---1---
---I------+-----I-------{ 
125 Master Bedroom 
126-- King bed and Oak Mission Bed Frame---- x _____ _ 
IT? Oak night side tables (2)- -----r=--x ------+-----+----t 
~ Wall mounted lamps (2) ~~___ ' ___ _ ______ >: _ 
129 Floor Lamp x 
~~ ~~~~S-Q..mini-component stereo _- ___ =- ~-------=f_ X -------x--
132 Color -- ---- I ~x_+_::o__:_:_=_:___:_:-+----i----t_-----{ 
133 High backarrn_c~ai':l~.e.£~ett styJ.e_}_______ -----r . SeII/Divide~~~Divide 
134 Oak Armoire x 
~135 08k4-drawerare5ser (G~'s clos~tL ___ ~===-=_ _ ----.. x ------+-----+-------,1------1 
136 3 drawer white wicker Armoire (Pam's closet) r-- x 
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A~~ETjDE~T/EQl!~!-:.I~AT!ON CHART ~-- All Property . Gomf!1.lJnity p'Yr''':' <l_~~fJ~~~~~()p~~~comments 
ASSETS Fair Market Value Gary Pam Gary Pam 137 t --- - T-- x-------r-
_t x _-- _ 
one one ___ __ 
X , 
141 
---------
142 Master Bathroom 
I~TTowel Rack Sta~d______ x-I 
1.4~ __ TV (White) _____ 1-____ x 
~~ Scales_i -_. ---146 I 1~f7 ILinens & Towels _n 1-- - Haffl----Half , __ n_ 
{lffUilts & Blankets -== H_~____-Half 
-- - - --- I 
150 Basement 
- ---_._--- -_.--_.-
,)51 Utility room __ _ _' ___ 1_ 
152 'Washer & Dryer x 
153 !AdjustableFreestanding Metal Shelve;s------ -- - --_x-
15j 'Vacuum Cleaner --)(  
l?.? 2 Irons __ ._ __+__ one one_ 
156 Rug Shampooer .. x 
I5? __ B~ach Street washer/dryer '_' x 
158 Family Area.___ /_ 
159 J60 Oak sa:;:-rabl~s (2) ~~ches high - --- _' ________ I ~elllDivide _ SelllD~vide I 
3~~ ~_ir_e-_ctor-~h_al_rs (4)_fO_ld_in_9 _ ._j_-_-_--~_-_-_.=--=-_-r seIl/Dlv.!ge! S~II/~ __ 
163 C~mp~~ent Stereo System (AmplTuner!..QLl.el tap_e. CD) J .T_ __-=_ 
1§4 Board G~mes - .. f- ~-- -------f x . .:.t\ ____ -+ ____ i--___ _ 
1. ~~ Down Stairs Bedroom --------f-- b I --t-- ----I 
1§7 Wicker ArmOTre--(Wi~E~r & Wood) _~- -~-. - -" " x =+= 
168 Swivel Barrel Chair and O.t~0rTl~_____ _ _____ ~ .. _ Sell/DIVIde. Sell/DIvide 
169 f-------l------ t-----.--_. --+----
170 IGarage 
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Gary Stephen v. Pamela Stephen ~ AS~~T/Q!=8T/EQUALiZATION CH~RT_ .. ----.. l.i __ ._-_AII Prop_erty 1-... g_Ommunit§:t=-llropertYI s~paratel. IPropert~~ment~. 
I ~~~ETS ~_ _ _______ .. _ Fair M_arket Value_ Gary ___ parnr--. GarVT __ .p_...::a~m.:.j.r_-_-__ 
171 Table Saw x ~~~::.:.----.- .------.---------.... -1-----.------ . 
172 .Air Compressor & Hose 25 feet XI 
f73 ITooT13OX(roll-~rOUfld)--- ----------.--~~--=---- x -----+-----1---.. --.1------1 
174 ,Sawsall saw x ~ Circular Hand Saw --1-.- ---":X·~l-----I 
!-=--,--~-=--c.:.==-c --_. - .... ---------- ,------... --.----t----- -.:.:f-----I---
1]6 Router & Bits . _____ ._. ----1-----. x 
J 77 25pound bottle refriger~~IJ..?_ ----.--1---- ____ ___ _~x~+_----_+---_+---_+_--
178 Freon eV9_cuation cO_tTleress?! xf _____ I-___ +-___ II-____ .. ~79 Emer ency Road Kit ---==l --f ____ -'x-'-I-___ -+ ___ -+ __ 
1180 <?.o.rilla Rack MetaL~~elvil]jL I x 
181 Tread Mill . x 
~ Ladder 24 inch (2) x 
1§3 Lacjder 4 foot I _+--_____ ~Xj----+_-_ __f-
184 Ladder 6 foot , ____ -=x.:.J-___ --l-_ ----i-------l--
185 Ladderfolding x 
----'-'-1-----
,186 Floor jack -. ______ x . _____ . _-+--__ -j 
187 Jack Stands x 
188 x ---1--- ~ 
189 x 
190 Work BenchCraftsITlan --I--------·--+------'x~1--------i---·--1-----+-----1 
1_~L_ Hi h Pressure Washer x __ .-\-______ 1 
192 Chain Saw __ .-:.:..x+-___ +-___ --ff--____ , 
193 Pam's tool box aridto~ x 
194 Extension Co-rds (5+) Half Half 
_19_5_ Two Wheel Hand Cart . ________ . _______ + ____ . ____ ~xi--___ _l-----I---__+-----
1~~ Lawn Mower _ _ _~ ------1----+----.. 
197 
198 Garden Tools (shovels rakes hand tools) Half Ham- ------
,199 -- I_\'io_ Do,?r 8 foot metafCabinet ..:.x:+.-___ . ..+ ____ -+ ____ 1 
?OO ~~tal Storage Cabinet (3 x 2 x 41_ --t--- ______ .I ___ --'x::J-____ + ___ +-____ 1 
~01 Wheel Barrow __ .-t-- x _____ 4--_._ .-----+----\------1 
202 Garde:n Hoses _ HC:lJf ____ ~a::I.f:-I-----I____---I_----1 
203 
-·-----1 -------l~--+---_t_---
204 IOutside Patio 
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1 ____ +(3ary S~eph..~I'!..".. Pamela Stephen _ __ ___ _ ____ _ 
ASSET IDEBT IEqUALI~ATION ~tjART ______ --f---All1'rop~ f-Commu..!1l!~f-Xroperty _~<!~~tte ~~pert¥J Commel1ts 
_ AS~ETS~____ _ ____ _ ___ 1 __ Fair_ ~~_~et Va~~ ___ ~I)'_I_--- _ Y~_'!'..i-----~f-_~am 
.?.o§_ WhltE3£al~o J"...t:Jrniture Square Table and 4 Chalrs_l2~ets) __ 1___ ______ __ H<!~I--____ Half --1----
206 La_rg_e_Umbrelia & Stand (8 foot) ____ ________ ___ x 
~ __ 7_ IJVhite £..a_r_k _~enches (2)_ ----- l---______ I---:: ___ H_a!f - Half 
208 I!y.o_o.d Park Benchesj~_____ _____________ __ _ __________ Sell/Divi~~ SeII/DiVide,+ ___ --t~ j ___ _ 
209 2 Umbrella and Stand (6 foot) _ Half Hal~ ___ ----1-----
?10 Be:.dwo..od Patio F=urniture_ T_abl~ and 4 Chairs __ ~_-~=---- _ Sel~ivide Sell/Divide --- -- --
211 WhJte Patio Furnlture Recline~@L _________________________ ..J::!?-'il--______ H-={a~lf-----j-----+------1 
212_~~ite Patio LO~JaE.!~~erviE1.fL\J"9JI~ _________ ---.J __________ r--____ table trolley 
~1~ !'.ropane G':'JI (Stainless steal) _____ ____ --1_ '__ _ x 1 _____ 1 ______ -1--_____ 1 !j~ W_:o_:::_:_
1
::_: __ ' ;_~_.:.n_s-d~p_-I_a~_~c_o-v-a'L-a.~--1~-=-=_-_-_~ _~_--_-_~I__ _ ~I:: -~ __ H -a-~~I---I--_~---~ __ ~_I:1_a_l-+f _-_--___ -1 ______ 1 ___ _ 
218 §mith & Wesson 9MM Seml-Automalic Pistol ___ _('3!~! to Jennif~~I-________ 1--_____ +-___ _ 
~~ Gary's Guns _ __ _ ' x:.J---____ ---t _____ f-__ 
~r 1l!~~---=~~-_-~--~1 ______ _ I_~~~: :~---- f------__ -_-_--I-I--_____ 
I 
225 IDolis in Attic ____ _ ___ t __ .=J= xl-------l-----1-----~Chrjstrrl.9s Decorations -____________ __ ru---l- Half Half 
1_~Steinbach N~~crackers (7 ) 
228 -+-
___ Xc ___ -1-___ -1-_____ : 
------------J ·t- ---+----+----1-----
229 Cars 
230 1999 Lincoln NaVigator----~-_ ---- ___ -1-____ .....-:.. 
231 1996 318i BMW 
232 -1990 Chevy PU C15..9_0_ 4WD ____ --=~~=_ __ 
233 1987 Camero -L-------.::. 
234 Honda 750 SS 4 cylinder _. _____ _ ___ --..L..__ -- -I 
235 1989 Corvette (salvage title) I - ._-
236--- - I 
237 ASSETS TOTAL 238-1---------
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-- ASSE_fIDE~T/EqUALjZATI~~ CFA_ RY-- - r _ ~II Property comiij~_ll---_ p~r~o-e_-e-_rt-y-+-s-e-p-a-r--at~rproP~Eomine.!:l!~ 
_ASS~___ _ __ XajrMClr:.~~Value _~a_ry Pam Gary_~~ 
2}9 DEBTS _ __ ____________ ____ _ ___ _ _ ___ 1 __ _ 
240 Crescent Rim debt - 256767 256767 
241 CresceniRirn 2ncfdebt------ ---- ---------15156-----=j5156 r--
------~------~-----~'~t~~:n .______ ________ J-~-_ ----~;_~~ --~Ta7c_c;:_I_--_____ +----__ _ 
~:~ ~~::,:~w . ___ =___ t .. -:!~~L----,~gg==-~I_---____l------I-------, 
~47 ~~tlars---- __ -----1---__ -----<?-+------___ o]I~~~ ~~~:~------- ----- -- -·l--·ig~~ .. ·-~H~---=-,-·-~!jJ Lowe's ____ 900 ___ ~gol_ t----I:------1 
~~~ l~~!I~t --- =F=-- 14~~ 14~~ 
254-!Pier One 128 12 
?55 Crescent Rim suit _ -----~ ___ \--~--=-- 280001 2~q2~ 
!iL O~BT TOIAL--=· --= ~. __ "'~5~~1_ 4355'J~----oj-- I - 1 
1259 _ _ _ -- _ I 
'm :::ETSAND DE8TSDIVISION :-_ -- - - _ u _=~~"j:;~~ ~ ~~;;~~~=,_-
263 Pam --------r--
I 
13095 0 13095 
264-~otal -529595 435535 __ 1 ----J-------4----
265 -----------~1---_----4------_+-;~; - ____ ft--- 1--- -\ 
--- j----f-----t 
----j------ ------1--------
------+1------ ~ 
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WILLIAM J. SCHWARTZ, ISB No. 3649 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
Telephone: (208) 426-9383 
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., and ) 
SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: 
Case No. CV OC 0614241 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO DEFENDANTS 
IdentifY each person answering or assisting in answering these Interrogatories, also providing social 
security number, driver's license number, date of birth, address and telephone number of said 
person(s). 
ANSWER NO. L G. Scott Gatewood, Dennis J. Sallaz, 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho 83705~ 
(208) 336-1145. 
INTERROGATORY NQ. 2: 
Please provide the name, address, and telephone number of each witness in which you intend to utilize 
at trial, including witnesses you intend to utilize for impeachment or rebuttal purposes. 
ANSWER NO.2: G. Scott Gatewood, Dennis 1. Sallaz, 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho 83705; 
(208) 336-1145; any staff members who may be privy to direct communications with Plaintiff; Ann 
Shepard, Attorney, 200 N. 4th Street, Suite 302, Boise, Idaho, 83702, (208) 342-3881; Gary 
Stephens, address unknown at this time. This Answer may be supplemented. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3: 
Please state the period of time during which you rendered legal services to Plaintiff. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY 
REQUESTS TO DEFENDANTS - 1 
EXH!BIT_~ _  
ANSWER NO.3: The Plaintiff s file was opened June 18, 2003; Decree of Divorce entered August 
9,2004; filed Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 7-6-2005. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4: 
Identify your employers, partners, partnerships, associates, and/or associations engaged in the 
practice of law at all times during the period of time you rendered legal services to Plaintiff 
ANSWER NO.4: See answer No. 1 above. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5 
IdentifY all attorneys, law clerks, legal assistants, investigators, and researchers who assisted you in 
rendering legal services to Plaintiff. 
ANSWER NO.5: See Answer No. 1 and 2 above. S tafT: Millis Anderson, Legal Assistant; Marge 
Davidson, Legal Assistant; Kelli Walts, Secretary. 
INTERROGATORY NO.6: 
Generally state all facts upon which you contend support any defense that you have or may claim in 
this case. 
ANSWER NO.6: Telephone conferences, in office conferences, correspondence were engaged to 
communicate with Plaintiff and she always indicated she understood and knew exactly what was 
going on in her case and in fact, was most adamant about what she wanted to achieve in the divorce. 
There was never a question about her ability to understand and assist in reaching her goal in the 
divorce. Contact and discussions with Plaintiff subsequent to the entry of the decree regarding her 
truck and the Qualified Domestic Relations Order indicated she clearly understood the procedure, 
~lecisions, and events related to the case. Contacts with Plaintiff subsequent to entry of the Decree 
involving her acceptance ofthe payments per the Decree Agreement. The fact this lawsuit was filed 
only after her temporary maintenance ended. 
INTERROGATORY NO.7: 
State succinctly what matters of law relevant to the claims made against you in this cause of action 
that you contend are not or should not be in dispute. 
ANSWER NO.7: Objection; this request tends to discovery of work product; without waiving 
objection Defendant disputes this entire claim of action. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: 
Did you act as a fiduciary to Plaintiff during the attorney/client relationship? If not, state succinctly all 
facts upon which you rely to deny responsibility as a fiduciary. 
ANSWER NO.8: Our responsibility as fiduciary includes those required in an attorney-client 
relationship. Defendant denies any breach of any fiduciary responsibility therein. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY 
REQUESTS TO DEFENDANTS - 2 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: 
A copy of all letters, correspondence or any other fonn of written document which in any way refers, 
pertains or relates to any communication made by you to any liability or malpractice insurance carrier 
concerning any of the matters made the basis of this suit, including but not limited to all notices of 
claim or proofs of claim. 
RESPONSE NO.9: None. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: 
A copy of your (Mr. Gatewood) current curriculum vitae and/or fum brochure (Sallaz & 
Gatewood) or firm marketing material. 
RESPONSE NO.1: None. 
DATED this ) f day of February. 2007. 
Wi,liJf!z 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the JL day of February, 2007. I caused to be served in 
the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the fonowing: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark Law Office 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
......,.,--.- u. S. Mail 
~, Personal Delivery 
__ Fax: (208) 939-7136 
wiiliant 1. Schw~ 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY 
REQUESTS TO DEFENDANTS - 7 
Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697 
CLARK LA W OFFICE 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THEST ATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
) 
) 
) AFFIDA VIT OF 
) GARY STEPHEN 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Gary Stephen, first being duly sworn on oath as provided by law, states as follows: 
1. When I decided to divorce Pamela, I instructed my attorney Ann Shepard to file based 
on irreconcilable differences, because I did not believe there was any basis for any other 
type of divorce. 
2. My attorney never advised me that she believed there was a basis for any "fault" type 
divorce proceeding, and we proceeded as filed and pursued a divorce based upon 
irreconcilable differences. 
AFFIDA VlT OF GARY STEPHEN - I 
3. Even if there had been a basis for a "fault" type of divorce, I would not have pursued that 
course. 
4. Based on the length of our marriage, my income compared with Pamela's, Pamela's 
disabilities, and Pamela's lack of education, training and experience, I believed I would 
have to pay Pamela some type of ongoing support, even though I was filing, which Pam 
ultimately sought in her Answer and Counterclaim. 
5. We attended mediation with Mr. Beers just days before the trial date. During the 
mediation, I observed that Pam was lethargic and watched her rest her head on the table 
several times. When Pam was sitting upright, she would rock back and forth in her chair 
and appeared incoherent at times. I even offered to drive Pam home after the mediation, 
because I was concerned about her ability to drive. 
6. About a year later, Pam told me that she had been in St. AI's about a week prior to the 
mediation and the trial and that she was prescribed medications that made her lethargic 
and very tired. 
7. Pam also told me she had contacted her counsel and asked to postpone the trial because 
she had recently been hospitalized, but that he had refused to attempt to move the trial 
date. 
8. Had I known Pam had been hospitalized, I would have agreed to postpone the trial until 
she was mentally and physically better. 
9. At the divorce trial, my counsel and I met with Scott Gatewood, Pamela's counsel and 
discussed the property settlement agreement. When the property was split according to 
this document, lowed approximately $48,000.00 to Pamela. 
10. As I understood that the parties were supposed to divide the assets equitably, I believed 
that I would have to pay Pamela this money. 
11. Ann Shepard suggested to Mr. Gatewood that I be allowed to pay Pamela $2,000.00 per 
month for 24 months as an "equalization" payment to equalize the division of property. 
12. Mr. Gatewood responded that he believed this was appropriate as he felt that if Pamela 
receiving a large lump sum of money at one time "she would probably go out and blow 
it. " 
13. At the trial, when Pamela stated that she agreed to receive $2,000.00 per month (minus 
rent), which I understood to be the "equalization" payment for the division of property. 
14. I was surprised when Mr. Gatewood never pursued Pamela's claim for spousal 
maintenance. 
15. Last fall, I received a call from Scott Gatewood. Mr. Gatewood identified himself to me 
on the phone, and I recognized his voice on the phone because we had spoken at several 
court hearings. 
AFFIDA VIT OF GARY STEPHEN - 2 
16. Mr. Gatewood asked me several questions during the conversation. When we discussed 
my observation of Pam at the mediation, Mr. Gatewood stated he did not like my 
answers. 
17. Mr. Gatewood told me during this conversation that he believed Pam only sued him after 
her temporary maintenance had run out. I am sure he said "temporary maintenance," 
because I did not recall that the Court had awarded any maintenance, nor did I 
understand that I was paying Pamela maintenance. 
I declare under penalty of petjury under the laws of the State of Idaho and the laws of the 
United States, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED this 31 st day of March 2008. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31 st day of March 2008. 
MARK P. GIESQ 
Notary Publtc 
Stat. of Idaho 
LIC for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: BOI >e .r D 
My Commission expires: .J'k± i/c±Pf 3 
AFFrDA VlT OF GARY STEPHEN - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Q~ day of 2008, I 
caused to be served in the manner indicated a true and correct copy of e foregoing to the 
following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
Attorney for Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD., 
And Scott Gatewood 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Attorney for Dennis Sallaz. 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
Eric RZ9(ark 
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J , 
Eric R Clark. ISB# 4697 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
No. 1777 P. 2/6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHID., 
and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) CA TIIY L. NAUGLE. ESQ. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Cathy Naugle, first being duly sworn on oath as provided by law, states as follows: 
1. At the request of the Plaintiffs Counsel, I have agreed to act as a standard of care and 
conduct expert witness in this case. 
2. I graduated from University ofIdaho Schoo1 of Law in 1980 with a juris doctorate. I am 
a member in good standing of the Idaho State Bar. I was an Ada County, Idaho 
magistrate judge hearing, among others, family law cases between 1988 and December 
1992. From 1994 through the present I have been an Idaho attorney practicing almost 
exclusively in the area of family law. 
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3. I am currently licensed to practice law in Idaho, and I am a former Ada County 
Magistrate Judge. 
4. I have reviewed the Defendants' divorce file and Court file in this case. I have also 
reviewed the audio recording of the AprilS, 2004 divorce proceeding. 
S. My opinions stated herein are based on what I believe was the standard of care and 
conduct for an attorney in Idaho during the relevant years 2003-2006, when the 
Defendants represented Ms. Stephen in her divorce proceedings. 
6. I am assuming certain facts as true when providing my opinion, and I am in no way 
asserting that I have personal knowledge of any facts of consequence in the case. As an 
expert witness, however, I believe I can provide my opinions based on certain 
assumptions that the Plaintiff must prove at trial. 
7. I have reviewed both the 2003 and 2004 versions ofIRPC 1.14. They specifically 
provide guidance for an attorney when that attorney is representing a person with a 
"disability" or with "diminished capacity." (The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
were amended in July 2004, and Rule 1.14 addressing this issue was changed.) 
8. rfMs. Stephen disclosed at any time to the Defendants certain psychological conditions 
including that she was bi~polar and was taking medications for psychosis, the standard of 
care and conduct for an attorney would be to investigate these conditions with Ms. 
Stephen's medical providers at the earliest opportunity after the disclosure to detennine 
the nature and extent of Ms. Stephen's conditions and to detennine whether Ms. Stephen 
needed a guardian. 
9. After such disclosures, if the Defendants did not investigate Ms. Stephen's conditions 
with the relevant medical care providers, the Defendants' conduct fell below the standard 
of care. 
10. I have read the Answer and Counterclaim these Defendants filed on Ms. Stephen's 
behalf, which indicates the Defendants were seeking spousal maintenance based on 
Idaho Code 32~ 704 and 32-705. Seeking maintenance under these statutes requires the 
attorney to investigate facts establishing the factors set out in Idaho Codes Sections 32-
704 and 32-705. Failure to investigate these facts would constitute a breach of the 
Attorney's duty of diligence. 
11. In my opinion, this divorce presented complex issues based on the extent of the parties' 
real and personal property and the request for spousal maintenance. The issue of the 
Plainti.iPs disclosed mental health history made this divorce more complicated. 
Attorneys pursuing this case therefore should have had experience, legal knowledge and 
skill necessary to represent a potentially mentally impaired client in a divorce proceeding 
that involved a corrununity estate of approximately $1,000,000.00. An attorney 
representing Ms. Stephen in this case who lacked such experience, legal knowledge and 
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skill would have violated his duty of competency to Ms. Stephen and such conduct 
would fall below the standard of care and competence. 
12. One of the criteria stated in Idaho Code 32-705 for a Court to consider when deciding 
whether or not to order spousal maintenance is "fault." The Court is required consider 
the "fault" of either party and compare fault if there are allegations constituting fault 
raised by both parties. In my experience as a magistrate and family law attorney, 
however, infidelity in and of itself is not considered sufficient grounds for denying 
spousal support, and if considered at all is to be considered by the court only in 
determining the amount and duration of spousal support. I cannot recall any specific 
cases in which I have been directly involved as a magistrate or attorney that involved 
each party claiming that the other's infidelity established "fault" grounds under Idaho 
Code Section 32-705. However, based on my knowledge and experience, such a 
situation would most likely be considered a "wash." 
13. In my professional opinion allegations of illegal drug use on behalf of the party 
requesting spousal support would not preclude an award of such support vvithout 
additional evidence of other disqualifying factors under Idaho Codes 32-705, such as, for 
instance, the financial hardship of the requesting spouse having been caused by the 
expenditure of significant income and resources on the acquisition of drugs. 
14. rfMs. Stephen was unemployed and had no means to provide payment to the Defendants 
for legal fees, and if her spouse was employed and earning in excess of $250,000.00 per 
year, the standard of care and conduct would be to seek pre-judgment payment of at least 
a portion of Ms. Stephen's attorney fees according to Idaho Code 32-704(3). If the 
Defendants did not pursue prejudgment payment of their Client's attorney fees, that 
conduct fell below the requisite standard of care. 
15. If in 2003 and 2004 (a) there had not been an appraisal of the Crescent Rim home since 
1999 (b) the home had not recently been on the market, and if the Defendants failed to 
advise Ms. Stephen that it would be prudent to obtain at least a Comparative Market 
Analysis, if not a fonnal appraisal, before agreeing to the value of this property, that 
conduct fell below the standard of care. 
16. The court file indicates that notwithstanding the primary asset in this divorce was Mr. 
Stephen's UPS retirement account, the Defendants failed to obtain a plan summary prior 
to settlement and failed to obtain valid QDRO before they withdrew nearly a full year 
after the decree was entered. Such conduct would fall below the standard of care and 
conduct. 
17. I have reviewed the Defendants' divorce file and there appeared to be minimal discovery 
propounded to or obtained from Mr. Stephen. Again, in a complex divorce case such as 
this, the fact that these Defendants did not even obtain Mr. Stephen's tax records 
indicates a lack of diligence. 
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18. Based on the length of the Stephen's marriage, Mr. Stephen's income compared with 
Ms. Stephen's lack of income, Ms. Stephen's unemployment at the time of the divorce, 
Ms. Stephen's documented mental conditions, and Ms. Stephen's lack of education, 
training and experience, and I believe the Court would have awarded Ms. Stephen 
spousal post-judgment spousal support. Depending upon the extent of Ms. Stephen's 
access to community funds during the divorce and/or the extent to which Mr. Stephens 
was paying community expenses during that same period of time, I believe that Ms. 
Stephens might also have been awarded pre-judgment (temporary) spousal support. 
19. If Ms. Stephen had been invohmtarily conunitted for mental issues until approximately a 
week before the divorce trial on August 5, 2004 and was taking medication that may 
have affected her ability to understand and comprehend the proceedings, the standard of 
care would have been to seek a short postponement of the trial until her mental stability 
could be confirmed by a medical provider. Failing to seek a short postponement and 
telling a client that the attorney would not seek a postponement unless the client got a 
"note" from a doctor, under the circumstances, is a breach of the standard of care and 
conduct. 
20. In my opinion the Defendants' conduct fell below the standard of care in the ways 
identified above and as a result of this conduct Ms. Stephen suffered damages, including 
a reasonable amount of spousal support per month, at least post-judgment but possibly 
pre-judgment also; a higher share of the community equity in the Crescent Rim property; 
and a credit of approximately $15,000.00 for payment of the judgment against the 
Crescent Rim property that was paid from community funds, but Mr. Stephens was 
credited ($30,000.00) as a debt to the community. 
I declare under penalty ofpetjury under the laws of the State ofIdaho and the laws of the 
United States, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED this _c2_1_~ ___ day of May 2008. 
caili~~ N~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2. l11:- day of ~t 2008. 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State ofIdaho 
Residing at: ~ ldttkl> f 
My Commission expires: I ::LIt j ~I z... 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the a<1.fv day of _-f--,--,<--+-_/ _ 200S, I 
caused to be served in the manner indicated a true and correct copy of th foregoing to the 
following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
Attorney for Sal1az & Gatewood, CHID., 
And Scott Gatewood 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Attorney for Dennis Sallaz. 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
Eric R. Clark 
AFFIDA VlT OF CATHY L. NAUGLE· 5 
JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF JOlIN PRIOR 
IS8#5344 
16 lih Avenue S., Suite 113 
Nampa, 10 83651 
(208) 465-9839 
Fa.x (208) 465-9834 
Attorney for Defendant 
JUN 022008 
j. DAVID NAVARH(j. ~:eif( 
6'1l. Ar"IES 
JF.Pf~:T'I 
IN THE l)ISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAGISTRA TE DIVISION 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GA TWOOD, CHTD., 
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT 
GATEWOOD, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV OC 0614241 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant Scott Gatewood by and through his counsel of record John 
Prior and submits this reply brief in support of Defendant Gatewood's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
" .. / 
( .. .. ~ 
In Heinze. V. Bauer 2008 IDSCCI33579-012508, the COurt Was presented with a 
substantialfy similar case arising Out of the 4'" JUdicial District. In the Heinze case, the court 
&ranted SUInmmy judgment to Mr. Bauer, the Defendant in that case. In the Heinze case, it 
should be noted that Mr. Heinze at the time of the original divorce settlement expressed 
concerns regarding the sufficiency of the settlement. In the present case, Ms. Stephens never 
expressed Concerns regarding the settlement of her case until wel/ after any time to set aside her 
divorce. In the Heinze decision the court noted" that Judicial estoppel is applied when a litigant 
obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, through means of Sworn 
statements, and subsequently adopts inconsistent and Contrary al/egations or testimony to obtain 
a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 
Loomis, 76 Idaho at 93-94. 277 P.2d at 565. "Heinze p.2 Both the present case and the Heinze 
case are remarkably similar with the only exception being that Ms Stephens is alleging that she 
Suffered from some disability at the time of her agreement in the divorce case. In her affidavit 
which was provided in opposition to this SUmmmy judgment motion she al/eges that she was 
bipolar at the time of the pendency of this divorce. In her complaint in this case, she al/eges this 
disability prevented her from understanding the nature of the divorce proceedings. The Plaintiff 
has never submitted any medical dOcumentation in the form of an affidavit by a medical 
professional that contirms this medical condition. The Plaintiff has the burden of establishing 
that this medical condition Was present at the time of the entry of the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce and that the medical condition prevented her from understanding the nature of the 
prOCeedings. The Plaintiff has fuiled to provide any medical expert testimony to suPPOrt this 
)osition. In addition, the Plaintiff cannot decide subsequent to a stipulated Judgment of Decree 
<MORANDUM IN SUpPORT OF MOnON FOR SUMMARY .Jph~' 
of Divorce being entered that she did not like the benefit of the bargain she received This is 
consistent with the findings by the court in the Heinze case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting that the divorce settlement was 
unfair. Further, Mr. Gatewood's recommendation to settle was an infonned decision based on 
the relevant law and facts of this case and therefore Mr. Gatewood was not negligent. Finally, 
Plaintiff cannot prove that, had things been done differently, she would have obtained a better 
settlement. Plaintiff cannot prove that the advice caused her damages. Further Plaintiff 
provided no medical evidence to support her claim that her disability if any prevented her from 
understanding the nature of the divorce proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim cannot 
succeed and, as a matter oflaw, Mr. Gatewood's motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
DA TED this (;1 day of June 2008. 
//jOHN PRIOR 
/ ~ttorney for Defendant 
'--'// 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"J . I~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2=. - day of June 2008, I caused a true copy of the 
foregoing Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to be served by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Charles Crafts 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Fax: (208) 389-2109 
±>tY.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
7tEacsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~YFacsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAlYIELA K. JEORGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., and ) 
SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
CASE NO. CV OC 06-14241 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANN K. 
SHEPARD 
COMES NOW Ann Shepard, after being first duly sworn upon oath and deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho 
2. That my law practice is mainly focused in the area offamily law, including divorce cases. 
3. That I represented Gary Stephen, in his divorce, with his ex-wife Pam Stephen, Case No. 
CV DR 03011S1 0, which was settled by stipulation on August 5, 2004. 
4. That on the Sth day of August, 2004, r met with Scott Gatewood and Pam Stephen, along 
with my client Gary Stephen and negotiated a settlement in their pending divorce case. I 
observed Pam Stephen both during our final negotiations as well as during the time the 
agreement was placed on the record in front of Judge Day. 
AFFrDAVIT OF ANN K. SHEPARD - Page I 
5. That my observation of Pam Stephen on August 5, 2004 was that she understood the 
negotiations, participated in the negotiations and made the decision as to her agreement to 
the final settlement. Mrs. Stephen appeared to be lucid and articulate. 
6. That on August 5, 2004, my client, Gary Stephen, remarked that Mrs. Stephen appeared 
to be clear headed and appeared to be un-medicated. 
7. That as the attorney for Gary Stephen, I counseled my client that the ultimate settlement 
was generous on his part, and that we may well get a more favorable outcome if we were 
to proceed to trial. My client was, and is, a kind person who wanted to be fair to his wife, 
even under the difficult circumstances of the divorce. On the instruction of my client, I 
settled the case on what I considered to be very favorable terms for Mrs. Stephen. 
8. That I am familiar with the property distribution between Pam and Gary Stephen as 
outlined in their final divorce decree, Case No. CV DR 0301151D. There was ultimately 
an unequal division of the community property in favor of Pam Stephen, and there are 
additional other factors that made the settlement even more favorable to Mrs. Stephen. 
First, there was a very good chance that the property on Beach Street would have been 
awarded to my client as his separate property. In addition, my client assumed all of the 
costs necessary to repair both the Beach Street and the Crescent Rim residences, which 
had been damaged and neglected by Mrs. Stephen and her boyfriend and friends. Also, 
many of the outstanding debts were incurred by Mrs. Stephen and her boyfriend for 
improper purposes while the divorce action was pending. 
9. That I advised my client that spousal support was not warranted in the divorce action 
because Mrs. Stephen's behavior was clearly the cause of the divorce, and that Mrs. 
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Stephen was at fault. I was prepared to produce evidence that the underlying cause for 
the divorce was that while the parties were still married, Mrs. Stephen moved her 
boyfriend into the parties' residence and both were financially supported by my client for 
nearly two years. Mrs. Stephen's boyfriend physically threatened my client and forced 
him from his own home. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
ANN SHEPARD 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWO RN To before me this (f!frJay of ;:]C;:ty , 2007. 
\ ffiL \~ \ ~ul '~~ = \-'0 j Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: &~IG<./ i , 
Commission Expires: Z1 L~( /1 
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JOHN PRIOR 
Law Oftice of John Prior 
16 121h Avenue S., Suite 113 
Nampa. [D 83651 
Telephone: (208) 465-9839 
Facsimile: (208) 465-9834 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., and ) 
SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
--------------------------~ 
STA IE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County 01' Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 06-14241 
AFFIDAVIT OF MILLIS 
M.ANDERSON 
COMES NOW Millis M. Anderson, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am a legal assistant for the law offices of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., and have been 
in that capacity for more than 6 years. 
2. I worked on the Pam Stephens divorce matter on a regular basis during the time she 
was represented by this office. In that capacity I had many contacts with Ms. 
Stephens in the course of her case, including in-person visits at the office and 
telephone calls. 
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3. At no time was I ever concerned about Ms. Stephens ability to understand or 
respond to anything going on in her case or communications with this office. 
4. She was certainly articulate and well able to understand any communication with her 
and respond appropriately with questions or answers, depending on the occasion and 
the material to be communicated. 
5. As a matter of fact, she did not hesitate to comment on exactly what she wanted, and 
what she expected. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. L/~!;~ j /' '_':-:?"V~'-'/:/ ,-.// / 
.:-/,./ .-4oCccc.:..?<L __ t.>;::t: _<!:".:; -?'~ 
Millis M. Anderson 
/) L' /-A 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this c{ '] ~ day of June, 2007. 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: /() . J / -J 0 10 
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JOHN PRIOR 
Law Office of John Prior 
16 121h Avenue S., Suite 113 
Nampa, ID 83651 
Telephone: (208) 465-9839 
Facsimile: (208) 465-9834 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., and ) 
SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 06-14241 
AFFIDAVIT OF KELLI 
M. WALTS 
COMES NOW Kelli M. Walts being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
I. I am the Receptionist and Billing Clerk for the law offices of Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd., and have been in that capacity for more than 8 years. 
2. As the Receptionist I spoke with Pam Stephens on her divorce matter on a regular 
basis during the time she was represented by this office and saw her when she came 
into the office. 
3. I do not recall any instance either in person or over the phone when Ms. Stephens did 
not seem to understand any communication with this office. She was able to 
AFFlDA ,IT OF KELLI M. WALTS, P. I 
articulate regarding the progress on her and what contact or 
information she wanted from the attorney handling her case. Although she was often 
impatient, at no time was I ever concerned about Ms. Stephens' ability to understand 
or respond to anything going on in her case or communications with this office. 
4. Ms. Stephens was well able to understand any communication with her and respond 
appropriately with questions or answers, depending on the occasion and the material 
to be communicated. 
5. I saw her bring in papers and documentation and she seemed to know exactly what 
she was bringing in and what those documents meant. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
KeU M. Walts 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this::..J'~ day of July, 2007. 
~J / ') 
. «7 ./ ./;, I 
" s </'?-??4..-;f.... ~-?i'Z{};-:.'J?7'~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Rhiding at Boise, Idaho . 
. ' :rvfy Commission Expires: ~L~.f<Y.:3 
: 
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JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
ISB#5344 
16 12th Avenue S., Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
Telephone (208) 465-9839 
Facsimile (208) 465-9834 
. Jrney for Defendant 
NO.------==-II-l-~1. I 
4M_ ~~t.i.7J: == 
JUN 2'~ 2008 
J. DAVIO NAVARRO, Clerk 
By,). EARLE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD, and 
SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
CASE NO. CV OC 0614241 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, by and through his 
attorney, JOHN PRlOR, and hereby presents this Motion to Reconsider pursuant to LR.C.P. 11 
(a)(2)(B) and respectfully requests this court reconsider its prior ruling denying Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on June 10, 2008. This motion is supported by the Affidavit 
submitted herewith. The basis for the motion is that the Plaintiff has not provided nor has the 
Plaintiff provided any medical expert that has made a determination that the Plaintiff was 
incompetent and thus unable to understand the legal proceedings in the divorce in Stephens v. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER - PAGE I 
Stephens. That discovery responses attached herewith confirm Plaintiff presently has no medical 
expert that can aid Plaintiff in establishing her claim of incompetence. 
(...----
DATED this 7f1 day of June, 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
c~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _~ day of June, 2008, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Continue was delivered by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Erik Clark 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 2504 
Eagle, 10 83616 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Charles Crafts 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120 
Boise, 1083705 
Fax: (208) 389-2109 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER - PAGE 2 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
\s,L) Facsim' 
)UN.24.2008 11=48AM & ASSOCIAT 
CHARLES C. CRAFTS rSB # 7070 
CRAFTS LAW INC. 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 8370S 
Phone: (208) 367~ 1749 
Facsimile: (208) 389~2109 
Attomey for Defendant: Dennh J. SIlDu 
NO. 172 P.l 
NO. 
A,M_-= ---"'~"'-'lE~-.:!tZtt= 
JUN 2 % 2008 
J. DAVID NAVARRO CI 
8 J ark yJ. EARLE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF mE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.; 
DENNIS SALLAZ and 
SCOTT GATEWOOD 
Defendant. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 06-14241 
AFFIDA VlT OF CHARLES C. 
CRAFTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
Charles C. Crafts, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am the attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz in the above-entitled action. 
2. That during the discovery process, I propounded requests for admissions on the Plaintiff. 
3. That in my Request for Admission No 10, I propounded the following Request and received 
the following response from the Plaintiff: 
a. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Please admit th.at you have never been 
diagnosed by a medical professional as incompetent to understand legal proceedings. 
b. RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Objection, relevance. 
AFFIDAVIT 0,., CHARLES C.CRAFTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RJo:CONSIDER·l 
Jt. NO. 172 P.2 
4. That this request was answered on December 4th, 2007, and that the Plaintiff has not filed 
any supplemental discovery, or provided a reason why this request is irrelevant. 
5. That allegations 14 and 15 of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint specifically state that the 
Plaintiffwas incompetent during the period of time that she entered into her divorce. 
6, That I have included a true and correct copy of the discovery responses I received. 
7. That I have read the same and know the contents thereof and that the same are true as I 
verily believe. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~day of June, 2008. 
AFFlDAvrr 0 .. " CHARLES C. CRAFTS IN SIJPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER· 2 
Eric R. Clark. ISB# 4697 
I I VN 1Sc H:i:iOCIRT 
C::UI;1 !lJ~·11 Jb 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW UROU P 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830.8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
12/4l2007 S:S3:0~( NO.172 P.3 Page 3 of 6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
PlaiJltift~ 
v. 
SALLAl & GA TEWOOD, CHTD., 
DENNIS St\LLAZ and SCOTT 
GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Cilse No.~ CV OC ()614241 
PLAINT[FF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEfENDANT SALLAZ' FIRST 
REQUEST fOR ADMISSIONS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and according to Rules 36(a), IRCP hereby provides the 
following objections responses to Detfmdant Sallaz' First Request for Admissions to the 
Plaintitf 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST fOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I: Please admit that YOli have not tiled a motion to 
set aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-0115 1 D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. ): Objection. Relevance. While the 
Plaintiff admits the factual allegation that the Plaintiff has not filed a motion to set aside the 
C"J 
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Judgment and Decree of Divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-0115 J D, the Plaintiff objects to this 
Reqllest as irreJevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, and as not being 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. r-h 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.2: Please admit tbat you have failed to fully mitigate 
your damages, if any, by nOt tiling a motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in 
Case No. CV DR03-0115ID. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.2: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO- 3: Please admit that YOll have not filed a motion to 
modify the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-011510. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.3: Objection. Relevance. While the 
Plaintiff admits the taenlal allegation that the Plaintiff has /lot tiled a motion to modify the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce III Case No. CV DR 03·01-151 D. the Pfaintiff ~jects. to this. 
Request as i'ielevant to the subject matter involved in the pellding action, and as not being 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: Please admit that you have failed to fl.llly mitigate 
your damages, if any, by not tiling a motion to modify the Judgment and Decl'ee of Divorce ill 
Case No. CV DR 03-01151 D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: DeilY. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSrON NO.5: Please admit that YOli \-\Jere present in the 
COlll1room on August 5, 2004, when the judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered Case No. 
CV DR03·01 151 D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST fOR ADMISSION NO.5: Admit the allegation that the Plaiiniff 
was in COW! on August 5, 2004, but denies the judgment or decree was "entered" at that time_ 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Please admit that you were placed under oath by 
Judge Day on August 5, 2004 ill Case No. CV DR 03·01151 D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: Please admit that once you were under oath, you 
informed Judge Day that yOll had reviewed the terms ofrhe divorce decree in Case No. CV DR 
03-0 Il51 D with your attorney, and that you did not have any questions regarding the terms of 
the divorce. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: TIle Plaintiff objection to this 
request to the extent that it suggests or implies that the Plaintiff initialed allY cOllversation with 
Judge Day. TI,e Plaintiff will admit that she responded affirmatively to Judge Day's questions, 
as instnlcted by her counsel prior to the hearing. 
[ "1 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Please admit that YOLI produced, in your OWJl 
handwriting, the documents attached herein as Exhibits A & B. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Exhibit A, Admit. Exhibit S, 
Objection, relevance. Additionally, without waiving this o~jec!iol1, the Plaintiff does not recall 
drafting this note and therefore denies its authenticity. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9: Please admit that Dennis SalJaz did not assist, or consult 
YOli in allY manner in Case No. CV DR 03-01151 D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9: Deny. AOtf, .... 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.1 0: Please admit that you have never been diagnosed 
by a medical pmfessionaJ as incompetent to understand legal proceedings. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. to: Objection, relevance. 
REQUEST fOR ADMISSION NO. II: Please admit that YOll waited nearly two yeal's 
from the time YOllr calise of action accrued to tile this lawsuit. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADM (SSrON NO. J 1: Objection: Relevance. Without 
waiving the objection, the Plaintiff tiled this action within 13 months after the Defendants 
withdrew from representing hel' in Case No. CV DR 03-0115 I D, and therefore denies the factual 
allegation as well. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Please admit that, initially, you tiled this lawsuit 
pro sa, or without an attorney. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Objection: Relevance. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Please admit that any amount of money you 
receive in this case, if any, may be commllility property. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. )3: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Please admit that Gary Stephen may be entitled 
to a portion of the proceeds, ifan)" ifyoll were successful in this case. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Please admit that Dennis Sallaz was not the 
senior attorney responsible for supervising Defendant Scott Gatewood during the time of yo til' 
divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-01151 D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION SO. 15: Deny, 
[ . ) 
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DA TED this 4th day of December, 2007. 
THE REAL ESTATE LAWGROUP 
ERIC R. CLARK, ISS #4697 
Attomey for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
NU.l('::: I"'.b 
f->oge 0 016 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of December 2007. I caused to be served in the 
manner indicated a tme and con'eet copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue SOllth. Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 8365/ 
Attol11ey for Sa/laz &, Gatewood, CHTD., 
And Scott Gatewood 
CHA.RLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LA W, INC 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise. 10 !:<3705 
Attomey for Dennis Sallaz. 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
F.ric R, Clark 
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Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, 1083616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
JUl 2 8 2008 
J. DAVID NAVARRO ("".", I, 1.~J vi' ri\ 
8y KATHY J. SIEHl. ~ 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
PLAI NTIFF'S PRE-TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, and files her 
pre-trial memorandum. 
I. ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
a. Legal Malpractice (Negligence). 
a. Duty 
b. Breach 
PLAINTwr's PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - I 
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c. Causation 
d. Damages 
b. Breach of Contract. 
a. Existence of a contractual relationship 
b. Breach 
c. Damages 
/I. CONTESTED FACTS 
a. Whether the Defendants' conduct constituted legal malpractice. 
b. Whether the Plaintiff suffered damages and if so, the nature and extent of 
these damages. 
/II. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW 
Whether a judge or Jury should decide issues relevant to the divorce case as 
a judge not a jury would have decided those issues in the underlying divorce 
action, 
a. The amount and duration of spousal maintenance, 
b, The equitable division of property. 
IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES, 
a. The admission of medical records. Based on the discovery proceedings, 
the Plaintiff believes the Defendants will attempt to introduce medical 
records by asking the Plaintiff to authenticate these documents, As the 
Plaintiff did not create the documents and has no knowledge as to 
whether the medical information contained therein is accurate, the Plaintiff 
PLAINTJlT'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2 
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cannot authenticate these records and the Defendants are required to 
present the custodians or the doctors who created the documents for 
proper authentication. 
V. AGREED OR STIPULATED FACTS. 
a. None. 
VI. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF AUTHORITIES ON ISSUES OF LAW. 
The circumstances of this case require the determination as to whether the Court 
or jury should consider and decide issues raised in the divorce proceedings. 
1. Spousal Maintenance. A court, not a jury, appears to have sole authority to 
consider and grant spousal maintenance according to Idaho Code 32-705. 
Idaho Code 32-705 MAINTENANCE. 
1. Where a divorce is decreed, the court may grant a maintenance 
order if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: 
(a) Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable 
needs; and 
(b) Is unable to support himself or herself through employment. 
·2. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such 
periods of time that the court deems just, after considering all 
relevant factors which may include: 
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance, 
including the marital property apportioned to said spouse, and said 
spouse's ability to meet his or her needs independently; 
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to 
enable the spouse seeking maintenance to find employment; 
(c) The duration of the marriage; 
(d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse 
seeking maintenance; 
PLAINTlrr's PRE-TRIAL MEMOR/\NDUM - 3 
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(e) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to 
meet his or her needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking 
maintenance; 
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse; 
(g) The fault of either party. 
The Plaintiff believes that during the trial, she is entitled to present evidence to 
support her claim for spousal maintenance to the Court without the jury present. If the 
Court rules that the Plaintiff is entitled to maintenance, the Court would then instruct the 
Jury that it has decided the amount and duration of spousal maintenance in accordance 
with the criteria listed in Idaho Code 32-705. The Court would then instruct the Jury 
that it is their duty to determine whether or not the Defendants' failure to obtain spousal 
maintenance constituted legal malpractice. Alternatively, if the Court rules that the 
Plaintiff is not entitled to maintenance, then that issue is resolved. 
2. Community property distribution. The same issue arises regarding the 
distribution of the community property. 
32-712 COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND HOMESTEAD -- DISPOSITION. 
In case of divorce by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, 
the community property and the homestead must be assigned as follows: 
1. The community property must be assigned by the court in such 
proportions as the court, from all the facts of the case and the 
condition of the parties, deems just, with due consideration of the 
following factors: 
(a) Unless there are compelling reasons otherwise, there shall be a 
substantially equal division in value, considering debts, between the 
spouses. 
PLAINTIrr'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 4 
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(b) Factors which may bear upon whether a division shall be equal, or 
the manner of division, include, but are not limited to: 
(1) Duration of the marriage; 
(2) Any antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, that 
the court shall have no authority to amend or rescind any such 
agreement; 
(3) The age, health, occupation, amount and source of income, 
vocational skills, employability, and liabilities of each spouse; 
(4) The needs of each spouse; 
(5) Whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to 
maintenance; 
(6) The present and potential earning capability of each party; and 
(7) Retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, social security, 
civil service, military and railroad retirement benefits. 
* * * 
Again, the Plaintiff believes that the Court shoud consider and resolve all 
issues relating to the distribution of community property, and if that figure is 
different that the figure used in the divorce proceedings to value the property, the 
Court would instruct the Jury that it has calculated what it believes is the proper 
distribution and if that figure indicates the Plaintiff was entited to receive more 
value in community property than she actually received when represented by the 
Defendants, then the Court would instruct the jury that it is their duty to 
determine if the Defendants' conduct resulted in the Plaintiff receiving less of the 
value of community property then she was entitled. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of July, 2008. 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of July, 2008, I caused to be served in the 
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC. 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, 10 83705 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
Eric R. Clark 
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Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-
TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, and files her 
pre-trial memorandum. 
I. ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
a. Legal Malpractice (Negligence). 
a. Duty 
b. Breach 
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c. Causation 
d. Damages 
b. Breach of Contract. 
a. Existence of a contractual relationship 
b. Breach 
c. Damages 
II. CONTESTED FACTS 
a. Whether the Defendants' conduct constituted legal malpractice. 
b. Whether the Defendants breached their contract with the Plaintiff. 
c. Whether the Plaintiff suffered damages and if so, the nature and extent of 
these damages. 
III. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW 
Whether a judge or Jury should decide issues relevant to the divorce case as 
a judge not a jury would have decided those issues in the underlying divorce 
action. 
a. The amount and duration of spousal maintenance. 
b. The equitable division of property. 
IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES. 
a. The admission of medical records. Based on the discovery proceedings, 
the Plaintiff believes the Defendants will attempt to introduce medical 
records by asking the Plaintiff to authenticate these documents. As the 
Plaintiff did not create the documents and has no knowledge as to 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2 
whether the medical information contained therein is accurate, the Plaintiff 
cannot authenticate these records and the Defendants are required to 
present the custodians or the doctors who created the documents for 
proper authentication. 
V. AGREED OR STIPULATED FACTS. 
a. None. 
VI. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF AUTHORITIES ON ISSUES OF LAW. 
Due to the Court's ruling on July 29, 2008 in which the Court stated the trier of 
fact would decide all issues presented at the trial, regardless of whether the Court 
would have decided certain issues in the divorce proceedings, the Plaintiff withdraws 
this argument. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 1 st day of August, 2008. 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 st day of August, 2008, I caused to be served in 
the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC. 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, 10 83705 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
/. 
,°1 
/ i 
Eric R. Clark 
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Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, 1083616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
,~"'. . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT 
GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL 
CONDUCT 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, and files this 
Motion in Limine to exclude evidence at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
;' 't/fj 
. 2008 
During the discovery phase of this case the Defendants have made it abundantly 
clear they intend to employ character assignation as a prominent strategy in their 
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defense. The Plaintiff objects to this tactic and seeks to exclude any evidence of illegal 
activity as that evidence is not relevant, and if it is relevant, its prejudicial effect 
outweighs its relevance. 
1. Relevance. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant 
evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these 
rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
This case involves a "case within a case" and the underlying case was a divorce 
proceeding. Neither party sought a "fault" type divorce, and each pled they were 
seeking a divorce bases on "irreconcilable differences." Evidence of any illegal conduct 
by either party to the divorce would therefore be irrelevant. As any alleged illegal 
conduct would have been irrelevant in the divorce proceeding, it is equally irrelevant in t 
his case. 
2. Undue Prejudice. "Even if relevant to a permissible purpose, evidence of 
uncharged misconduct is subject to exclusion under I.R.E. 403 if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." "The determination of 
whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the 
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court." Thorn Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Smith, 
137 Idaho 480, 486, 50 P.3d 975 (2002) (Internal cites omitted) (Emphasis added). 
In this case, the Defendant will attempt to introduce evidence of the Plaintiff's 
alleged use of illegal substances. While the Plaintiff contends such evidence is clearly 
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irrelevant, it is also extremely prejudicial. That prejudice clearly outweighs any minimal 
relevance and should therefore be excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court GRANT this motion in its entirety and 
Order the exclusion of any evidence of the Plaintiffs alleged use of illegal substances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this 6th day of August, 2008. 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of August, 2008, I caused to be served in 
the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC. 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, 1083705 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
Eric R. Clark 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT - 4 
CHARLES C, CRAFTS ISB # 7070 
CRAFTS LAW INC. 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. Orchard, Ste, 120 
Boise) ID 83705 
Phone: (208) 367-1749 
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109 
Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. Sallaz 
.1 ·1 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICL\L DISTRICT OF TIlE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff: 
VS. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.; 
DENNIS SALLAZ and 
SCOTT GATEWOOD 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 06-14241 
MOTION TO REMOVE BOB 
WALLACE AS GUARDIAN 
AND/OR NOT REFER TO HIM AS 
GUARDIAN DURING TRIAL 
COMES NOW the Defendants, DENNIS SALLAZ, by and through his counsel of 
record, CHARLES CRAFTS, and pursuant to I.e. 66-322 and LR.C.P. 17 hereby moves this 
Court for an Order removing Bob Wallace as the Guardian in this case. In the alternative, the 
Defendants seek an Order In Limine to keep the Plaintiff from referring to Bob vVallace as her 
guardian during trial. 
Respectfully sublnitted this ~ day of August, 2008. 
Attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz 
MOTION TO REMOVE B08 WALLACE AS CUARDIAN ANDIOR NOT REFER TO HIM: AS GUARorAN DURING l'RIAL - I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of August, 2008, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of 
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Eric R. Clark 
THE REAL ESTATE LA \V GROUP 
P.O. Box. 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
John Prior 
Law Offices of John Prior 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Namp~ Idaho 83651 
Attorney for Sal/a;; & Gatewood, CHTD. 
And Scott Gatewood 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[~ 
[ J 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[~ 
[ ] 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
CMlECF 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
CMlECF 
Attorney for Defendant Dezmis 1. Sallaz 
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CHARLES C. CRAFT'S 1SB # 7070 
CRAFTS LAW INC. 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Phone: (208) 367-1749 
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109 
Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. Sallaz 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA 1<.. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.; 
DENNIS SALLAZ and 
SCOTT GATEWOOD 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 06-14241 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO REMOVE BOB 
WALLACE AS GUARDIAN 
AND/OR NOT REFER TO HIM AS 
GUARDIAN DURING TRIAL 
COMES NOW the Defendants, DENNIS SALLAZ, by and through his counsel of 
record, CHARLES CRAFTS, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Remove Bob Wallace as Guardian. 
1. 
I.e. § 66-322 SETS OUT CERTAIN FACTORS THAT ARE INSTRUCTIVE AS TO 
WHETHER OR NOT A GUARDIAN SHOULD BE APPOINTED 
Idaho Code § 66-322 addresses the issue of appointing a guardian for purposes of 
medical treatment, and it lays out very specific standards for the appointment of a Guardian. It 
states in pertinent part: 
MEMORANlJUM IN SUPPORT Of MOTION TO ~EMOVE nOB WALLACE AS CUARDIAN AND/OR NOT REFER TO HIM AS 
GUARDIAN DUnINGTRIAL-1 
(a) Proceedings for the appointment of a guardian of a mentally ill 
person may be commenced by the filing 0 f a written petition with a 
court of competent jurisdiction by a friend, relative, spouse or guardian 
of the proposed patient, by a licensed physician, licensed clinical 
psychologist, prosecuting attorney, or other public official of a 
municipality, county or of the state of Idaho, or by the director of any 
facility in which such patient may be. 
(b) The petition shall state the name and last known address of the 
proposed patient; the name and address of either the spouse, next of 
kin or friend of the proposed patient; whether a guardian of the 
proposed patient has been previously appointed under the laws of this 
or any other state and, if so) the name and address of the guardian and 
the circumstances of such appointment; and a precise statement 
showing that the proposed patient is mentally il~ that treatment is 
available for such illness, and that the proposed patient lacks capacity 
to make infurmed decisions about treatment. 
eC) Any such petition shall be accompanied by a certificate of a 
licensed physician or licensed clinical psychologist stating that the 
nhysician or psychologist has personally examined the proposed 
gatient within the last fourteen (14) days and is of the opinion: (i) 
that the proposed patient is mentally ill (in that in the absence of 
treatment the immediate prognosis is for major distress of the 
proposed gatient which will result in serious mental or physical 
deterioration of the proposed patient, (iii) that treatment is 
available which is likely to avoid serious mental or physical 
deterioration of the proposed patient, and (j,v) that the proposed 
uatient lacks capacity to make informed decisions about 
treatment; or by a written statement by the physician or 
n,wchologist that the proposed patient bas refused to submit to an 
examination. 
(d) Upon receipt of a petition, the court shall within forty-eight 
(48) hours appoint anbther licensed physician or licensed clinical 
psychologist to make a personal examination of the proposed 
patient or if the proposed patient has not been examined, th~ 
court shall appoint two (2l licensed physicians or licensed clinical 
psychologists to make individual personal examinations of the 
proposed gatient and :rnay order the proposed patient to submit to 
an immediate examination. Within seventy-two (72) hours, the 
I 
physician or psychologist shall file with the court certificates 
described in subparagraph (e) above. if necessary. 
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(e) Upon receipt of such petition and certificates, the court shall 
appoint a time and place .fur hearing not more than seven (7) days from 
receipt of such certificates and thereupon give written notice to the 
proposed patient. The notice shall include a copy of the petition and 
certificates and notice ofthe proposed. patient's right to be represented 
by an attorney, or if indigent, to be represented by a comt~appointed 
attorney. Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall also be 
given to the petitioner. Emphasis Added. 
The Statute is instntctive as to when a guardian may be appointe~ but the following 
factors seem to be the most important: 
(i) that the proposed patient is mentally ill, 
(ii) that in the absence of treatment the immediate prognosis is for major distress of 
the proposed patient which will result in serious mental or physical deterioration 
of the proposed patient, 
(iii) that treatment is available which is likely to avoid serious mental or physical 
deterioration of the proposed patient, and 
(iv) that the proposed patient lacks capacity to make informed decisions about 
treatment ... 
Obviously, none ofthis information was provided to the Court, so the appointment of a 
guardian was inappropriate. Additionally, we have testimony from an expert stating that a 
person who is invo luntarily committed to a mental hospital because of suicidal thoughts should 
not be presumed to be incompetent to understand legal proceedings. In fact, suicidal thoughts 
are quite common - especially during times of high stress, 
2008: 
2. 
THE PLAINTIFF NOW ADMITS THAT SHE IS MENTALLY COMPETENT TO 
UNDERSTAND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. 
The fullowing excerpts are taken from Ms. Stephen's discovery responses filed on July 7, 
a. Pam will confirm that no medical care providers have been retained or paid for an 
opinion that Pa1111acked "mental competency to understand legal proceedings." 
b. Pam pled that she was taking prescribed medication on August 5, 2004 that she believed 
impaired her judgment and ability to comprehend the legal proceedings. Pam has not 
MEMORANOUM IN SUl'l'ORT OF MonON TO REMOVli: BOB W ALLACf.; AS GUARDlA!'! ANDIOR NOT R.EFER TO HJM AS 
GUAROIAN DURING TIUAL - 3 
asserted as tIus Interrogatory suggests that she suffered some diagnosed condition that 
impaired her "mental competency." 
Apparently, the only reason why Ms. Stephen's mental capacity is even at issue is 
because the Plaintiff now claims that she should have been given a higher award of spousal 
maintenance. Consequently, her mental condition does not impair her ability to understand the 
legal proceedings, so a guardian is unnecessary. 
3. 
ROBERT WALLACE IS INAPPROPRIATE AS A GUARDIAN BECAUSE HE WAS 
ORIGINALLY HIRED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
On Apri116, 2007, Robert Wallace was listed as an expert witness for the Plaintiff After 
his review of the case, Mr. Wallace Inade the fullowing findings: 
A. Opinion: Mr. Wallace will testify that the conduct of the Defendants fell below the 
standard of care and conduct as follows: 
1. The Defendants failed to recognize or appreciate the need to obtain a 
guardian to protect Pam Stephen's interests in the divorce after her 
disclosure of her mental conditions. 
2. The Defelldants failed to investigate the disclosed mental conditions or 
contact any treating physician to determine what effect these mental 
conditions had on Pam Stephen's ability to understand and comprehend 
legal proceedings. 
Thereafter, on January 1,2007, Mr. Wallace filed an affidavit with this court stating that 
he could serve as the guardian in this case, and he was appointed. There does not appear to be 
any case law on point regarding this issue, but it seems improper that someone hired to work as 
an expert witness is later entrusted with the position of guardian. On its face, there are several 
potential conflicts of interest. 
A. A guardian should make infurmed decisions on behalf of their ward, regardless of 
what the potential consequences may be. Because Mr. Wallace was retained as an 
expert witness, his view 0 f the facts may be different than a neutral detached 
guardian. 
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B. A guardian hired as an expert witness may be more willing to favor the opinion 
and viewpoints of the side that initially hired him. 
C. Mr. Wallace has already stated his opinion of the case, so it may be difficult for 
defense counsel to deal with him at arm's length. 
D. As a guardian, Mr. Wallace literally steps into the shoes of Ms. Stephen as the 
Plaintiff in this case. Necessarily, it may be in Ms. Stephen's best interest to have 
a guardian who WaS not previously retained as an expert in her own case. Once 
again, someone looking at this case without any preconceived notions may have a 
very different outlook than someone who was originally hired to testify on behalf 
of one party. 
In making this argument, the defense is not asserting that rvtr. Wallace or Mr. Clark have 
done anything improper in this case. Rather, we are stating that there is a potential conflict of 
interest in having Mr. Wallace as the guardian. 
4. 
IF MR. WALLACE CONTINUES AS THE GUARD!AJ.~ IN THIS CASE, THE 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO REFER TO mM AS HER GUARDIAN 
Admitting evidence of that Mr. Wallace is the guardian in this case is irrelevant. "Relevant 
Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the eXlStence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the detennination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. Obviously, the Plaintiff will assert at trial that the Defendants 
should have had a guardian appointed on behalf of Ms. Stephen. If Mr. Wallace is introduced as 
Ms. Stephen's guardian, a jury may :infer that the Defendants should have requested a guardian 
simply because one was appointed in this case. 
Next, even ifthe presence of a guardian is relevant, the probative value of such evidence 
is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect it would have on the Defendant. Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger a f unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jtrry, or by considerations 
MEMORANDUM IN SUl'{'ORT OF MonON TO REMOVE Bon WALLACE AS GUARD JAN AND/OR NOT REFER TO IHM AS 
GUARDIAN DU.RING TRIAL - 5 
of undue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. l.RE. 403. Once 
again, introducing Mr. Wallace as the guardian is extremely prejudicial to the defense, and has 
absolutely no probative value whatsoever for the Plaintiff. 
4, 
CONCLUSION 
For the f'Oregoing reasons, we would respectfully request that Mr. Wallace be removed as 
the guardian in this case, or in the alternative, that he not be introduced as the guardian for Ms. 
Stephen during trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 0 day of August, 2008. 
Attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz 
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Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF 
RE: RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
AND 
REQUEST FOR CONTINUING 
OBJECTION 
In an effort to get the train back on the tracks, the Plaintiff files this Memorandum 
of Law concerning the scope of relevant evidence at trial. 
The Plaintiff sought to narrow the relevant issues at trial to 1) the Defendants' 
conduct regarding the valuation of the Crescent Rim home, and 2) the Defendants' 
failure to account for payment of the judgment from community funds. The only relevant 
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evidence thereafter would address the calculation and value of the community estate in 
light of these two factors. 
Despite these seeming limited issues, the Defendants are attempting to conduct 
a divorce trial and to introduce evidence that the Plaintiff is somehow at fault and 
therefore the Court would have allocated her less than she deserved when the 
community estate was divided. This contention however, that fault is a relevant factor in 
determining the "equitable division" of community, is not supported by statue or case 
law. 
"Unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise, the court in a divorce 
action is required to make a substantially equal division in value, considering debts, of 
the community property between the spouses." Larson v. Larson, 139 Idaho 970,971-
2,88 P.3d 1210 (2004). Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85,822 P.2d 982 (1991); IDAHO 
CODE § 32-712(1)(a) (1996). (Emphasis added). 
Additionally, "Idaho Code § 32-712 specifically addresses how community 
property is to be divided. This section calls for an equal division of community property 
unless there are "compelling reasons" to do otherwise. The section lists a number of 
factors that the court may consider in determining the property division: 
(1) Duration of the marriage; 
(2) Any antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, that the 
court shall have no authority to amend or rescind any such agreement; 
(3) The age, health, occupation, amount and source of income, vocational 
skills, employability, and liabilities of each spouse; 
(4) The needs of each spouse; 
(5) Whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; 
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(6) The present and potential earning capability of each party; and 
(7) Retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, social security, civil 
service, military and railroad retirement benefits. 
Under this statute, the trial court has the discretion to fashion a just division of the 
community property." Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331,333,900 P.2d 807 (1995), 
citing Ross v. Ross, 117 Idaho 548,554,789 P.2d 1139, 1145 (1990); and Shurtliffv. 
Shurtliff, 112 Idaho 1031,1034,739 P.2d 330, 333 (1987). 
During this trial, the Court overruled the Plaintiff's relevance objection to 
testimony regarding the Plaintiffs alleged "boyfriend." The Plaintiff renews this 
objection as "fault" is not a relevant criterion when considering the statutory distribution 
of community assets. 
Additionally, while the Defendants' argue that if the Plaintiff was somehow 
"wasting" community property, then the Court could fashion some type of relief in the 
form of an inequitable distribution, that contention is also irrelevant in light of the limited 
issues presented for trial. If the Plaintiff prevails, the value of the community estate will 
change in relation to the increased value of the Crescent Rim home and based on the 
proper accounting for the pre-decree payment of a $28,000.00 judgment from 
community funds. It does not get much simpler than that. 
When the Plaintiff provided the Court with her estimation of the length of the trial, 
she did so intending to present evidence to support her limited claims. However, if 
these Defendants want to retry the entire divorce proceeding, which they apparently are 
pursuing, then this trial is going to take much longer and involve the introduction of a 
substantial amount of otherwise irrelevant evidence. 
PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF RE: RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND REQUEST FOR CONTINUING 
OBJECTION - 3 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of August, 2008. 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff 
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Eric R. Clark 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
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SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD, and 
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CASE NO. CV OC 0614241 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
PURSUANT TO IRCP II(a)(2) B 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, by and through his 
attorney, JOHN PRIOR, and hereby presents this Motion to Reconsider pursuant to LR.C.P. II 
(a)(2)B and respectfully requests this court reconsider its prior ruling. A Memorandum in 
Support of Motion supports this Motion for Reconsideration submitted herewith and as follows: 
I. The court did not reduce the damages assessed against Scott Gatewood in the 
amount of $10,000 for the separate property of Mr. Stephens for the Beach 
Street residence. 
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2. The court should not include the $28,000 indebtedness for the lien was paid 
prior to the divorce against Mr. Gatewood in determining damages. 
3. The Defendant represents that it is his belief that the appraisal experts for the 
defense determined the Crescent Rim Property to be valued at between 
$375,000 to $400,000. That the court should take the testimony of defense 
witnesses as to value of the property. Further that the court in its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law noted a range of $275,000 to $400,000 as 
opposed to what defense believes was a range of$375,000 to $400,000. 
4. That the court reconsiders its prior ruling regarding the applicability of Heinz 
v. Bauer 2008 ID R0128.004 based upon its Findings of Fact that Ms Stephens 
was not incompetent. 
y.-:.-
DATED this -.J2 day of October, 2008. 
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410 S. Orchard St., Suite 120 
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Fax: (208) 389-2109 
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CASE NO. CV OC 0614241 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
PURSUANT TO IRCP 11 (a)(2)B 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, SCOTT GATEWOOD, by and through his 
attorney, JOHN PRIOR, and hereby presents this Memorandum in Support of Motion For 
Reconsideration pursuant to LR.C.P. II (a)(2)B. 
In the court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Defendant 
respectfully requests that the court reconsider its decision and its factual findings as follows: 
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1. That the court consider reducing the damages assessed against Scott Gatewood in 
the amount of $1 0,000 for the separate property of Mr. Stephens for the Beach Street 
residence. This request is based upon the decision in Bliss v. Bliss 127 Idaho 170, 
898 P2d 1081 (1995). In Bliss, Id, the court noted that a conveyance by one party to 
another such as in the present case creates a separate property interest. That it is then 
the burden of the party objecting to that separate property characterization to present 
evidence to overcome that presumption. Bliss states in pertinent part; 
"Because the deed was in writing, signed by the grantor, and included the name and 
address of the grantee, it constituted a valid conveyance oflegal title to real property. I.C. § 55-
601 ;(1'nl) see, e.g., Erb v. Kohnke, ,337,824 P.2d 903,912 (CL App. 1992). In 
cases such as this, I.C. § 32-906(2) creates a presumption that the conveyed property is 
separate: 
(2) Property conveyed by one spouse to the other shall be presumed to be the sole and separate 
estate of the grantee and only the grantor spouse need execute and acknowledge the deed or 
other instrument of conveyance notwithstanding the provisions of section 32-912, Idaho 
Code; .... 
Under this statute, the forty-eight acres is presumed to be Althea's sole and separate property. 
Pursuant to Rule 30 I of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Gordon then had the burden of going 
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, although it remained Althea's burden 
of persuasion to demonstrate that the forty-eight acres was separate. The effect of the statutory 
presumption under Rule 301 is that the party in whose favor the presumption operates is 
relieved from having to adduce further evidence of the presumed fact until the opponent 
introduces substantial evidence of the nonexistence of the fact. Bongiovi v. Jamison. 
, 738, 718 P.2d 1172, 1176 (l986)".Bliss pg 174. 
Ms. Stephens, Ann Shepard and Scott Gatewood all testified that it was Gary Stephens separate 
property. At no time was there testimony that would overcome the presumption ofthe Beach 
Street property as separate property. Counsel for the Defendant has a recollection that the court 
examined the Quit Claim deed during the trial. If the court is going to allow Plaintiffto re-
characterize a debt form community to separate as in the case of the $28,000 debt, Defendant 
would request that the court consider that the Beach Street property be characterized as a 
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separate property and that Ms. Stephens award be reduced by $10,000 which represents an 
increase in the overall property equalization in which she was not entitled to. The Bliss case 
was precedent at the time of the divorce. 
2. That the court reconsider its ruling that the $8,000 debt paid prior to the divorce was 
a separate debt. There was no testimony in the present case that determined the 
source ofthe funds that paid that $28,000 debt. Mr. Stephens did not come forward 
and testifY the source of funds in paying off that debt. There was no witness that 
testified to what source of funds we were used to satisfY that debt. The court cannot 
speculate to a source. Further, the court should consider Mr. Gatewood's testimony 
and we would respectfully request that the court reconsider that divorce settlements 
do not always allow for an equal distribution or equal determination of what is 
separate and what is community assets. This would require the court to examine the 
mind set of all parties back in 2004. The very fact that there is a dispute as to 
characterization and that the court had to recalculate the settlement in terms of 
characterization of property and amount due should suggest to the court that divorce 
settlements are by their nature an exercise in speculation as to how to distribute 
property. As such we would respectfully request that the court reconsider its prior 
determination and reclassifY this $28,0000 debt as community debt. 
3. The Defendant represents that it is his belief that the appraisal experts for the 
defense determined the Crescent Rim Property to be valued at between $375,000 to 
$400,000. That the court should take the testimony of defense witnesses as to value 
of the property. That the fact that Mr. Stephens placed the value at $500,000 and the 
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In conclusion Defendant respectfully request that this court reconsider its ruling that Ms. 
Stephens was damaged by action of Mr. Gatewood. Further, Defendant respectfully 
request that this court reevaluate its detennination of damages based upon the argument 
presented herein. 
r.:.-
DATED this ( l day of October, 2008. 
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P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT 
GATEWOOD'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, and hereby responds 
to Defendant Gatewood's Motion to Reconsider. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court Correctly Ruled the Beach Street Home Was Community 
Property. As the Court noted in its Findings of Facts, the parties in the divorce considered the 
Beach Street property as community property, notwithstanding the existence of any deed. In 
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PlaintitT's Exhibit 105, Ms. Stephen presented Mr. Stephen's verified discovery responses in the 
divorce case in which Mr. Stephen, when asked to identify all "Community Real Property," 
identified both the Crescent Rim home and the Beach Street property, and when asked in the 
same discovery whether Mr. Stephen claimed any separate real property, Mr. Stephen replied 
"None." 
Additionally, Ms. Shepard, Mr. Stephen's divorce attorney, testified at trial that she 
believed the parties had settled their personal property division issues at mediation, but that the 
real property division was still in contention on August 5, 2004, the date scheduled for the 
divorce trial. Ultimately, the parties agreed that both the Beach Street and Crescent Rim homes 
were community property, despite the existence of any quit-claim deed ("2001 deed") concerning 
the Beach Street home, and memorialized this agreement and their respective understandings in 
the divorce decree. 
In his Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Gatewood directs the Court to Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 
170, 898 P .2d 1081 (1995), and asserts the Court must consider the Beach Street home as Mr. 
Stephen's separate property. This contention however ignores the facts in Bliss and the clear 
wording of Idaho Code § 32-906(2). 
In this case, the 200 I deed purports to convey property to Mr. Stephens, the Grantee, but 
Mr. Stephens although having knowledge of the deed, either conceded the 2001 deed was 
incorrect or agreed that notwithstanding the 200 I deed, the Beach Street home was community 
property. Ms. Stephen under the circumstances, as Grantor, stands in the same shoes as Gordon 
Bliss, who in the Bliss case sought to invalidate his deed conveying acreage to Mrs. Bliss. Had 
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Mrs. Bliss, as the Grantee, agreed that the property was community, despite the deed, as Mr. 
Stephen had done, the validity of the deed in Bliss would have been in question, just like it was 
in this case. Consequently, to have prevailed on this issue in the trial, the Defendants would 
have had to present Mr. Stephen's testimony that he believed the 2001 deed was valid and 
enforceable. However, Ms. Stephen presented evidence at trial that Mr. Stephens believed and 
understood the Beach Street home was community property and ultimately even after Mr. 
Stephens was aware of the 2001 deed agreed to divide the Beach Street home as ifit were still 
community property. 
Moreover, Judge Day was clear and unequivocal in the Decree and directed Ms. Stephen 
to quit-claim her community interest in the Beach Street home to Mr. Stephen (Decree, page 2. 
para. 3). If Mr. Stephen or his Counsel Ms. Shepard believed the decree was not accurate, they 
should have petitioned the Court for a correction. While Bliss may apply when the Grantee 
asserts an entitlement to the deed, it is not controlling when the Grantee concedes the deed was 
either erroneous or that the real property remained community property despite the deed. 
Mr. Gatewood also argues that the Court should grant this motion because the Court "re-
characterized a debt from community to separate as in the case of the $28,000.00 debt." Once 
again, Mr. Gatewood is incorrect. The record confirmed that Mr. Stephen paid the $28,000.00 
community debt from community funds while the parties were married (Plaintiffs Exhibit 117). 
It was error for Mr. Stephen to deduct the $28,000.00 community debt from the community 
equity, when that debt no longer existed. The Court correctly increased the value of the 
community estate by $28,000.00 to reflect the fact the $28,000.00 debit that Mr. Stephens 
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received for a community debt that no longer existed was error. The Court did not, as Mr. 
Gatewood contends, somehow "re-classify" the judgment debt from community to separate. 
Finally, if the Court were to reverse and rule the 2001 deed as valid, the Beach Street 
home would have been Mr. Stephen's separate property from August 24, 200l. Assuming this 
was correct; the Decree indicates the mortgage on the Beach Street home was $860.00 per 
month, and there was no evidence presented that Mr. Stephen had any separate property funds to 
pay this mortgage. The community would therefore be entitled to reimbursement for the 
community funds paid for the mortgage of$30,1 00.00 ($860.00 x 35 months). Mr. Stephen 
would owe Ms. Stephen half of this amount, and based on the Defendant's estimate ofa $10,000 
shortfall, the Defendants would actually now owe Ms. Stephen an additional $5,000.00. Ms. 
Stephen however did not assert the 2001 deed was valid and enforceable, despite that she would 
have been entitled to reimbursement, because the facts clearly establish that neither party to the 
2001 deed considered it valid and to reverse would be clear error. 
2. The Court Properly Ruled Mr. Stephen Was Not Entitled To Debit The 
.Judgment Lien. Defendant Gatewood asks the Court to reverse its ruling "that the $[2]8,000 
debt paid prior to the divorce was a separate debt.,,1 This contention, however, ignores the actual 
rul ing. Ms. Stephen argued that Mr. Stephen was not entitled to debit the judgment lien that was 
paid before the decree was entered and therefore, as the Court correctly ruled, the amount of 
community estate equity increased by the amount of this deduction. Once this debt was paid, it 
should not have been listed on the property settlement agreement and to have given Mr. Stephen 
I. Gatewood's Memo. In support of Motion for Reconsideration Page 3. 
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a $28,000 deduction was error. 
Regarding the "source of funds" argument, contrary to Defendant Gatewood's claim, the 
evidence presented at trial indicates the judgment lien was a lien against a community real 
property asset, arose from a construction dispute regarding this community real property asset, 
occurred during the marriage, and was ultimately paid for from community funds. We know it 
was paid for from community funds because Mr. Stephen indicated in his discovery responses 
that he did not have any separate property sources of income. 
Finally, at trial the Defendants effectively stood in the shoes of Mr. Stephen in the 
divorce proceedings. Consequently, the burden of proof and production in this case remained the 
same as in the divorce action. It is the party asserting a certain classification as separate or 
community to produce evidence in support of that contention. If Defendant Gatewood believed 
Mr. Stephens paid the judgment lien from separate property funds as he contends, it was his 
burden to support and prove this contention at trial. Mr. Gatewood, however, did not meet his 
burden. 
3. The Court's Determination of the Value of the Crescent Rim Property 
Should Stand. Mr. Gatewood appears to argue nothing more than the Court should believe his 
appraisers and not Mr. Schultz and relics on allegations he had every opportunity to prove in 
Court but failed. As the Court remembers, Ms. Shepard and Mr. Gatewood both conceded on 
cross-examination that then had absolutely no evidence that Ms. Stephen was the cause of or 
responsible for any alleged damage to either property, yet Mr. Gatewood now argues "Mr. 
Stephens had to repair two residences damaged by Ms. Stephen and her guests." 
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The Court undeniably detennined that Mr. Schultz' appraisal was more compelling, 
perhaps because Mr. Schulz, unlike the Defense appraisers, actually entered the Crescent Rim 
horne and viewed the inside of the residence when perfonning his appraisal. The Defendants had 
every opportunity to seek access to this property so their appraisers could perform a similar 
appraisal, but never pursued this avenue. Instead, Mr. Gatewood's appraisers conducted a 
limited appraisal from the curb. As the Court's decision regarding the value of the Crescent Rim 
horne is supported by substantial evidence, the Court's ruling should stand. 
4. Heinze v. Bauer does not require a finding the Plaintiff was incompetent. 
Once again, Mr. Gatewood's interpretation the application of judicial estoppel is incorrect. As 
the Court cited in its denial of the Defendant's motions for summary judgment and again when 
the Court denied the Defendants' motion for directed verdict, competence or incompetence is not 
the standard it is what the person "charged" with knowledge actually knew. 
Notwithstanding proof that Ms. Stephen was taking medications that likely affected her 
cognitive functions, and her Attorney was aware of this situation, the record is clear that Mr. 
Stephen believed the Crescent Rim home was worth $500,000.00 and that Mr. Gatewood did not 
provide that information to Ms. Stephen. Moreover, Ms. Stephen did not know that Mr. Stephen 
had paid the Crescent Rim judgment from community funds before the divorce was finalized. 
Consequently, regardless of any "incompetence" issues, judicial estoppel should not apply 
because Ms. Stephen simply did not know relevant and material facts when she agreed to the 
property settlement. "Stated another way, the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not 
only what a party states under oath in open court, but also what that party knew, or should have 
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known, at the time the original position was adopted." }V/cKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 
937 P.2d 1222 (1997). There is no disputed evidence that Ms. Stephen knew or should have 
know ofMr. Stephen's opinion of the value of the Crescent Rim home or that she knew or 
should have know that Mr. Stephen paid the Crescent Rim judgment. As the evidence 
established she did not know these facts, judicial estoppel cannot apply, and the Court has been 
correct in its rulings for two years. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court DENY the Defendant's Motion to 
reconsider. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 12th day of November, 2008. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark, for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11 th day of November 2008, I caused to be served in the 
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC. 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, IO 83705 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Via Fax (208) 389-2109 
Eric R. Clark 
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WILLIAM 1. SCHWARTZ, ISB NO. 3649 
Attorney at Law 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
Telephone (208) 426-9383 
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263 
Attorneys for the Defendantsl Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff/RespondentiCross-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendantsl Appellants/Cross-Respondents. ) 
Civil No. CV OC 0614241 
MOTION FOR STAY OF 
EXECUTION ON MONEY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Respondents, SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, 
CI-ITD., DENNIS SALLAZ, and SCOTT GATEWOOD, (hereinafter collectively referred to as, 
"the Appellants Sallaz & Gatewood"), by and through their attorney of record, William 1. 
Schwartz, and pursuant to LR.C.P. 7(b)(3), and LA.R. 13(b)(l5) file this MOTION FOR STAY 
EXECUTION ON MONEY JUDGMENT. 
This motion is made for the reason that a stay of execution of the Amended Judgment 
entered in the above-entitled action on February 9, 2009, The Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, 
District Judge, presiding, and all interlocutory or final judgments related to that Amended 
MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION 
ON MONEY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
ORI INAL 
Judgment, is necessary to preserve the status quo between the parties pending the outcome of the 
appeal that is now pending before the Idaho Supreme Court, Case No. 36322-2009. The 
Appellants Sallaz and Gatewood have posted a cash deposit as security for the issuance of a stay 
of execution, in the amount of $53,604.06, (Cashier's Check No. rJ.13dj():if1> which includes 
the amount of the Amended Judgment plus 36% as required by rule. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of June, 2009. 
MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION 
ON MONEY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
~.~ 
Attorney for the Appellants 
Sallaz & Gatewood, et al. 
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the attached document was mailed or delivered via 
facsimile and US Mail to the following named persons: 
ERIC R. CLARK 
Clark and Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Telephone (208) 685-2320 
Facsimile (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff/RespondentiCross-appellant 
Date: 7u~ I ~ .::Lpo ~ 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS ) 
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross ) 
Respondents. ) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD 
. Supreme Court Docket No. 36322-2009 
Ada County Docket No. 2006-14241 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellants/Cross-Respondents on December 21, 2009. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants/Cross-Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT 
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the 
documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Stipulation to Allow Plaintiff s Motion to Amend Complaint, file-stamped June 25, 
2007; 
2. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, file-stamped June 26, 2007; 
3. Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, file-stamped July 2,2007; 
4. Answer to Amended Complaint, file-stamped October 16,2007; 
5. Answer, file-stamped October 16,2007; 
6. Verification of Answer to Amended Complaint, file-stamped October 16, 2007; 
7. Defendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, file-stamped September 8, 
2008; 
8. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, file-stamped October 3,2008; and 
9. Judgment, file-stamped December 1,2008. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents 
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS: 
l. Sallaz &- Gatewood Fee Agreement, dated June 16,2003; and 
2. Letter to the DMV from Sallaz, dated June 16,2003. 
-&-
DATED this 1$ day of December 2009. 
~tePhen W. Kenyon, lerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
, . 
Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHID., 
and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
STIPULATION TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
COME NOW the respective Parties and by and through their counsel of record and 
hereby agree and stipulate to allow the Plaintiffto amend her Complaint as set forth in the 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. Based on this stipulation, the Parties request that the Court 
approve and sign the Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
STIPULA TION TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND - I 
Jun 25 aOO? 9:50AM OFFices of John Prior 
. . 
"rom: a;rn It. o.tc To: Jolin Prior Dale: 8f22I2OO7 'llMe 11:03: 14 10M 
RESPECTFULLY SUDMJITED this 22nd day of June 2007. 
Eric R. Clark, 
For the PlaintifT 
659834 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH1l~~~ 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA • ~4JJt 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CY OC 0614241 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. 
The Court understands that this is a matter in which it has discretion. In applying its 
discretion, the Court has reviewed the record; including the proposed pleading attached to the 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and including a stipulation signed by counsel for the parties in 
which the Defendants indicate they have no objection to the Motion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is 
GRANTED. 
ENTERED THIS 14: day of June 2007. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND - 1 
: 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2J; ~ay of June, 2007, I caused to be served by 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
John Prior 
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
Eric R. Clark 
The Real Estate Law Group 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND - 2 
6l / Z 
Eric R. Clark, ISB# 4697 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT 
GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CY OC 0614241 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
As a complaint against Defendants Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., Dennis Sallaz and Scott 
Gatewood, plaintiff Pamela K. Joerger Stephen alleges: _ 
I. Plaintiff Pamela K. Joerger Stephen ("Pamela") is a resident of Ada County, 
Idaho. 
2. Defendant SaUaz & Gatewood, Chtd., is a professional corporation authorized to 
do business in the State of Idaho, with its principal place of business in Ada County, Idaho. 
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3. Defendants Dennis Sallaz and Scott Gatewood are residents of Ada County, Idaho 
and licensed by the Idaho State Bar to practice law in Idaho. 
4. Pamela hired Defendants to represent her in n divorce action filed by her husband 
Gary Stephen in Case No. CV DR 03-01151 D in the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada. The court 5cheduled this action for trial before the 
Honorable David E. Day on August 5, 2004. 
S. During the initial interview with the Defendants, Pamela disclosed she believed 
she was "bi-polar" and suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome. She also disclosed that 
she had attempted suicide. 
6. The Defendant required that Pamela review and sign an "Employment 
I 
Agreement" in which they represented to Pamela she had hired the "the office to represent you." 
I 
Thereafter. both Dennis Sallaz and G. Scott Gatewood were listed as Pamela's attorneys in 
pleadings filed in the divorce case. Additionally. Defendant Sallaz was the senior attorney and 
was responsible for supervising Defendant Gatewood. 
7. Pamela was very concerned about the divorce. She was suffering from the 
disclosed mental conditions which required medica.l care and costly prescription medica.tions to 
treat. Mr. Stephens was a pilot with UPS and as an employee benefit had great medical 
insurance that was paying for Pamela'S medications and treatment, but Pam was unsure about the 
future coverage after the divorce. 
8. Pamela was also concerned about future income. Pamela stayed at home to raise 
the couple's daughter and only worked part-time during the twenty-five year marriage. Pamela 
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believed she was entitled to spousal support due to her illness, age, limited education, and 
minimal experience and asked the Defendants to seek maintenance for her. 
9. Initially, the Defendants drafted and filed a motion for temporary maintenance. 
However, nothing in the record in the divorce action indicates this motion proceeded to hearing 
and there is not an order indicating this motion was ever granted or denied. The Defendants told 
Pamela the motion had been denied. 
10. Pamela's husband, Gary, earned approximately $250,000.00 per year from his 
employment at UPS and maintained control over the couple's bank accounts. After he filed for 
divorce, Gary denied Pamela access to any of his income or bank accounts, and due to her 
illnesses and lack of employment, Pamela was in a dire financial situation. The Defendants, 
although they were aware of this situation, required that Pamela pay a large retaiMf and did not 
seek their compensation from Gary according to Idaho Code § 32w 704. 
11. The Court set a pre-trial conference for July 19,2004 where the Defendants 
appeared and informed the Court the Defendants had not had contact with Pamela "in months." 
12. On this same day, the Defendants filed a motion to withdraw stating that the 
Defendants did not think it was in Pamela's "best interest" for the Defendants to continue to 
represent her. However, although the Defendants filed this motion, there is no indication it was 
set for heariIlS and the Defendants continued to repl'esent Pamela, despite their representation to 
the Court in their motion that doing so was not in her best interests. 
13. Additionally, during the course of the divorce action. Pamela was hospitalized 
due to her mental illnesses and was released from the hospital shortly before August 5, 2004, the 
date of her trial. 
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14. Upon her release from the hospital in late July 2004, Pamela was prescribed 
numerous drugs for the purpose of controlling her illness, which she took as prescribed. One of 
the side-effects of the drugs was to render Pamela incompetent and unable to make intelligent 
decisions regarding her personal affairs. 
15. Defendants were aware ofPrunela.'s hospitalization and of the drugs that had been 
prescribed to her. They also knew or had reason to know that those drugs had rendered her 
incompetent and unable to make intelligent decisions regarding her personal affairs. 
16. Pamela contacted the Defendants shortly before the trial date and requested they 
seek to postpone the trial due to Pamela's conditions. The Defendants however refused to seek 
to vacate and reschedule and told Pamela the judge would not appreciate her claim of mental 
illness. 
17. The Defendants also did not request the appointment ofa guardian ad litem for 
plaintiff or take any other action intended to inform the Court of Pamela's disability. 
18. Prior to the trial, the Defendants conducted minimal discovery and no 
I 
investigation regarding the parties' assets. The parties owned two homes; one they lived in and 
one as a rental. The Defendants failed to determine the value of these properties or request an 
appraisal. The Defendants advised Pamela to agree to a value of the Crescent Rim home that 
was approximately $} 00,000 below the current value. 
19. Pamela had contributed separate property funds to the purchase, maintenance, and 
improvements to the parties t real property that were readily traceable. The Defendants did not 
however seek credit for this separate property nor advise Pamela she was entitled to recover 
compensation for this separate property in. the divorce 
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20. Gary also disclosed ajudgment of approximately $28,000.00 which he agreed to 
accept as part of the distribution of property. Consequently, the Defendants agreed with this 
figure and as Gary was taking this debt he was entitled to an offset from the total value of the 
community assets. However, this debt was paid several months prior to the trial date from 
community funds and should not have been credited to Gary. 
21. Although Pamela had disclosed her mental conditions. the Defendants failed to 
obtain Pamela's medical records or contaot her treating physicians during the Defendants 
representation or in any manner seek to inform themselves about these conditions. 
22. As Gary's retirement plan was an asset in the divorce, a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order C"QDRO") was necessary to order the division of the retirement account. The 
Defendants failed to obtain Ii valid QDRO before wIthdrawing. Pamela had to employ other 
counsel, Constance Norris, to complete the QDRO thereby ensuring Pamela would eventually 
receive funds from Gary's retirement account. 
COUNT I. NEGLIGENCE. 
23. Pamela hereby incorporates all facts ~d allegations previously stated as if set 
forth herein. 
24. As Pamela's attorneys, the Defendants owed Pamela various duties including the 
duty of competency and the duty of diligence. They also had a heightened duty as Pamela had 
disclosed a disability that indicated she may have had diminished capacity, 
25, The Defendants breached these duties. 
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26. The Defendants failure to seek a postponement of the trial, to seek the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem or to take other action to advise the court of Pamela's mental condition was 
negligence. 
27. The Defendants failure to seek temporary or permanent maintenance and attorney 
fees from Gary to pay their fees was negligence. 
28. The Defendants failure to investigate and determine the values of the parties' real 
property before advising Pamela to agree to the stated value was negligence. 
29. The Defendants failure to investigate and determine the value of Pamela's 
separate property and to ensure she was compensated for this separate property was negligence. 
30. The Defendants failure to investigate the existence and validity of the judgment 
against the marital estate was negligence. 
31. The Defendants failure to obtain a valid QDRO before withdrav.ing was 
negligence. 
32. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' negligence, Pamela has 
suffered damages In excess of $1 0,000.00. 
PRA YER FOR RELIEF 
Therefore, Plaintiff Pamela K. Joerger Stephen requests the court to enter judgment 
against defendants Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., and Scott Gatewood and Dennis Sallaz, jointly 
and severally as follows: 
1. Awarding plaintiff judgment for such damages as ore proved at trial; 
2. Awarding plaintiff her costs and attorney fees that she incurs in the course of this 
action; and 
, 
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3. Granting plaintiff such other relief as the court deems just under the 
circumstances. 
TRIAL BY JURy 
Plaintiff demands a trial by a jury of 12 on all issues as to which she has that right. 
DATED this 2nd day of July 2007. 
THE REAL ESTATE LA W GROUP 
ERIC R. CLARK, for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of July 2001, I caused to be served in the 
manner indicated a true a.nd correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF lOtIN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa,ldaho 83651 
Via Fax (208) 465-9834 
Attorney for Defendants Gatewood and Sallaz and Gatewood, CHTD. 
Eric R, Clark 
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CHARLES C. CRAFTS ISS # 7070 
CRAFTS LAW INC. 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Phone: (208) 367-1749 
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109 
Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. Sallaz 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.; 
DENNIS SALLAZ and 
SCOTT GATEWOOD 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 06-14241 
ANSWER TO AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant, Dennis Sallaz, and answers 
Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim against this answering Defendant upon which 
relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
I) 
This answering Defendants denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not 
herein expressly and specifically admitted. 
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2) 
This answering Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1,2,3 
and 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
3) 
This answering Defendant is without sufficient infonnation to either admit or 
deny the allegations set fiJrth in paragraphs 5, 6, 7,8,9,10, II, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,19,20, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 and therefore denies the same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
This Defendant has fully performed his duties under the agreement, and the 
PlaintifThas received the full consideration agreed upon, and that the transaction was carried out 
in full and in accordance with the agreement. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest as respects all or a part of this claim, 
contrary to Rule 17, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Other third persons, not in this Defendant's control, were guilty of negligent and 
careless misconduct at the time of and in connection with the matters and damages alleged, 
which misconduct on their part proximately caused and/or contributed to said events and 
Plaintiffs resultant damages, if any. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has, and continues to have, the ability and opportunity to mitigate the 
damages alleged with respect to the subject matter of this action, and has failed to mitigate said 
damages, if any were in fact incurred. 
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SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has waived, or by her conduct is estopped from asserting the causes of 
action contained in his Complaint. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff gave her express consent to Defendant and/or co-defendant to execute 
her divorce in the manner negotiated. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
That the plaintiff was guilty of laches and unreasonable delay in bringing this 
action and in asserting any cause of action against this Defendant, and that such laches and 
unreasonable delay were without good cause and substantially prejudiced this Defendant. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
There has been a novation between the parties resulting in accord and satisfaction 
and waiver thereby releasing any claim alleged by Plaintiff herein. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff ratified the Defendant's actions by accepting the fulI benefit ofthe 
divorce decree for nearly two years before bringing this lawsuit. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
That more than two (2) years have passed since Plaintiff's action for professional 
malpractice accrued against this Defendant, thus, Plaintiff's action is barred by the Statute of 
Limitations pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-219(4). 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party to this action. 
ANSWER TO AMENnEn COMPLAINT - 3 
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs alleged course of action fails because of accord and satisfaction and 
release. Plaintiff specifically maintained that she was capable of and understood the proceedings 
and demanded the settlement terms as agreed. 
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE 
Defendant reserves the right to assert any additional affirmative defenses and 
matters in avoidance that may be disclosed in the course of additional investigation and 
discovery, including without limitation, comparative negligence, statute of limitations, 
waiver/estoppel, supersedinglintervening cause, negligence ofa third-party not in Defendant's 
control and setoff 
PRA YER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintitftake nothing by her Complaint, that 
the same be dismissed, and that Defendant be awarded his costs of suit and attorney fees, and 
such other and further relief as the Court deems just. 
JURY DEMAND 
DEFENDANT DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of 
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Eric R. Clark 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Attorney/or Plaintiff' 
John Prior 
Law Offices of John Prior 
16 1 t h Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
Attorney/or Sallaz & GateH'Ood, CHTD. 
And Scott Gatewood 
ANSWER TO AMEN!)E!) COMPLAINT -:; 
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
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Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
CM/ECF 
[..--r- U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
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Overnight Mail 
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CM/ECF 
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JOHN PRIOR 
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
ISB #5344 
16 12111 Avenue S " Suite 113 
Nampa., ID 83651 
(208) 465·9839 Telephone 
(208) 465·9834 Faosimile 
Attorney for Defondant Scott Gatewood 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIct OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAl\1ELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaint:ift 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHID" lUld 
SCOTT GATEWOOD. 
Defendants. 
! 
! 
) 
) 
~ ) 
CASBNO. CV OC 0614241 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW. the above named Defan~ SCO'IT GATEWOOD. by and through his 
counsel of record, JOHN PRIOR., and hereby answers the Amended Complaint filed by the 
Plal.ntiff. and admits, denies and a11eg~ as follows. 
I 
Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Pla.inti.1rs Amended Complaint 
not specifically admitted herew. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - hie 1 
,- ~. - ''', ',~ 
Egel 9(:E-802 POOM<lj 2 9 "? 2fl:eS v-lJ LO 2~ 02 1 J 050C2 
Oct 16 2007 2:30PM L~w Offic~~ o~ John P~ior 2094659834 
n 
Th.o Defendant is without suffiolent information to either admit or deny the allegations set 
forth in patagraph 1, therefore it is deemed denied. 
m 
Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragmphs 2, 3 and 4. 
IV 
Defendant a.dmits the allegation in paragraph S in part that the Plaintiff informed the 
Defendant that she believed she was hi-polar. Defendant denies the rewaining portion of 
pe.rag:raph 5. 
v 
p.3 
Defendant admits tho allegation in paragraph 6 in part, that the firm :represented the 
Plaintiff. Defendant denies the rem.ain!ng portion ofparagraph 6. 
VI 
Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 7. 
VII 
Defendant a.dmits the allegations in paragraph 8. 
vm 
Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs 9 and 10. 
IX 
Defendant admits the allcgatiorul in paragraph 11. 
x 
Defendant admits paragraph 12 in that a Motion to Withdraw was file~ however the 
Plaintiff called and we agree to continue to work. her case. 
ANSWER TO CO:MPLAINT - Psie 2 
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Xl 
Defendant denies Pflnlgnlph-' 13, 14, 15 and 16. 
XII 
Defendant admits paragrapb 17. 
xm 
Defendant denies paragraphs 18, 19.20,21,22.23,24.25.26.27, 2B. 29,30.31 and 32. 
AFFlBMATlYE DEFEN$E§ 
AffIrmative D~fen.Je No, 1: The Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can b I) 
granted . 
.A.ffitn1ativ" Defense No, 2: The P laintiff fails to mitigate her damages. 
A:ftln.nlltive DefeDse No.3: Laches. 
p .... 
WHEREFORE, Defendant, having made an answer to the Amended Complaint filed 
herein against Defendant, prays as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be diaotissed and that the Plaintiff takes 
nothing ~by; 
2. That the Defendant ~ awarded his reasonable attorneys fees and court costs 
incurred herein. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court may &eem just and propel' in the 
premises. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - Paec 3 
Oct 1S 2007 2l31PM L~w OTfio~s of John Prior 
DATED this I ( ~ ofOotobor, 2007. 
STATEOFIDAffO 
County of Canyon 
) 
)8&. 
) 
scon GATEWOOD; being duly sworn upo.u oath. states as follows: 
That he i5 th~ Defendant in tho foregomg action; that he has m:td the foregoing 
docwnent, and the facts therein stated are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
?-'SCOTT GATEWOOD 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of October, 2007. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - hll! " 
-f, 
NOTARY~C!OR~] 
Residing at:  
My coonmission expires: ;; :3 / Zt:9 1-..5' 
p.5 
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CERTIF[~ATE OF SREVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of October, 2007, I caused. true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing ANSWER to be delivered to the following and by tho 
method indicted below: 
Erik Clark 
Attorney at Law 
POBox 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Charles Crafts 
Attorney at Law 
410 S. OrohArd St. Suito 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Fax: (208) 389-2109 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT ~ Pltge! 
lJju.s. Mail, Postage Pxepajd ) Hand Delivered j Overnight Mail Facsim.ile 
JJu.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid ( Hand Delivered ( Ovemi~t Mall Facsimile 
£9Z,-9((-802 pODMJ12~ '? H\les :,.,Jd LO 2, OZP06002 
\ 
J 
CHARLES C. CRAFTS ISB # 7070 
CRAFTS LA W INC. 
Attorney at Law 
4 lOS. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Phone: (208)367-1749 
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109 
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Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. Sallaz 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.; 
DENNlS SALLAZ and 
SCOTT GATEWOOD 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 06-14241 
VERI FICA TION OF ANSWER TO 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant, and verifies the Answer to the Amended 
Complaint as follows: 
VERI FICA TION 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, being duly sworn upon oath, states as follows: 
That he is the Defendant in the t()regoing action; that he has read the Answer to the 
Amended Complaint, and that the tacts therein stated are true to the best of his knowledge and 
belief 
~ ,/ SalJaz VERIHCATION OF ANSWER TO AMENUE[) COMPLAI - I ' 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ADA 
,,..@.tt.I!",."'~~".!r-~ ", 
This document was acknowle~ge'd befur~ me of1,Qctober 16,2007 
.t <~ .. 
.' , 
Notary Seal, if any: 
" 
, 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I~ day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing VERIFICATION OF ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT by 
delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Eric R. Clark 
THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
A uorney.lor PlaintifF 
John Prior 
Law Offices of John Prior 
16 I til Avenue South, Suite I 13 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
A ttorneyfor Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD. 
And Scott Gate}t'Ood 
VERIFICATION OF ANSWER TO AMENnE» COMPLAINT - 2 
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[ J 
r~ 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
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[ ] 
u.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
CM/ECF 
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Overnight Mail 
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s 
Attorney for Defenc 
VERIFICATION OF ANSWER TO AMENnE() COMPLAINT - J 
ennis 1. Sallaz 
CHARLES C. CRAFTS ISB # 7070 
CRAFTS LAW INC. 
Attorney at Law 
4 lOS. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
Phone: (208) 367-1749 
Facsimile: (208) 389-2109 
Attorney for Defendant: Dennis J. SaUaz 
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OEPLJTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.; 
DENNIS SALLAZ and 
SCOTT GATEWOOD 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 06-14241 
DEFENDANT SALLAZ'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
COMES NOW, Dennis Sallaz by and through his attorney, Charles C. Crafts, and 
presents the following proposed jury instructions. 
FACTS 
The attorney client relationship between Ms. Stephen and Sallaz and Gatewood began on 
June 16, 2003. See Plaintiffs exhihit lOO. Sallaz and Gatewood CHTD., was formed on 
September 9, 2003. See P/aint~frs exhihit 129. Ms. Stephen stipulated to the terms of the 
divorce on August 5, 2004, and the Judgment and Decree of Divorce were entered on August 9, 
Dctendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I.aw -I 
2004. See Plaintiff's Exhihit 103. The Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in this 
case was filed on July 2, 2007; Dennis Sallaz, in his personal capacity, was not added as a 
Defendant until this date. 
In her Amended Complaint, Ms. Stephen alleged that "Defendant Sallaz was the senior 
attorney and was responsible for supervising Defendant Gatewood." See Allegation 6. Amended 
Complaint. However, Ms. Stephen failed to provide any evidence at trial to support this 
allegation. In fact, both Defendants specifically stated that Mr. Sallaz was not supervising Mr. 
Gatewood at any point during this litigation. Finally, Ms. Stephen now claims that her Amended 
Complaint was also meant to include partnership liability, despite the fact that it was not pled in 
her Complaint - either factually or legally. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
EVEN IF DEFENDANT GATEWOOD WAS NEGLIGENT, THE PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO SHOW THAT SHE WOULD HAVE OBTAINED A DIFFERENT RESULT 
BUT FOR THE NEGLIGENCE 
'1 fthe allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action 
In tort. (See Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations (1950) 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 
1201.) The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, 
or the threat of future harm-not yet realized-does not suffice to create a cause of action for 
negligence. (Walker v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 513, 517, 6 Cal.Rptr. 924; 
McGregor v. Wright (1931) 117 ·Cal.App. 186, 196-198, 3 P.2d 624.) Ralphs v. Ci~y (~f Spirit 
Lake. 98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315, (1977). 
Essentially, the Plaintiff failed to take into account a number of factors that Gatewood 
negotiated on her behalf So, even if Defendant Gatewood was negligent, Ms. Stephen failed to 
Defendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law -2 
show that, but for his negligence she would have achieved a more favorable result. A detailed 
discussion 0 f these facts is presented later in this brief: 
ANY CAUSE OF ACTION THE PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE IN THIS CASE DID NOT 
ACCRUE UNTIL AUGUST 5,2004 
Under Idaho law, a cause of action generally accrues, and the statute of limitation begins 
to run, when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another. Galhraith v. Vangas. Inc.. 103 
Idaho 912,915,655 P.2d 119, 122 (Ct.App.1982). See also Spence v. HOlte/!. 126 Idaho 763, 
770, 890 P.2d 7 I 4, 72 I (I995) (The cause of action accrued upon the breach of the contract.); 
Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co .. 112 Idaho 85, 88, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1986) (Cause of action 
does not accrue until aggrieved party suffers damages.); Stephens v. Stearns. 106 Idaho 249, 254, 
678 P.2d 41,46 (1984) (A negligence cause of action accrued when the plaintiff sustained 
injuries.) Western Corp. v. Vanek 144 Idaho 150,151, 158 P.3d 313,314 Idaho App.,2006. 
Assuming Ms. Stephen suffered any damages in this case, she could not have suffered 
those damages prior to August 5, 2004. At that time she was clearly represented by Sallaz & 
Gatewod CHTD., a professional corporation, where Dennis Sallaz was a director. Necessarily, 
we must examine Mr. Sallaz's liability from the aspect of a professional corporation. 
Any officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation organized under this 
act shall remain personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or 
wrongful acts or misconduct committed by him, or by any person under his direct 
supervision and control, while rendering professional services on behalf of the. 
corporation to the person for whom such professional services were being 
rendered. le § 30-1306 
Once again, the Plaintiff failed to provide any information at trial showing that Mr. Sallaz 
was acting in a supervisory capacity over Mr. Gatewood. I f we look at the entity Ms. Stephen 
was dealing with on the date her damages accrued, then Mr. Sallaz, in his personal capacity, 
should be dismissed from this litigation. 
Defendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law -3 
DURING THE TIME THAT THE RETAINER WAS SIGNED, BUT BEFORE THE 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION WAS FORMED, MR. SALLAZ DID NOT HAVE 
ANY LIABILITY TO MS. STEPHEN 
Idaho Code § 30- I -204 deals with Liability for pre-incorporation transactions, and it 
reads as fo llo ws: 
All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, when there was no 
incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severalIy liable for all liabilities 
created while so acting. 
First of all, the Plaintiff did not aver that Defendant Sallaz was liable for any pre-
incorporation transactions in her Complaint. Instead, this appears to be an alIegation and 
strategy that was reserved specifically for trial. Due to the failure of the Plaintiff to properly 
plead this allegation it should not be considered by this Court. 
Secondly, I.e. § 30- I -204 holds parties responsible for any liabilities that were created 
during the pre-incorporation process. Here, Ms. Stephen did not produce any evidence that she 
suffered any damages between the time that she retained the firm, and the time that the firm 
became incorporated. So, by reading the plain language of the statute, Mr. SalIaz did not incur 
any pre-incorporation liability to Ms. Stephen. 
FinalIy, there does not appear to be any Idaho case law dealing specifically with I.e. § 
30-1-204, but it only speaks to liabilities created during the pre-incorporation process, such as 
signing a lease agreement, or some negligent act that occurred during the pre-incorporation 
period. Here, assuming Ms. Stephen was somehow harmed by the firms actions, that injury did 
not occur during the pre-incorporation process. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS ANY CLAIM AGAINST DENNIS 
SALLAZ IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY 
I.C. § 5-219(4) provides that actions for professional malpractice must be brought within 
two years, and that "the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the 
Dcfcndant Salla;:'s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law -4 
occurrence, act, or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by 
reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom .... " 
Here, the alleged harm in this case accrued on August 5, 2004. Defendant Sallaz, in his 
personal capacity was added as a party in this case on July 2, 2007, nearly three years after Ms. 
Stephen's cause of action had accrued. Defendant Sallaz alleged in his answer that this action 
was barred by the statute of limitations, so this Defendant would respectfully request this Court 
to enter an Order dismissing him trom this action. 
DEFENDANT SALLAZ SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS 
In considering a request for attorney fees under section 12-120(3), the trial court must 
first determine whether any litigant is the "prevailing party," a decision that is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court. Gither! v. City orCa/dwell. 112 Idaho 386, 399, 732 P.2d 355,368 
(Ct.App.1987); Chadderdon v. King. 104 Idaho 406, 411-12, 659 P.2d 160, 165-66 
(Ct.App.1983). The guiding rule for this determination is I.R.c.P. 54(d)( 1)(8), which states: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
Thus, there are three principal factors a trial court must consider when determining which 
party, if any, prevailed: (I) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; 
(2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which 
each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. DaL\y Mfg. Co .. Inc. v. Painthall 
Sports. Inc .. 134 Idaho 259, 261-62, 999 P.2d 914, 916-17 (Ct.App.2000); Chadderdon. 104 
Defendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law-5 
Idaho at 41 1,659 P.2d at 165. If the court detennines that a party has prevailed only in part, it 
may apportion the costs and attorney fees in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of 
the issues and claims involved in the action and the judgment or jUdgments obtained. ld. See 
Prouse v. Ransom. 117 Idaho 734,739,791 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Ct.App.1989). Nguyen v. Bui 
--- P.3d ----, 2008 WL 2789298 Idaho App.,2008. 
Here, assuming that Defendant Sallaz is dismissed from the case, then he is a prevailing 
party and should be awarded attorney's fees as well as his costs. However, if Mr. Sallaz is not 
dismissed he should he should still be awarded a significant majority of his fees and costs. When 
considering the three factors above, the Court should note that on July 14, 2008, the Plaintiff 
filed an Ofter to Settle for $450,000. At that time, the Plaintiff was seeking damages related to 
her spousal support, in addition to damages for the Defendant's handling of her Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order. 
Literally, the day before trial, the Defendants and this Court were notified that the 
Plaintiff would not be proceeding on her claim for spousal support or for the Q.D.R.O. Instead, 
the parties went to trial over the following amount: 
Plaintiff's claim regarding Crescent Rim: 
Plaintiffs appraised value of the home: $458,000 
Stipulated value of the home: $385,000 
Difference: $73,000 
Minus half for community property: $36,500 
Claim: $36,500 
Plaintiff's claim for judgment paid by Gary 
Stephen: 
Judgment paid prior to divorce: $28,000 
Minus half for community property $14,000 
Claim: $14,000 
I Total amount requested: $50,500 I 
Dcfcndant Sallaz·s Findings of Fact .lI1d Conclusions of Law-6 
As you can see, if Ms. Stephen were awarded the entire amount she is seeking then she 
would be entitled to $50,500. This means that prior to trial the Defendants prevailed in 
defending $399,500 worth of the Plaintiff's claim. [n other words, if the Plaintiff were awarded 
her entire request, she would only prevail on 1/9th of her total claim, whereas the Defendant 
would be successful on 8/9th of their defense. 
However, based upon the evidence provided at trial, the Plaintiff's award, if any, should 
be reduced significantly based on the following factors: 
1. Value ofthe Beach Street home, which would have been Gary's property. 
a. $105,000 - $85,000 = $20,000 
2. Excess value of equalization payment: 
a. $80,965 - $13,095 = $67,870 
b. $67,87012 = $33,935 (The amount Pam should have been awarded) 
c. $48,000 (The amount Pam was awarded in equalization) 
d. $48,000 - $33,935 = $14,065 
3. These two figures alone equal a downward adjustment In the Plaintiff's request of 
$34,065. 
4. Therefore, $50,500 - $34,065 = $16,435 
The above adjustments can be mathematically calculated, but there are additional 
departures that should be counted against the Plaintiff's request for damages, they are: 
I. Community Waste: 
a. The Plaintiff admitted to using methamphetamines for a number of years leading 
up to the divorce, and tested positive for meth use approximately ten days prior to 
the date ofthe divorce. 
b. The Plaintiff was living in the Crescent Rim home for at least one year prior to the 
entry of the divorce, and kept the home in terrible condition at least according to 
Ann Shepard. 
c. The Plaintiff admitted that she was receiving rent from the Beach Street House, 
while her husband was paying the mortgage on that property. 
2. Failure to Mitigate Damages: 
Defendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law-7 
a. The Plaintiff filed this Complaint approximately three days before the Statute of 
Limitations would run against Defendant Gatewood. 
b. The PlaintifT received the benefit of her negotiated and stipulated divorce for two 
years. 
c. The Plaintiff received every equalization payment from Mr. Stephen before filing 
this Complaint. 
d. The Plaintiff never filed a Motion to Set Aside her Decree, which would have 
given the magistrate who heard this case an opportunity to determine whether Ms. 
Stephen's claims of mental incompetency had any merit. 
e. The Plaintiff never filed a Motion to ModifY her Decree, which, once again, 
would have given Judge Dayan opportunity to hear the merits of her case. 
3. The Plaintiff's appraisal should be adjusted for the following: 
a. The appraiser specifically stated that he would need to re-visit his appraisal if he 
did not obtain the information regarding the condition of the home in August, 
2004 from the person living in the home at that time. 
b. The appraiser testified that he obtained his information about the condition of the 
home from Mr. Stephen, but Ms. Stephen was living in the home in August 2004. 
c. The appraiser stated that if methamphetamines were being used in the home that 
lower the appraised value ofthe home. However, he stated he did not know of any 
illegal drug use in the home in August, 2004. 
d. The appraiser failed to take into account similar properties that were within a one 
mile radius ofthe Crescent Rim home, which he even admitted was a violation of 
Fannie Mae - Freddie Mac financing guidelines. 
e. The appraiser went specifically to the most expensive area In Boise (Warm 
Springs) to locate similar properties for the Crescent Rim home. 
4. The Plaintiff failed to prove that the $28,000 paid by Gary was paid with 
community funds: 
a. The Satisfaction of Judgment offered into evidence by the Plaintiff IS for 
$30,2 I 4.79. 
b. The debt that was paid by Gary Stephen prior to the divorce was $28,000. 
c. There is no evidence in the record that this satisfaction of judgment is the bilI paid 
by Gary in the divorce decree. 
Defendant Sallaz's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law-8 
d. The Plaintiff failed to prove that this debt was paid with community funds. 
e. It is highly likely that this debt was paid off with another debt because Gary's 
attorney Ann Shepard stated that during the divorce he was "strapped for cash." 
( If Gary paid this debt with another loan, then that new loan would be community 
property, and Pam may be liable for an additional $14,000. 
g. It is just as likely that Gary paid this debt with a new loan because there was a 
pending writ of execution. 
Based upon the foregoing factors, the Plaintiff's claim should be reduced significantly or 
even eliminate the Plaintiff's claim entirely. Consequently, this Defendant believes an award of 
attorney's fees and costs is warranted. 
Chari s C. Crafts 
Attorney for Defendant Denn' 
Defendant SallaL's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law-9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of September, 2008, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT SALLAZ'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, 
by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Eric R. Clark 
THE REAL EST A TE LAW GROUP 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, 10 83616 
Tel: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
A uorneyfor Plaint(ff 
John Prior 
Law Offices ofJohn Prior 
16 I t h Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
A ttorneyfor Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD. 
A nd Scott Gatevt'ood 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, Case No. CVOC06-14241 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALLAZ &GATEWOOD, CHTD. and 
SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCES 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
For Plaintiff: Eric Clark of The Real Estate Group 
14 Robert Wallace, Guardian ad Litem for the Plaintiff, Pamela K. Stephen 
For Defendant Scott Gatewood: John Prior of the Law Offices of John Prior 
15 For Defendant Dennis Sallaz: Charles Crafts of Crafts Law, Inc. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
This matter came on for court trial on August 11 th, 12th, 14th and 18th, 2008. On 
August 18th , the Court took the matter under advisement and gave counsel the 
opportunity to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be filed with 
the Court on or before September 8, 2008. 
PROCEEDINGS 
A Complaint was filed in this case asserting attorney malpractice on the part of 
Scott Gatewood, Dennis Sallaz, and Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered. The parties waived 
their respective right to a jury trial and the matter was presented to the Court. 
The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants were negligent in their representation of 
her by failing to obtain an equal division of community assets in the divorce. The 
FINDINGS OF FACT - CASE NO. CVOC0614241 - PAGE 1 
1 Plaintiff asserts that she was suffering from a mental health condition that impaired her 
2 understanding of the proceedings and that she did not receive information about the 
3 divorce proceedings that would have allowed her to make knowing and intelligent 
4 decisions about the settlement that was reached. Further, the Plaintiff asserts that the 
5 Defendants failed to properly investigate the fair market value of the Crescent Rim 
6 property and the correct amount of indebtedness owing against that property and thus, 
7 she received a less than equitable share of the community real property as a result of 
8 the failure of the Defendants to investigate those issues. 
9 ISSUES 
10 The issues that this Court must resolve in this case are as follows: 
11 1. Was the Plaintiff impaired due to her bi-polar condition and the medications 
12 she was taking during the course of the attorney-client relationship and at the 
13 time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and did the Defendant Gatewood 
14 breach his duties as to an impaired client during his representation of the 
15 Plaintiff? Did the Defendant Gatewood adequately communicate information 
16 about the property issues in the divorce proceedings with the Plaintiff? 
17 2. Did the Defendant Gatewood breach the duty to investigate the value and 
18 debts of the community real property during his representation of the 
19 Plaintiff? 
20 3. Was this breach of duty the proximate cause of any damages to the Plaintiff? 
21 LEGAL STANDARD 
22 The elements of a legal malpractice action are: (a) the existence of an attorney-
23 client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure to 
24 perform the duty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate 
25 cause of the damage to the client. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134 (Idaho 2004). 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2 The Plaintiff was served with a Complaint for Divorce in May of 2003 by her 
3 husband, Gary Stephen (hereinafter referred to as Stephen) and retained Sallaz and 
4 Gatewood Chartered to represent her in June of 2003. Scott Gatewood (hereinafter 
5 referred to as Gatewood) was the lawyer who represented the Plaintiff on all legal 
6 matters pertaining to this divorce case. The attorney representing Stephen was Ann 
7 Shepard. 
8 In this case there is no dispute that there was an attorney-client relationship 
9 between Gatewood and the Plaintiff from the signing of the retainer agreement in June 
10 of 2003 until after the judgment and divorce decree was entered in August of 2004 and 
11 continuing into 2005. 
12 There was no evidence presented to the Court that Dennis Sallaz provided any 
13 legal services directly or indirectly to the Plaintiff nor did he act in a supervisory capacity 
14 over Gatewood. Sallaz and Gatewood formed a professional service corporation in 
15 September of 2003, known as SALLAZ &GATEWOOD, CHTD, and continue to the 
16 present date in that business organization. 
17 At the time of Gatewood's initial meeting with the Plaintiff, there were 
18 discussions regarding the community property, spousal maintenance and other related 
19 issues. In this case, the Plaintiff had been married to Mr. Stephen since 1976. Mr. 
20 Stephen was a pilot for UPS and had income in excess of approximately $171,000 per 
21 year and the Plaintiff and Stephen had accumulated assets during the course of the 
22 marriage that were not substantial but were certainly above the average community 
23 property assets. (See Exhibit 105 and 106). The Plaintiff advised Gatewood that she 
24 thought the value of the community residence located on 3309 Crescent Aim in Boise 
25 was $400,000. 
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The Plaintiff advised Gatewood that she suffered from a bi-polar mental heath 
2 disorder and Gatewood made such a notation in their initial May 3, 2003 appointment. 
3 (See Exhibit 113) The Plaintiff's primary concern as testified to by Gatewood was 
4 spousal maintenance because she had not been employed during the marriage. (See 
5 Exhibit 108).1 
6 In August of 2003, Gatewood sought to obtain temporary spousal maintenance 
7 for the Plaintiff. During this process he became concerned about pursuing temporary 
8 spousal maintenance based upon several factors. 
9 First, the Plaintiff was living in the community residence on Crescent Rim and 
10 Stephen was paying the loan, utilities and other related costs and all of these could 
11 have been an offset to any spousal maintenance. A further complicating issue was that 
12 the Plaintiff was openly living with another man and allegedly supporting him. Finally, 
13 the Plaintiff was receiving rental income from other rental property, the "beach house," 
14 and not paying the loan payments and other expenses on that property. Gatewood was 
15 also advised by Stephan's attorney, Ann Shepard, that the Plaintiff was using 
16 methamphetamine. Based upon these issues and concerns, Gatewood did not pursue 
17 temporary spousal maintenance. Thus, Gatewood as early as September, was aware 
18 of the Plaintiff's unstable living conditions. 
19 In the next phase of the proceedings both of the attorneys for the Plaintiff and 
20 Stephan exchanged discovery requests in the form of interrogatories and requests for 
21 production of documents. Stephan, in response to the initial discovery request in 
22 September of 2003 submitted by Gatewood on behalf of the Plaintiff, indicated in 
23 Interrogatory No.1, that the Crescent Rim property had a fair market value of $500,000. 
24 
25 1 Exhibits 120-123 are notes of Gatewood that establish that he was aware of the Plaintiff's continuing and 
worsening mental health issues during the fourteen month period of his representation of her, including 
26 the Plaintiff's involuntary hospitalization five days prior to the divorce hearing on August 5, 2004. 
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The relationship between Gatewood and the Plaintiff was poor from the 
2 standpoint of communication. The Plaintiff testified that she received very little 
3 correspondence such as letters, court pleadings and discovery documents during the 
4 course of her representation by Gatewood. The Plaintiff contends she did not receive 
5 information from GateWOOd that Stephen had placed a value on the Crescent Rim 
6 property of $500,000. Gatewood testified that he had no specific recollection that he 
7 discussed this information with the Plaintiff but contends that general office policies 
8 would have resulted in the Plaintiff receiving this information. 
9 Gatewood testified that the office policy was to provide all of this type of 
10 information to clients but he had no specific recollection as to what documents had 
11 been provided to the Plaintiff and no cover letters or other evidence of what 
12 documentation the Plaintiff had received during the two years that he represented the 
13 Plaintiff was introduced into evidence. Gatewood testified that there were inconsistent 
14 policies between the paralegals in his office as to providing information to clients. 
15 Gatewood testified that there were periods of time when he did not have contact 
16 with the Plaintiff despite repeated phone calls to the Plaintiff to contact him. Gatewood 
17 testified that he went over to the Plaintiff's home on numerous occasions to try and 
18 communicate with her as to ongoing issues in the divorce over the course his 
19 representation of her. This is demonstrated in Gatewood's billing statement that 
20 showed little or no activity from January 28 through April 30 of 2004. In January of 
21 2004 during a phone call with the Plaintiff, Gatewood testified that the Plaintiff sounded 
22 groggy, was not responsive, that she advised him that she had been in bed for 5 days 
23 and a doctor wanted to hospitalize her. 
24 In July of 2004 the relationship had reached the point that Gatewood filed a 
25 motion to withdraw stating a complete breakdown in communications; however, 
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1 Gatewood withdrew the request. Gatewood testified that he was aware of the 
2 involuntary hospitalization of the Plaintiff days before proceeding to a final hearing on 
3 the divorce. In addition, Gatewood testified that he was of the opinion that the Plaintiff 
4 was using methamphetamine during the time he represented her. 
5 The Court will find that there were times when the Plaintiff was not provided with 
6 documentation pertaining to the case because there was not in place any type of an 
7 effective document policy in the law offices of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. that would 
8 demonstrate or verify that the Plaintiff was receiving correspondence in the form of 
9 discovery responses and other pleadings in a case. No evidence in the form of 
10 correspondence or testimony from the Defendants' paralegal staff was presented to the 
11 Court as to what, if any, correspondence was provided to the Plaintiff, with the 
12 exception of the affidavit in support of temporary spousal maintenance and the answers 
13 to interrogatories and production of documents. The Court will find that the Plaintiff's 
14 testimony that she did not receive these documents is the most credible testimony. 
15 Plaintiff and Stephen did meet a few weeks prior to the divorce trial with a 
16 mediator, Steve Beer, without counsel present, in an attempt to resolve some of the 
17 issues in this case. No evidence was presented as to what observations, if any, Steve 
18 Beer had as far as the Plaintiff's understanding of the issues during the mediation was 
19 presented to the Court. 
20 Approximately five days before the August 5, 2004 divorce trial date, the Plaintiff 
21 was involuntarily committed to a local mental health hospital. The Plaintiff advised 
22 Gatewood of this on July 2ih. Gatewood did not inquire of the Plaintiff where she had 
23 been hospitalized, for what reason or by what doctor. 
24 The Plaintiff testified generally that during the course of the divorce proceedings, 
25 she had very little memory of what was taking place because of her mental state and 
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the medications that she was taking. Sam Hoagland, who is both a licensed attorney 
2 and pharmacist, testified that the "cocktail" of medications that the Plaintiff was taking 
3 could have resulted in medication induced confusion on the part of the Plaintiff. 
4 The Plaintiff testified specifically that due to this lack of communication with her 
5 lawyer, her state of mind and her involuntary mental health hospitalization five days 
6 prior to the court date in which the property settlement agreement was presented to 
7 Judge Day, that she had little or no understanding of what was being presented to the 
8 divorce court on these issues. 
9 The parties on the day of the scheduled trial met, conversed and ultimately 
10 appeared before Judge David Day with a proposed decree of divorce and property 
11 settlement, listing assets and debts of the parties attached to that judgment and decree 
12 of divorce as set out in Plaintiff's Exhibit No.1 03. 
13 During the course of the proceedings, Judge Day asked each of the parties, Mr. 
14 Stephen, the plaintiff in that divorce proceeding and the Plaintiff, the defendant in that 
15 divorce proceeding, under oath, if they understood the settlement agreement and were 
16 they in agreement with the settlement. Mr. Stephen indicated he was. The Plaintiff 
17 indicated she was also in agreement "as far as I know." The decree was submitted to 
18 Judge Day and is Exhibit 103. 
19 Gatewood testified that when he dealt with the Plaintiff on the day of the divorce 
20 court appearance in which the property settlement agreement was reached that he 
21 found the Plaintiff to be clear in her thoughts and understanding of the proceedings and 
22 that he did not believe that she was impaired as a result of methamphetamine use 
23 and/or mental health issues. He testified that she appeared to be angry at the time. 
24 Although the Court cannot use the Code of Professional Conduct for attorneys 
25 as a basis for civil liability, clearly the Rules of Professional Conduct can be utilized to 
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at least define duty. 
2 Since the enactment of those rules on July 1, 2004, there have been added 
3 provisions that pertain to impaired clients. Specifically, Rule 1.14 deals with clients with 
4 diminished capacity. Subpart (b) sets out a lawyer who reasonably believes that a 
5 client has diminished capacity and is at risk of substantial financial or other harm unless 
6 action is taken and that client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, a 
7 lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action including consulting with 
8 individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and in 
9 appropriate cases, seek an appointment of guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. 
10 One of the comments in 1.14 discusses a reconsideration period to permit clarification 
11 of improvement of circumstances and that a lawyer may seek guidance from an 
12 appropriate diagnostician in determining the extent of client's diminished capacity. 
13 In this case, Gatewood readily conceded that he believed the Plaintiff was 
14 consuming methamphetamine and he knew that she had been hospitalized involuntarily 
15 just days before the divorce hearing. 
16 Cathy Naugle testified as the Plaintiff's expert as to the duty owed by an attorney 
17 to a client during the applicable time frame of these proceedings. Ms. Naugle, a well 
18 respected and experienced family law attorney and former magistrate judge who now 
19 primarily handles domestic relations cases, testified that in her opinion as an expert on 
20 this issue that there was a breach of that duty on the part of Gatewood by not seeking 
21 additional information about her mental state or seeking a guardian ad litem 
22 appointment for the Plaintiff when he became aware of the fact that the Plaintiff had 
23 been involuntarily hospitalized just days prior to negotiating the property settlement 
24 agreement. Considering that the standard for an involuntary mental hospitalization 
25 requires a finding by a court that the patient is mentally ill, likely to injure herself or 
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others or is gravely disabled due to mental illness; and lacks capacity to make informed 
2 decisions about treatment, the Court must concur with Ms. Naugle's opinion. 
3 Granted, the Plaintiff had been released from the involuntary commitment which 
4 can be an indication that the patient has been stabilized psychiatrically, that does not 
5 equate to a client being capable of understanding a legal proceeding that deals with the 
6 equitable division of property and the complexities of that process. Sam Hoagland's 
7 testimony though insightful as to how psychotropic medications can create problems for 
8 a patient, the Court cannot find that the Plaintiff was confused as a result of medication 
9 issues alone. Though this Court cannot make a finding from the evidence presented in 
10 this case that the Plaintiff was impaired to the pOint that she was incompetent, the Court 
11 can find from the evidence the Plaintiff was not in a state of mind to comprehend all of 
12 the issues she was facing in this litigation in a knowing and intelligent manner. 
13 When a client has been involuntarily hospitalized and the client's attorney has 
14 had to go to the client's home to communicate with that client on ten occasions, there is 
15 obviously a problem that should have been addressed by Gatewood either through 
16 contact with the Plaintiff's medical providers to determine her level of impairment or 
17 appointment of a guardian ad litem. In the alternative, Gatewood should have advised 
18 Judge Day of the recent hospitalization so that a continuance could have been granted 
19 to give the Plaintiff additional time to process these issues or for the appOintment of a 
20 guardian ad litem. This is clearly allowed under the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
21 not a violation of client confidences. Gatewood had more than ample information and 
22 personal observations that should have alerted as to his duty to inquire further about 
23 the Plaintiff's mental health status. 
24 Other than Gatewood's testimony, no other lawyer expert testified for the 
25 Defense on this issue of duty or for that matter any other aspect of the issue of 
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negligence. 
2 Even assuming the Plaintiff was not impaired, the issue of the investigation by 
3 Gatewood as to the valuation of the Crescent Rim property demonstrates an additional 
4 breach of duty on the part of Gatewood. 
5 Stephan initially placed a value of $500,000 on the property and the Plaintiff 
6 initially placed a value of $400,000 on the property. This is a significant disparity as 
7 testified to by Ms. Naugle. 
8 The evidence establishes that the Plaintiff was not advised by Gatewood that 
9 Stephan had placed a value of $500,000 on the Crescent Rim property. The Plaintiff 
10 was not aware of this even at the time of negotiations for the division of community real 
11 property. This is vital information to a party to divorce litigation because the higher 
12 value may have been the correct value for the property. 
13 Ms. Naugle testified as an expert on behalf of the Plaintiff that Gatewood failed 
14 to meet the applicable standard of care for an attorney practicing in 2003 and 2004 by 
15 not seeking a comparative market analysis of the Crescent Rim property. Even if the 
16 Plaintiff was short of funds, Ms. Naugle testified that a real estate agent, at little or no 
17 expense, could have shed more objective light on this real property valuation issue. As 
18 Ms. Naugle testified, this variance is too significant to rely on the client's information 
19 alone. 
20 What is of concern to the Court is that Stephen, who initially gave an opinion that 
21 the property was worth $500,000, was awarded the residence. Gatewood testified that 
22 he had heard from Stephen's attorney, Ann Shepard, that the Plaintiff was very 
23 knowledgeable about the fair market value of the residence. However, in light of the 
24 fact that the Plaintiff was possibly impaired from methamphetamine use and was, by 
25 Gatewoods's own notations in her file, showing signs of deterioration as to her mental 
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health, he breached the duty he owed to his client when he failed to investigate this 
2 critical valuation issue in this case. The $385,000 that the Plaintiff had subsequently 
3 indicated the property value on the Crescent Rim property to be worth was the valuation 
4 used in the calculation of the division of the community real property. 
5 In divorce cases deliberate undervaluation by a party is not at aJl uncommon 
6 especially when that party is requesting to be awarded that asset in the divorce action. 
7 In the event the property is awarded to that party in the divorce they may sell or dispose 
8 of that asset for the asset's actual higher value and gain a windfall. 
9 Gatewood testified that it is not at all uncommon in divorce proceedings for the 
10 parties to negotiate a property settlement based upon property values that they receive 
11 from their clients. In this case Gatewood did have a 1999 appraisal of the property 
12 provided to him by the Plaintiff. Cathy Naugle testified that this conduct by Gatewood 
13 of solely relying upon property valuations from clients, especiaJly where there is such a 
14 disparity in valuation, fell below the standard or duty for an attorney in this type of 
15 proceeding. The Court will find Cathy Naugle's testimony was credible and accurate in 
16 this regard and therefore the Court wiJl find that Gatewood breached the applicable 
17 standard of care as a lawyer practicing in 2003 and 2004 by not investigating the value 
18 of the real property when there was such a disparity in valuation by the parties. 
19 The Court then wiJl find that because of Gatewood's failure to properly 
20 investigate the fair market value of the property along with the correct amount of 
21 indebtedness owing against the property, coupled with the Plaintiff's questionable 
22 mental health status, that the Plaintiff, as a proximate result of Gatewood's breach of 
23 duty on all of these issues, did not receive an equitable award of community real 
24 property. 
25 The damages issue in this case is clouded in part due to the fact that only 
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portions of the property distribution in the divorce were addressed in the Plaintiff's 
2 damage claims. 
3 Gatewood contends that the settlement agreement was the best that the Plaintiff 
4 could expect and that based upon the appraisal testimony by his experts the Plaintiff 
5 suffered no damages. 
6 Gatewood's first position is that the "beach house" was separate property of 
7 Stephen and because this was included as community property, the Plaintiff received a 
8 $42,500 community share that she should not have received. The problem with this 
9 position is that Stephan from the outset of this litigation listed the beach house as a 
10 community asset. For this Court to award this as an offset against damages would go 
11 against the clear evidence that this real property was in fact a community asset. 
12 Gatewood also testified that there were concerns about not only the boyfriend, and not 
13 only an inappropriate lifestyle, but there had been an ongoing waste of community 
14 assets. Gatewood went on to testify that these were the balancing issues that took 
15 place in this divorce settlement process and that the Plaintiff received a favorable 
16 settlement in this case. Again, there was no credible evidence presented that 
17 demonstrated that the Plaintiff wasted community assets and that this should be an 
18 offset as to the real property division. 
19 As to the issue of damages, the Plaintiff called William Schultz to testify that 
20 based upon his appraisal of the premises, the premises was worth $458,000 at the time 
21 of the property settlement agreement in August of 2004 rather than the $385,000 set 
22 forth in the property settlement. 
23 Gatewood called two appraisers who opined that the property had a value 
24 between $275,000 and $400,000. The Court will find that the fair market value of the 
25 residence at the time of the divorce in August of 2004 was $440,000. The Court bases 
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this on fact that the Defense witnesses correctly pointed out that some of the 
2 comparable properties utilized by William Schultz in his appraisal were not of like value 
3 and location thus resulting in a higher valuation than established by accepted appraisal 
4 standards. 
5 There was testimony presented that in the course of the divorce there were 
6 negotiations between the parties and that based upon the total assets and the total 
7 debts, that Stephen received a net $67,870 amount over and above what the Plaintiff 
8 received as a result of the settlement agreement. However, Stephen paid $2000 a 
9 month to the Plaintiff for a course of 24 months or $48,000 as an equalization payment 
10 to the Plaintiff, which she has received. 
11 There was a claim in this case that there was a $28,000 judgment lien against 
12 the Crescent Rim property that should not have been listed as a debt in the 
13 presentation to Judge Day. Exhibit 117, the $28,000 indebtedness against the Crescent 
14 Rim property as set out in the decree of divorce had in fact been paid nearly two 
15 months prior to the divorce tria/. The Plaintiff indicated that she did not know the status 
16 of this debt when she answered the request for discovery in Exhibit 108. Other than the 
17 list of debts set forth in Exhibit A attached to the divorce decree and Stephan's answer 
18 to Interrogatory No.3, no other investigation was done by Gatewood to determine the 
19 status of this debt. Gatewood should have obtained documentation as to this debt prior 
20 to the s~ttlement agreement. 
21 In this case, the Court has found that there was an under-evaluation of the 
22 Crescent Rim property in the amount of $55,000 and in addition a $28,000 debt that 
23 should not have been included in the debt division in the decree. Thus the total amount 
24 of the damages brought about by Gatewood's breach of duty was $83,000. The 
25 Plaintiff, being entitled to half of that, the gross damages total $41,500.00 
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1 However, the Plaintiff received an offset that exceeded the original calculations 
2 as set forth in the decree of divorce. The Plaintiff received payments of $2,000 a month 
3 for two years and this was in light of the difference between the net community assets 
4 received by Mr. Stephen in the divorce proceeding versus those received by the Plaintiff 
5 in the divorce proceeding. The actual equalization was $33,935 (1/2 of $67,870), when 
6 in fact the Plaintiff received $48,000 thus there was $14,065 paid in excess of the 
7 equalization. The Court will find that this is an offset against the $41,500.00 in 
8 damages. Thus the Plaintiff has established in this case that she was damaged in the 
9 amount of $27,435.00. 
10 JUDGMENT 
11 THEREFORE, the Court will find that Plaintiff has prevailed in these proceedings 
12 and is entitled to a judgment in the amount of $27,435.00. Counsel for the Plaintiff will 
13 prepare a judgment reflecting the Court's findings. The judgment will reflect Scott 
14 Gatewood and Sallaz and Gatewood Chartered as the Defendants that are responsible 
15 for this judgment. Dennis Sallaz in his individual capacity will not be listed as a 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
defendant for purposes of the damage award. 
DATED this 3 day of October, 2008. 
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ICHAEL McLAUG 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
2 ./?n:1 
I hereby certify that on the:5 day of October 2008, I mailed (served) a true 
3 
4 
and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
5 Eric R. Clark 
6 THE REAL ESTATE LAW GROUP 
PO Box 2504 
7 Eagle, 1083616 
8 John Prior 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
9 16 12th Ave S, Ste 113 
10 Nampa, 1083651-3962 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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./ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., 
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT 
GATEWOOD, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV OC 0614241 
JUDGMENT 
The Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on October 3, 
2008, and therein directed the entry of Judgment for the Plaintiff. In accordance with the Court's 
decision on October 3,2008, Judgment according to Rule 58(a), IRCP, is hereby entered for the 
Plaintiff Stephen and against Defendants Gatewood and Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD,jointIy and 
severally; and these Defendants alone, and not Defendant Dennis Sallaz individually, are 
responsible for the Plaintiff's damages of $27,435.00. 
DATED this d S day of November, 2008. 
~ ichael R. McLaughlin 
District Judge 
JUDGMENT -1 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I day ofWevsmeer;2008, I caused to be 
served in the manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
JOHN PRIOR 
LA W OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR 
16 12th Avenue South, Suite 113 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
CHARLES C. CRAFT 
CRAFTS LAW, INC. 
410 S. Orchard, Ste. 120 
Boise, ID 83705 
ERIC CLARK 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
US Mail 
US Mail 
US Mail 
Clerk of the DiStfiCtCOllft" 
JUDGMENT - 2 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS ) 
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross ) 
Respondents. ) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 36322-2009 
'Ada County Docket No. 2006-14241 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant on December 22, 2009. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent/Cross-Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT 
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the 
document listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
l. Answer and Counterclaim (Plaintiffs Exhibit 102), file-stamped June 20, 2003. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents 
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS: 
1. Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff, file-stamped January 17, 
2007; 
2. Affidavit of Eric R. Clark, file-stamped January 17,2007; 
3. Affidavit of Robert A. Wallace, file-stamped January 17,2007; and 
4. Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff, file-
stamped March 16, 2007. 
DATED this Lday of December 2009. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
/'-'StePhen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
NO. copy 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, ISB No. 1053 
A.&t __ 'iI -
-JUN 20 28D:3 G. SCOIT GATEWOOD, ISB No. 5982 SALlAZ & GATEWOOD, CHID. 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 8956 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
J. DAVID NAVARAQ f"iA~ 
8y BJ KNAPP 1~" 
CE?lrr-( 
Telepbone: (208) 336-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFADA 
GARY ALLEN STEPHEN, ) 
) 
PJaintifflCounterdefendant, ) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
PAMELA KATHERINE STEPHEN, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV DR 0301151 D 
ANSWER 
AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through her attorney, Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd., and in answer to Plaintiffs Complaint filed herein, admits, denies and avers as 
follows: 
1. Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not specifically 
admitted herein. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations as stated in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. I 
3. Defendant denies the allegation in paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and 
affIrmatively alleges that Plaintiffhas been forced to retain the firm ofSallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd. to protect her interests herein and that Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
As and for a counterclaim against Plaintiff, Defendant alleges as follows: 
1. The parties were married to one another on the 17tb day of December, 1976, at Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho, and have been, and now are husband and wife. The parties resided 
together as husband and wife in Idaho. 
2. There has been cine (1) child born as issue of the marriage who is now an adult. 
3. That dming the marriage of the parties, they have accumulated community propert'j 
which should be equitably divided between the parties. 
4. That during the marriage of the parties, they have incurred certain community debts 
which should be equitably divided between the parties. 
5. That Defendant/Counterclaimant lacks sufficient property to provide for her 
reasonable needs and due to physical and emotional limitations is unable to support herself 
through employment. 
6. That there is a substantial disparity of the incomes of the parties and that Plaintiff! 
Counterdefendant should be ordered to pay to DefendantiCounterclairnant, monthly 
maintenance to meet the reasonable needs of the DefendantiCountercIaimant. 
7. That Defendant is without funds to retam an attorney to prosecute this action; that 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 2 
she has employed Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. and Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to 
Defendant, as and for her attorney fees herein, the sum of $1200.00, plus costs, should this 
action be Wlcontested and such sum as the Court may deem reasonable if said action is 
contested. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for Judgment against the Plaintiff as follows: 
A. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore and now existing between the parties 
hereto be dissolved and forever set aside and that Defendant be granted an absolute Decree 
of Divorce from Plaintiff herein on the groWlds of irreconcilable differences. 
B. That the Court order an equitable division of the commWlity property of the 
parties hereto. 
C. That the parties' community debts should be equitably divided between them. 
D. That Plaintiff be ordered to pay to Defendant, as and for maintenance support, the 
sum of$2,500 per month in addition to an amount reasonable for Defendant's mortgage. for 
a period ofthe Defendant's life from the date hereof. 
E. That Plaintiff be ordered to pay to Defendant, as and for her attorney fees herein, 
the sum of$1200.00, plus costs, should this action be Wlcontested and such sum as the Court 
, 
may deem reasonable if said action is contested; and 
F. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just. 
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(' 
DATED This d...O day of June, 2003. 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'" ') I hereby certify that on the~ day of June, 2003 ..• I caused to be served a tme 
and correct copy of the above and forgoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following. 
Ann K. Shepard 
Shepard Law Offices, PLLC 
200 N. Front Street, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
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__ U.S. Mail 
_~ Hand Delivered 
~ Via Fax: (208) 429-1100 
